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Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff
Daniel S. Fuchs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control,

CASE NO. CV 2009-3914
(Consolidated with Case No. CV 20094185)
AFFIDA VIT OF BRIAN DONESLEY
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DANIEL S. FUCHS,
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Control,
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OR!

Y

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss.
)

BRIAN DONESLEY, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

Affiant is the attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced action and has

personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit.
2.

Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE LIQUOR CONTROL CODE, November
2000, published by the State of Michigan, Liquor Control Commission, Michigan Department of
Consumer and Industry Services.
3.

Further, your Affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this

'). \0

day of November, 2009.
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c< ( , 1

Brian Donesley
Attomey for Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me,

.
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day of November, 2009.
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Commission expires: /1-..;.:;;Jf/.S
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 20 th day of November, 2009, I hereby celiify that I served the above document on
the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to the following party by method indicated
below:

Cheryl Meade, Deputy A.G.
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642-6202

] U.S. Mail
] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ X] Facsimile (884-7228)
I

/

'::YicLc
f'rvo··&"i (!tvcrl!J~~
Barbi McCary Crowell
I

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN DONESLEY

Page 3 of3

I

.~

U

THE MICHIGAN LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION

&
LOCAL UNITS OF GOVERNMENT

A Guide to the Rights and Responsibilities of Local
Governments under the' Liquor Control Code
November, 2000

Michigan Department of Consumer and Industry Services (CIS)
John Engler, Governor
Kathleen M. Wilbur, Department Director
"Serving Michigan ... Serving You"
www.cis.state.mi.us

E)GilB~T__'_ _

.:U

j ,

Table of Contents
Preface

-i-

Licensing - On-premises
Escrowed Licenses

2

The Quota System

3

Permits

6

Local Approval

8

Test Yourself: On-premises retail licenses

11

Licensing - Off-premises

12

Local Approval

13

Test Yourself: Off-premises retail licenses

14

Objection to Renewal & Revocation of a License

16

Test Yourself: Objection to Renewal or Revocation of
a license

18

Enforcement of Michigan Liquor Laws

19

Responsibility for Licensing Activities

21

The Liquor Law Violation Administrative Process

21

Possible Actions Against Licensees under the Liquor
Control Code

22

Independent Criminal Complaint

22

Training in Liquor Law: Classes & Publications

22

Law Enforcement Officials Prohibited from Holding a
Liquor License

23

Test Yourself: Enforcement of Liquor Laws

23

The Department of Consumer & Industry Services will not discriminate against any
individual or group because of sex, religion, age, national origin, color, marital status,
disability or political affiliation. If you need assistance with reading, writing, hearing, etc.,
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, you may make your needs known to this
agency.

Liquor Control Commission Offices Phone/FAX

Tear-out page

I

U

LC-PU 8-0020

11/00

Total Copies: 1800 Total Cost: $1,090 Cost Per Copy: $0.61

U

1

Preface
The hospitality industry in Michigan is a dynamic one that brings jobs and good will to our
state and contributes to economic growth. Holding a license to sell alcoholic beverages is
often considered an important component of being competitive and profitable within the
industry.
Local units of government - cities, townships and villages - and the Michigan Liquor
Control Commission (MLCC) work together in both the licensing process and in the
enforcement of the state's liquor laws. Whether you are a city or village council member, a
township board member or a local law enforcement official or officer, this guide is
designed to help you understand how the licensing process works and your role in granting
specific liquor licenses and permits. Additionally, when a local governmental unit is
considering adopting a resolution objecting to the renewal of a license or requesting the
MLCC to revoke a license, the unit should be aware of the documentation that must be
submitted with the resolution. Finally, this guide explains the Commission's position on the
responsibilities that local governments have for the enforcement of liquor laws. Obviously,
the local government's attorney should be consulted about these matters.
We also provide Questions and Answers to show how the laws and rules are applied in
real situations. It may be useful for you to refer to more complete language of the statute or
court cases, so references have been provided. MCl refers to the Michigan Compiled
Laws; MAC refers to the Michigan Administrative Code which contains the administrative
rules promulgated by the MLCC.
The Commission believes that when local officials have a better understanding of their
rights and responsibilities under the Liquor Control Code, our working relationship will be
improved with you as well as with applicants and licensees. We must caution however,
that this Guide is not intended to be a substitute for the Liquor Control Code and
Administrative Rules, or for competent legal counsel.
We welcome your comments and suggestions for future editions of this Guide. Send them
to the Commission's Lansing office at the address printed in the back cover. You are also
invited to attend our semi annual public hearings where we receive comments from the
public on the administration of the Liquor Control Code. The meeting dates are published
on our web site at
_
The Michigan Liquor Control Commission
November 2000
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Licensing
This chapter, directed primarily to members of local government legislative bodies, provides
information designed to answer the most commonly asked questions about the on-premises
licensing process including types of licenses and the quota system for licenses to sell alcoholic
beverages. It also describes the role of the local legislative body and local law enforcement
officials in the licensing process.

On-premises Licenses
These licenses are issued to allow alcoholic beverages to be sold, served and consumed on the
premises of the licensed business:
! Class C

This license allows the business to sell beer, wine, liquor and mixed spirit drink for
consumption on the premises. MCl 436.1107(2)

! Club

This license enables a private club to sell beer, wine, liquor and mixed spirit drink
to bona fide members only. MCl 436.1107(3)

! B Hotel

This license permits a hotel to sell beer, wine, liquor and mixed spirit drink for
consumption on the premises and in the rooms of bona fide guests.
MCl 436.1107(9)

! A Hotel

This license allows a hotel to sell only beer and wine for consumption on the
premises and in the rooms of bona fide guests. MCl436.1107(8)

! Tavern

This license enables a business to sell only beer and wine for consumption on the
premises. MCl 436.1113(1)

! Brewpub

This license is issued in conjunction with an on-premises license and authorizes
the licensee to manufacture and sell beer for consumption on the premises or for
take-out. MCl436.1105(11)

! Micro
Brewer

This manufacturing license allows a business to sell beer produced on
the premises to consumers for consumption on the premises or for take-out. MCl
436.1109(2)

!Wine
Maker

This manufacturing license allows a business to sell wine produced on
the premises in a restaurant for consumption on or off the premises.

! Special
License

This license (often called a "24-hour license") allows a non-profit
organization to sell beer, wine and/or liquor for consumption on the premises
for a limited period of time. This includes wine auctions for charities.
MCl436.1111(10)

! Resorts

In the years permitted by law, the Commission can issue a limited number of
Resort licenses for any of the on-premises classifications except Club and Special
licenses, in addition to the quota established by law for these licenses. MCl
436.1531

U 1

An on-premises licensee often holds a Specially Designated Merchant (SDM) license to sell beer and wine
for consumption off the premises, in conjunction with the on-premises license.

Summary of On-premises License Information
On-premises
License Type:

Sell
Beer?

Sell
Wine?

Sell
Liquor
?

Licensed to sell to:

Population
Quota Applies?

Class C

Yes

Yes

Yes

General Public

Yes

Resort Class C

Yes

Yes

Yes

General Public

No

Club

Yes

Yes

Yes

Club Members

No

B-Hotel

Yes

Yes

Yes

General Public and in guest
rooms

Yes

Resort B-Hotel

Yes

Yes

Yes

General Public and in guest
rooms

No

A-Hotel

Yes

Yes

No

General Public and in guest
rooms

Yes

Resort A-Hotel

Yes

Yes

No

General Public and in guest
rooms

No

Tavern

Yes

Yes

No

General Public

Yes

Resort Tavern

Yes

Yes

No

General Public

No

Special License

Yes

Yes

Yes

Generlal Public

No

Transferability of Escrowed Licenses
On-premises escrowed licenses issued under MCl 436.1531 are available subject to local
legislative approval under section 501 (2) to an applicant whose proposed operation is located
within any local governmental unit in a county with a population of under 500,000 or a county with
a population of over 700,000 in which the escrowed licehse was located. If the local
governmental unit within which the former licensee's premises were located spans more than 1
county, an escrowed license is available subject to local approval to an applicant whose
proposed operation is located within any local governmental unit in either county.
If an escrowed license is activated within a local governmental unit other than that local
governmental unit within which the escrowed license was originally issued, the Commission
shall count that activated license against the local governmental unit originally issuing the
license. The upgrading of a license resulting from a request under MCl 436.1531 (1) involving
the transfer of an escrowed license, shall be approved by the local governmental unit having
jurisdiction.

2

The Quota System
A quota system exists for retail licenses in order to control the growth of licensed businesses
selling alcohol beverages in the state. Simply put, quotas have been established by the
legislature based on a ratio of licenses to population. Pi change in the demographics of a
municipality, whether an increase or decrease, can change the number of licenses available.
There are no quota restrictions for Specially Designated Merchants (SDMs).
The population ratios the Commission uses are different for on-premises and off-premises
licenses. For on-premises licenses, one license is granted for each 1,500 of population or major
fraction thereof. For off-premises licenses (SOD), one liCense is granted for every 3,000 in
population or any fraction thereof. Examples of the ratios are:
!

On-premises

Off-premises

Population

#of
licenses

Population

# of
licenses

1- 2,250

1

1-3,000

1

2,251- 3,750

2

3,001- 6,000

2

3,751- 5,250

3

6,001- 9,000

3

5,251

4 etc.

9,001-12,000

4 etc.

local units of government have an important role to play:in the issuing of quota licenses. For
example, in the case of an on-premises license, approval is required from a local governmental
unit with a population of less than 750,000. In the case of off-premises licenses, local approval
is not required but the Commission requires license applicants to meet all appropriate local
ordinances, including zoning requirements. There are exceptions to quotas when issuing certain
types of licenses. For more detailed information see MCl 436.1531 and MCl 436.1533.
Any of the conditions below can change the number of licenses available within a local unit of
government. The MLCC will notify the clerk of the legislative body if:
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

A special or regular census, or annexation, makes additional licenses available.
A canceled or revoked license creates an opening ;in the number of licenses available.
An applicant who is approved by the MLCC does n'ot subsequently submit required documents and
the license is not issued.
An approved applicant does not subsequently opern the licensed business within one year of
approval and fails to obtain required extensions.
The number of unissued but available licenses declines because the population decreases.

Filling Quota Openings
The legislative body of the local governmental unit has the responsibility of determining whether
to fill the quota opening for on-premises licenses. If yes, ~nd there are a number of applicants
for the available Iicense(s), then you must send the Commission a resolution as to which
person was approved "above all others" for the available Iicense(s). Refer to the sample
resolution at the end of this section.
The Liquor Control Commission cannot approve an application for an on-premises license
subject to the quota, without an approval resolution from the local legislative body. However,
there is no statutory requirement that a local unit of government must approve any application or

3

authorize issuing all or
available under the:quota.
The applicants approved by the local legislative body will also go through the MLCC investigation
process prior to consideration by the Commission for a license. This investigation is thorough
and concentrates on the applicant's (including partnerships and corporations) qualifications for
the license requested.

Waiving the SDD Quota
The Commission may waive the quota requirement if it has been filled and there is no existing
SOD license issued within two miles of the proposed location measured along the nearest traffic
route. MCl 436.1533
The Commission can also waive the quota requirement if all of the following conditions are met:
A.
8.

C.

the city, township, or village has a population of less than 3,000 and
the only existing SOD license is held in comjunction with an on-premises A-Hotel or 8Hotel license, and
no other waivers have been granted in the local governmental unit. MAC R 436.1135(6)

On-premises Licenses Exempt from Quota Restrictions
Development District Authorities
A "development district" is any of the following (MCl 436.1521 (9)) :
1.
2.
3.
4.

An authority district established under the tax increment finance authority act, 1980 PA 450, MCl
125.1801 to 125.1830.
An authority district established under the local development financing act, 1986 PA 281, MCl
125.2151 to 125.2174.
A downtown district established under 1975 PA 197, MCl 125.1651 to 125.1681.
A principal shopping district established under 1961 PA 120, MCl 125.981 to 125.987, before
January 1, 1996.

Under MCl 436.1521 the Commission may issue up to 50 tavern or Class C licenses in addition
to the number of licenses provided by quota, to persons or businesses that meet the following
requirements:
A)
8)
C)
D)
E)

The business is a full service restaurant, is open to the public, and prepares food on the premises.
The business is open for food service not less than 10 hours per day, 5 days a week.
At least 50% of the gross receipts of the business are derived from the sale of food for consumption
on the premises. Food does not include beer or wine sales.
The business has dining facilities to seat not less than 25 persons.
The business is located in a development district with a population of not more than 50,000 in
which the authority, after a public hearing, has found that the issuance of the license would prevent
further deterioration within the development district and promote economic growth within the
development district. The commission will not issu,e a license as outlined in section 521 unless the
local unit of government within which the authority is located, after holding a public hearing, passes
a resolution concurring on the findings of the authority.

Also, the Commission will not issue a license under section 521 if the local governmental unit
within which the development district is located has not issued all appropriate on-premises
licenses available under quota or if an appropriate on-premises escrowed license is readily
available in any local unit of government in which the development district is located. The
Commission shall not issue more than 2 licenses authorized under section 521 in any city or
municipality with a population greater than 50,000. If an applicant's proposed location is within
more than 1 development district, the applicant shall obtain the approval of both or all of the
4
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applicable local units of

ent or development districts.

Resort Licenses
Resort licenses may be issued for Class C, Tavern, B-Hotel and A-Hotel classifications without
regard to the quota only when it is deemed to be econornically desirable and beneficial to the
tourist industry. Resort licenses are subject to approval by the local legislative body and must
meet the qualifications for both the type of regular license requested and as a Resort.
There are several types of on-premises resort licenses authorized under MCl 436.1531 :
A.

550 on-premises resort licenses which are transferrable to any location in Michigan. All of these
licenses have currently been issued, but their ownership and location is transferrable.

B.

The Commission may issue not more than 10 additional licenses in years designated by statute to
establishments whose business and operation is designed to attract and accommodate tourists
and visitors to the resort area, whose primary purpose is not the sale of alcoholic liquor and whose
capital investment in the licensed premises is at least $75,000. These licenses may be transferred
from one owner to another but cannot be moved (location).

C.

In addition to A and B above, up to 20 additional licenses for resort economic development may be
issued to applicants who demonstrate that they meet the criteria above and have a minimum
investment of $1,500,000. These licenses may be transferred from one owner to another but
cannot be moved (location).

Other Licenses Not Subject to Quota
Public and County-owned airports, municipal civic centers or civic auditoriums, private,
non-profit clubs and municipal golf courses are not subject to quota restrictions. A
limited number of speCial purpose licenses are also available to well established nonprofit organizations with university affiliation wheril the event is held on campus (art
expos, outdoor festivals) and to National or Interrlational sporting events hosted by a city.

Publicly Owned Airports
An on-premises license may be issued by the Commission to the owner and/or lessee of
buildings within a passenger terminal complex of:a publicly-owned airport. The airport
must be served by regularly scheduled commercial passenger airlines certified by the
Federal Aviation Agency or the Civil Aeronautics ~oard to enplane and deplane
passengers. These licenses are not transferrable. MCl436.1507

County Airports
An on-prernises license may be issued by the Commission to an establishment situated
on property where there is an airport that is owned by the county or in which the county
has an interest. MCl 436.1531 (1 0)

Municipally Owned Golf Courses
An on-premises license may be issued by the Commission to a golf course open to the
public and owned by a county, city, township or village situated in a county with a
population of 1 ,000,000 or more. These licenses are not transferrable. MCl 436.1515
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Municipal Civic Center or

c Auditorium

On-premises licenses may be issued by the Commission to the governing or operating
body of a municipal civic center or civic auditorium and/or one or more of its
concessionaires for the service of alcoholic beverages at scheduled events. In order to
obtain this type of license, the civic center or auditorium must be located within a city or
township having a population of at least 9,500. The facility must be owned and operated
as a municipal enterprise. Additionally, the local legislative body must authorize the
governing body or its concessionaire to apply to the Commission for a license. These
licenses may not be issued to an educational institution or a facility operated in
connection with an educational institution and are not transferrable. MCl436.1509

Club
A Club license enables a private club to sell beer, wine, liquor and mixed spirit drinks to
bona fide members only. MCl436.1537(d)

National or International Sporting Event Licenses
A maximum of 40 licenses may be issued for a period of not more than 30 days. The
premises to be licensed must be in the central business district of a city having a
population of 70,000 or more and the city must be the official host of the national or
international sporting event. The governing bodyof the city must recommend the number
of licenses to be issued in the theme area(s) and must provide a list of the applicants
and locations with certification that premises to be licensed meet applicable state and
local building, safety, and health laws and ordinances. MCl436.1517

College/University (with Hospitality Program) Hotel and Conference Center Licenses
An on-premises license may be issued by the Commission to the governing board of a
college or university operating a conference center for the sale of alcoholic beverages at
regularly scheduled conference center activities only. The conference center, with
certain exceptions, must have meeting rooms, banquet areas, social halls, overnight
accommodations and related facilities for special activities scheduled by the college or
university. MCl 436.1513

Permits
Banquet Facility Permits
Banquet Facility Permits are extensions of on-premises licenses for the purpose of
serving alcoholic beverages at a facility used only for scheduled functions and events.
This permit does not affect the quota for on-premises licenses even if issued in a
governmental unit other than that in which the license is issued. Approval of the local
legislative body in which the facility is located is required. MCl 436.1522

Special Activity Permits
The information on the following pages describes special activity permits which can be issued
with the different types of retail liquor licenses. These activities may not be allowed on a
licensed premises without having the appropriate special activity permit.
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PERMIT
TYPE

DESCRIPTION I ACTIVITY

ISSUED TO

Sunday
Sales

On-Premises: Class C, Club Allows Sunday sales of spirits between the hours of 12
S-Hotel
noon and 12 midnight. Subject 10 these restrictions :
I Sunday sales must be legal in the local unit of
government.
Off-Premises: SOD
, Gross sales of spirits must be less than 50% of the
gross sales of the entire business, Including beer anI
Resorts : Class C, B-Hotel,
SOD
wine.

Uving
Quarters

On-Premises : Class C,
Tavern

Allows living quarters to be direclly connected to the
licensed premises.

Off-Premises: SOD, SoM
Resorts: Class C, Tavern,
SOD, SOM
Direct
Connection
Authorization

All types of retail licenses

ReqUired to connect the licensed business with any
unlicensed area not under the direct control of the
licensee.

After Hours
Food

All On-Premises licenses
IncludIng resorts

Allows the business to stay open for the sale of food
between 2:30 a.m. and 7 a.m. Monday through
Saturday or between 2:30 a.m. and noon on Sunday.
The business must operate a full service kitchen . Th ~
licensee must specify the hours requested . Sales or
consumption of any alcoholic beverages are not allov ed
during these hours.
Approval of local law enforcement Is required.

Dance

All On-Premises licenses
Including Resorts

Allows dancing by patrons . The dance floor must be at
least 100 feet square, well defined, clearly marked, a d
un-obstructed when customer dancing is permitted.
Approval of local police and teglslative body is requir d
In all other areas.
Activities allowed by this permit may only be conduct! d
during the legal hours for sale and consumption of
alcoholic beverages .

En te rtainment

All On-Premises licenses
Including Resorts

Allows dancing by employees or contract entertainer
or for monologues, dialogues , motion pictures, still
slides, closed circuit television, contests, or other
performances for public viewing. Does not allow dane ng
by patrons.
Not required for orchestra playing, piano playing, or
playing of other musical instruments, or for the showi 9
of publicly broadcast television .
Police and local legislative body approval is requ ired
except in Detroit where only police approval is requir« d .
Activities allowed by this permit may only be conduclE d
during the legal hours for sale and consumption of
alcoholic beverages .
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PERMIT
TYPE

DESCRIPTION I ACTIVITY

ISSUED TO

Topless
Activity

All On-Premises licenses
including Resorts

Allows entertainment or work related activity performl d
on the licensed premises in which the female breast
area is exposed by any means Including see-through
clothing or body stockings.
Except in Detroit, this permit must be approved by bo h
the local law enforcement agency and governmental
unit.

Golf

All On-Premises licenses
including Resorts

Allows the lice nsed premises to be occupied for
registering golfers before the legal hour of 7:00 a.m. pn
weekdays and between 2:30 a.m. and noon on Sund y
Alcoholic beverages cannot be sold or consumed on h e
premises during this period . licensed premises mus
be adjacent to the golf course . Local police investiga 0 n
and approval Is also required .

Additional Bar

Class C, B-Hotel, Class C
Resort, B-Hotel Resort

Required for each bar over one on the licensed
premises at which custo mers ma y purchase alcohol ic
beverages . :
Local law enforcement investigation and approval is Iso
re qu ired . Additional Bar Permits are not required for iA
Hote ls , Clubs and Tave rns .

Bowling

Bowling alleys with any OnPremises license

Allows bowling on the licensed premises before or afiel
the legal hours . The licensee must specify the hours 0
operation . Alcoholic beverages may not be sold or
consumed during these hours. Local law enforcemen
Investigation and approval is also required

Outdoor
Service

All On-Premises Licensees
including Resorts

Allows the sale and consumption of alcoholic bevera( es
in a well-defined and marked area adjacent to the
licensed premises . Local law enforcement invesligati( n
and approval is also required .

Ski

All On-Premises licensees
including Resorts

Allows the licensed premises to be occupied for the
registration of skiers before or after the legal hours.
Alcoholic beverages may not be sold or consumed 01
the premises during the period of the permit.

Miscellaneous

Specific purpose permits may be issued for other types of un ique circums tan ces (i.
tennis or ra cquetball) which require the p~emises to be occupied at other than the Ie gal
hour. These requests are considered on an individual basis.

Local Approval
Legislative Body and Law Enforcement
In local governmental units with a population of less than 750,000 , approval of the local legislative
body is required for ali on-premises licenses (both new and transfers ) except Club and Special
licenses. Approval of the local legislative body is also required for Dance , Entertainment,
Topless Activity and Banquet Facility permits issued to licensees authorizing certain activities on
the licensed premises . Approval and recommendation of the chief local law enforcement officer
having jurisdiction is also part of the licensing process for all licenses and permits where only
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police approval is required.

436.1501 and 1916, and MAC R436.1

The chart below shows which types of on-premises licenses and permits require local
legislative body approval, and which require only local law enforcement investigation.

Summary of Local Approvals Required for On-premises Licenses and Permits:
Type of On-premises License:

Local Legislative Approval?

Local Law Enforcement
Investigation Required?

Class C & Resort Class C
Club
B-Hotel and Resort B-Hotel
A-Hotel and Resort A-Hotel
Tavern and Resort Tavern
Special (24-hour)

Yes - except Detroit 1
Yes - except Detroit 1
Yes - except Detroit 1
Yes - except Detroit 1
No - except on state military bases

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Specific Purpose Permit
Food, Golf, Bowling, Ski 3

No

Yes

Type of On-premises Permit

Local Legislative Approval?

Local Law Enforcement
Investigation Required?

Dance
Entertain ment
Topless Activity
Banquet Facility Permit
Additional Bar
No
Outdoor Service
Living Quarters
Direct Connection to Unlicenseft:lo
premises

Yes 2 Yes 2 Yes 2 Yes No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

N02

Type of On-premises Permit

except in
except in
except in
except in

Detroit 1
Detroit 1
Detroit 1
Detroit 1
Yes

Yes

No
Yes

Sunday Sales Legal hours of sale on Sundays are from 1Q:00 noon until 2:00 a.m. of the next day, unless
locally prohibited. 4 Individual governmental units may prohibit the sale of alcoholic liquor on
Sundays by resolution or ordinance, but local approval is not needed specifically for a
Sunday Sales permit. By state law, beer and wine may be sold after 12:00 noon on
Sunday without special authorization however, sales may be prohibited locally by
referendum.
1- Because of the number of licensed establishments in the city of Detroit, it has a specialized liquor investigation
process which includes technical approvals for zoning and ordinance investigation. Therefore, the local
legislative approval requirement has been waived for Detroit by MCl 436.1501.
2 - Although Club licenses do not require legislative body approval,local approval is needed for Dance,
Entertainment and Topless Activity permits issued to Clubs. Clubs must meet all local zoning and code
requirements. MCl 436.1916 and MAC R436.11 05(3)
3 -Restaurants and similar establishments may receive permission from the MlCC to operate for a specific
purpose (such as registering golfers) at other hours as long as all alcoholic beverages are sold Q.Q)y,during legal
hours. MAC R436.1437
4 - Any questions on local referenda for liquor sales should be referred to the Commission because of the
complexity of the laws and relevant court cases.
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legislative Body
When legislative body approval is required, contact the MLCC to obtain the necessary forms.

Sample of Approval Resolution:
The local legislative body must take action before the license application can be submitted to the
Commission for consideration. All applications for transfer of ownership or new permits,
in particular, should receive immediate consideration by the local government so that
the transaction is not unduly delayed.
NOTE: The MLCC will not accept conditional approvals except for the case where a local
legislative body is waiting for final approvals from building or health inspectors. If the local
government has no other objections to the application then approval can be accomplished by
having the local law enforcement approval made subject to final inspection(s). The MLCC can
also make its approval subject to final inspection by local law enforcement officials, thereby
avoiding delay of the licensing process caused by the local legislative body having to pass a
second, unconditional approval resolution prior to the issuance of the liquor license.
Club Licenses
As a courtesy to local governmental units, the Commission will contact you when an application
for a new club license is received. Public notice of the intent of the Commission to issue the
club license must be given by the club through publication in a newspaper of general circulation
within the local governmental unit jurisdiction at least 10 days before the license is issued. The
courts have ruled that this public notice is required in lieu of approval of the local legislative body.
If you object to a club license
application, you must notify
tc;+otYl(JIII<t
_t:M:.p
G(•.
the Commission of the reason
for your objection within 15
business days after receiving
~ i ",10g Ci:'l toon,n
,I _ _ ·;..,-;,,·.........
our notice. The reasons must
..,"' .... "';"I:\'~ .. _ _ _ DI1 _..'!...~.u. n~l
WI e,Ci] ~ .• '"
be based upon the
Commission's licensing
qualification rules or based on
Jd. t. COl"jlorn !tn t., ...... ~. n [f:f t 0 .. , ~
violation of building codes, health
11, •• U t~ b. lC .. tld It ~ •• E. ~~r St_t,
codes or zoning ordinances
(Refer to MAC R436.11 05).
Copies of relevant local codes or
ordinances (and of violations and
'Y .. "
convictions) should also be sent
to the MLCC with your objection.
l,4toioaA4 Q(PiJl:TIoIIfH" ;)~
·:o'lTAa~
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Ordinance Prohibiting Retail
Sale of Alcoholic Beverages
MCl 436.2109
In addition to the previously
mentioned local and county
options that may be exercised
relative to the sale of alcoholic
beverages, a city, township or
village may adopt an ordinance
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that prohibits all retail sales of
holic beverages within their borders.
ordinance may
only be adopted if there are no existing licenses issued within the local governmental
unit for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. This includes licenses for the retail sale of
alcoholic beverages for consumption both on and off the premises.
This ordinance must be submitted to the electorate at the next general or special election that is
held. However, the election may not be less than 45 days after the adoption of the ordinance.
In the event the electorate affirms the ordinance, the Commission is prohibited from issuing a
license for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages within that local governmental unit.
local Liquor law Enforcement Mel 436.1543
Local units of government - cities, townships and villages - which have a full-time police
department or a fUll-time ordinance enforcement department, receive 55% of all retail liquor
license and renewal fees for each retail liquor license located in the boundaries of the local
governmental unit.
Townships and villages who contract for local law enforcement sometimes use the returnable
license fees as partial payment for the contracted county services. The treasurer of the local unit
of government is required to sign an affidavit, provided by the Commission, certifying that the
funds are used for liquor law enforcement activities before the Commission can send the fees to
the local unit.
The law enforcement agency is also responsible for completing the LC 1800 (applicant
investigation) form, fingerprinting the license applicants, collecting the State Police fingerprinting
fee and forwarding the form, card and fee to the MLCC for processing through the Michigan
State Police. The State Police records are checked for Michigan criminal history. Local units of
government may charge a separate fee for taking the fingerprints.

TEST YOURSELF: On-premises Retail Licenses
Q.

There is an opening in the on-premises quota for our township. We have heard that a large
restaurant is interested in a piece of prime property. Must we approve one of the
applicants we currently have on file for the available license?

A

No. The local governmental unit can decide when and if it wants to approve issuance of
the available license. If you prefer to wait until a later time, you may.

Q.

Part of our township was annexed to the neighboring city. A liquor license was contained
within the geographical boundary of what was annexed. Do we now have an opening in our
quota?

A

It depends on whether your township retained a sufficient population base to continue at
the same quota. If your township was at its maximum number of licenses prior to the
annexation, and if you have retained a sufficient number of people under the census to
continue at the same number of licenses, then your township will have one additional
license that can be issued. Additionally, the license that was in the geographical boundary
annexed to the city will be counted as part of that city's quota licenses. If they were
already at their quota, the license will still be counted for that local unit of government.
The Commission cannot require that the number of licenses in that unit be reduced.

Q.

Do on-premises Taverns and A-Hotels (beer and wine) count as part of our city's quota?

A.

Yes. Even though these licensees may not sell spirits, by law they do count towards the
11
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quota. However, Club licenses in your city do NOT count toward the pOIPUIatIC:>n-Oa!;eCl
quota of licensees.
Q.

A.

Our township board is willing to approve an applicant above all others for a new onpremises license upon the condition that the applicant plant trees on the property. This
condition will be added to the approval resolution being submitted to the Commission. Will
the resolution be accepted?
No. Conditions on local approvals are private contractual agreements between the local
governmental unit and the applicant. The recommendation by the community to the
MLCC must be unqualified (except in the case of meeting health code or zoning/building
requirements).

Q.

A proposed licensed location is within 500 feet of a church. Should our village consider the
proximity of the church to the proposed licensed premises?

A.

It is the sole responsibility of the MLCC to make a determination regarding proximity to
churches and schools. When it appears that a licensed location may be within the SOO-foot
limitation, Commission investigators will measure the distance. If the proposed location is
within 500 feet of a church or school, the church or school will be notified (by certified
mail) of their right to have a hearing to object to the proposed license location. If an
objection is filed, a hearing will be held by the MLCC and the local governmental unit will
be notified of the hearing date and location. If the church or school does not object to the
proposed location, the Commission will proceed with the application process. The 500foot rule does not apply to SDM (beer and wine) off-premises licensed businesses unless it
is to be held in conjunction with an on-premises license.

Licensing
Like the previous chapter, this section is directed primarily to members of local government
legislative bodies and answers the most commonly asked questions about licensing - only now
the focus is on off-premises licenses. This chapter will explain the types of off-premises
licenses, the quota system, and the role of the local legislative body and the local law
enforcement officials.

Off-premises Licenses
These licenses are issued for businesses such as party stores, supermarkets, convenience
stores, and drug stores where alcoholic beverages are sold for consumption off the premises.
SOD

Specially Designated Distributor. This license enables the licensee to sell
packaged liquor (distilled spirits and mixed spirit drink only) for consumption off
the licensed premises. MCl 436.1111 (11)

SDM

Specially Designated Merchant. This license enables the licensee to sell only
beer and wine for consumption off the licensed premises and is not subject to
quota restrictions. MCl 436.1111 (12)

SOD Resort In the years permitted by statute, the Commission can also issue a limited
number of off-premises SOD resort licenses in governmental units where the
population is 50,000 or less, and where there are no SOD licenses available
under the quota. MCl 436.1531 (5)
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Off-premises
Licenses Type

-Alcoholic beverage soldBeer?
Wine?
Liquor?

Licensed to sell to

Quota
Applies

SOD
SDD Resort
SDM

No
No
Yes

General Public
General Public
General Public

Yes
No
No

No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
No

Note: Off-premises licensees may also sell up to 9 liters of spirits per month to an On-premises licensee if
the proper permit has been obtained from BATF.

Local Approval
Ordinance and Zoning Compliance
Off-premises licenses (SOM and SOD) do not require approval of the local governing body.
Because the Commission's rules require that licensed locations be in compliance with all
appropriate state and local building, plumbing, zoning, fire, sanitation and health laws and
ordinances, the Commission will notify you of any applications for a new license or a transfer of
an existing license or location that are received.
The local governing body, or your designee (such as a building inspector or police agency), has

15 days to notify the Commission of any instances of non-compliance. These must be outlined
in detail indicating the specific laws or ordinances, and a copy of the applicable law or ordinance
must be attached. If the Commission does not receive notification within 15 days, it will assume
that the location complies with local laws and ordinances. MAC R436.11 05 (3)
The chart below indicates local responsibility for investigation of off-premises licensed locations:

Summary of Local Approvals Required for Off-premises Licenses & Permits:
Type of Off-premises License:

SOD & SOD Resort
SOM

Local Legislative Approval?

Local Law Enforcement
Investigation Required?

Yes
Yes

No
No

Type of Off-premises Permit:

Sunday Sales - SOD

Direct Connection
Living Quarters
Off-premises Storage

The county board of commissioners must have authorized the sale of
liquor (distilled spirits) after 12:00 noon on Sunday. Beer and wine may be
sold after noon on Sunday without special authorization from the MLCC unless prohibited by local ordinances. *
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

* Any questions regarding local referenda on liquor issues should be referred to the Commission because of
the complexity of the laws and relevant court decisions.
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Ordinance Prohibiting

Sale of Alcoholic Beverages

In addition to the previously mentioned local and county options that may be exercised relative to
the sale of alcoholic beverages, a city, township or village may adopt an ordinance which
prohibits.illl retail sales of alcoholic beverages within their borders. This ordinance may only
be adopted if there are no existing licenses issued within the local governmental unit
for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. This includes licenses for the retail sale of
alcoholic beverages for consumption both on and off the premises.
This ordinance must be submitted to the electorate at the next general or special election that is
held after the ordinance is adopted. However, the election may not be less than 45 days after
the adoption of the ordinance.
In the event that the electorate affirms the ordinance, the Commission is prohibited from issuing
a license for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages within that local governmental unit.
Revocation of the ordinance by the electorate is effective on the date of the certification of the
election results. The commission may then issue retail licenses for the sale of alcoholic
beverages within the local governmental unit. MCl436.2109

TEST YOURSELF: Off-premises Retail Licenses
Q.

We believe our city has increased in population since the last federal Census. Can we
conduct a special population count to determine if we are entitled to an additional SOD
license within the quota?

A

Yes. Under provisions of Act 279 of P.A. of 1909, as amended (Section 117.6 of the
Michigan Compiled laws) or under Section7 of Act 245 of P.A. of 1975 (MCl
141.907) the local unit of government may, by resolution, request a special state
census of the unit. For more information, call the Bureau of Elections, Special
Census unit at the Secretary of State (517) 373-2540.

Q.

Our full-time charter township police department has neither the time, the funding, nor the
expertise to conduct a local investigation for a liquor license that involves researching
zoning ordinances, local health codes, and the other regulations that a licensee must
comply with. How can we avoid doing this?

A

You cannot. If your township treasurer signs the affidavit providing your
township with 55% of the liquor licensing fees for each retail licensee located in
the township, you must assume responsibility for enforcement of the liquor laws
including local investigations.
This requirement is for the benefit of the township, not the Liquor Control
Commission. In order to ease the demand on your police department, your
township may want to set up a system to handle liquor matters. Most
governmental units have a zoning and code enforcement team. You can have
the premises inspected by the person responsible for these inspections, such as
the building inspector or fire department.
Some smaller townships contract with the county sheriff for local law
enforcement. If the township signed the required affidavit to receive the
returnable license fees, then the Commission would mail the payment to the
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township.
, the township would then use the fu
to help pay the
county contract. You should be aware, however, that these fund expenditures
are audited.
Q.

Our city council has approved a transfer of a license and conducted

a local investigation.

Does the Commission also conduct a separate investigation?

A

Yes. The MLCC investigators conduct an extensive investigation of the
applicant. Our investigation focuses on the applicant's background and financial
status. Commission investigators also examine the proposed location to
determine if it meets the legal requirements for a specific license. This could
mean that even though a person has been approved at the local level, the
application could be denied by the MLCC. However, the local governmental body
should not conclude that this means that an applicant has something undesirable
in his or her background: there are many reasons that a person may not meet
licensing qualification standards.
In fact, local legislative approval is not required to transfer an off-premises
license. You can make a recommendation and the Commission will consider it;
however, the Commission is not bound to act according to a local
recommendation as it is with on-premises license transfers.

Q.

Our village council has been advised that an applicant for a liquor license wants to turn a
former laundromat into a take-out party store and obtain both an SDM and SOD license.
Although we have no objection to licenses being issued to the applicant, we feel there
may be some problems with the location. There is a pin-ball/electronic game shop next
door that is frequented by teenagers. The concern of people in the community is that
sales to minors will occur. Can we object to the license being issued?

A

There are two issues involved in this question.
First, can the village council legally object to the license being issued?
Second, if the license is granted, are there automatically going to be problems
with sales to minors?
Although the purpose of the local review is to determine whether there are any
zoning or ordinance problems with the proposed licensed location, the Liquor
Control Commission (under Rule 436.1105(2)(d)) may also consider the opinions
of the local residents, local legislative body, or local law enforcement agency with
regard to the proposed business. Therefore, the village council could choose to
advise the MLCC of local concerns even though there are no violations of local
ordinances or codes. The village can strengthen its objection by being as
detailed as possible.
A local unit of government should not assume that a licensee will sell alcoholic
beverages to minors simply because a nearby business caters to teenagers.
However, if it appears that the licensee is violating the law, your local law
enforcement agency should investigate the licensee.
As shown in the next chapter, your village may request revocation of a license if
the licensee is determined to be responsible for violating the Liquor Control
Code or the MLCC Rules on three occasions within one year. In addition to
Commission action, the licensee may be subject to criminal action and also to
possible civil action under Dram Shop statutes.
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local units of governrnent have the right to object to the renewal of an on-premises license,
and also rnay request that the MlCC revoke an on-premises license. local governments
may request that the MlCC revoke an off-premises license, but may not object to renewal
of an off-premises license. These rights are accompanied by specific requirements that have
evolved based on court decisions.
What licenses are subject to these actions?
Because local units of government are required to approve public on-premises licenses, they
may also object to renewal or request revocation of Class C, A-Hotel, B-Hotel, Tavern, Class C
Resort, A-Hotel Resort, B-Hotel Resort, Tavern Resort, and Micro Brewer licenses.
local governments may also request revocation of off-premises SOD and SOM licenses in their
jurisdiction when: (1) the Commission has determined that the licensee has violated the Liquor
Control Code by selling or furnishing alcohol to a person under 21 years of age on at least three
occasions within a calendar year, and (2) those violations did not involve the use of false or
fraudulent identification by the person under 21 years of age MCl 436.1501 (3).
If a local unit of government objects to renewal or requests revocation of an on-premises retail
license, and the licensee also has an off-premises SOM license, the Commission will also hold
a "show cause" hearing to determine if there is any reason that the SOM license should not be
renewed or revoked at the same time because the business no longer meets the licensing
qualification requirements.
local governments may also request revocation of any permit held in conjunction with an onpremises license but must follow the rules of due process as outlined below.
Due Process
Regardless of whether the local unit of government wishes to object to a renewal or request
revocation of a license or permit, the licensee is entitled to due process. In Bundo v City of
Walled Lake (395 Michigan 679 [1976]), the Michigan Supreme Court held that the liquor
licensee has a property interest in the license and, therefore, is entitled to due process
protection.
The procedural safeguards that the courts deemed necessary regarding a decision by the local
body to object to renewal of a license consist of "rudimentary due process." Courts have said
this includes notice to the licensee of the proposed action and the reasons for the action, a
hearing at which the licensee may present evidence, testify, and confront adverse witnesses,
and a written statement of the findings. In Roseland Inn, Inc. v Robert D. McClain and
Township of Blackman and Liquor Control Commission (118 Michigan App [1982]), the
Court of Appeals held that a lack of standards and fair notification of the standards violates a
licensee's right to due process. Therefore, local units of government should consider the
following guidelines and standards when pursuing an objection to renewal or a request for
revocation of a liquor license:
Guidelines and Standards
A

Guidelines- The local governmental unit must establish standards or guidelines stating
what conditions will constitute a basis for requesting non-renewal or revocation of a license.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

B.

Notification of Guidelines - The local governmental unit must notify licensees of the
guidelines and any subsequent changes.

C.

Notification of Hearing - If the local governmental unit is objecting to renewal or
requesting revocation of license, it must give the licensee timely written notice of the
hearing, including:

Date and location of the hearing.
The proposed action that the local legislative body is considering taking.
The detailed reasons for the proposed action (i.e., citing specific standards or guidelines the
licensee has not complied with).
The licensee's rights at the hearing, including the opportunity to defend by confronting adverse
witnesses and by being allowed to present witnesses, evidence, and arguments.
The licensee's right to be represented by an attorney.
D.

Hearing - At the local legislative body hearing, the licensee must be given an effective
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses, evidence, and arguments.

E.

Resolution and Statement of Findings - After the hearing, the local legislative body
must make a written statement of findings and adopt a resolution indicating the specific
action requested.

Required Documentation
The local unit of government must send the following documents to the MLCC before the
Commission can take any action regarding objection to renewal or revocation of a
license:

A.

A copy of the standards or guidelines, or a description of the guidelines established by
the local governmental unit as to what would constitute a basis for objecting to renewal or
to revoke the license. Please include the date of adoption and, when publishing in a
newspaper, the name of the paper and date of publication.

B.

A certified copy of the notice sent to the licensee.

C.

A copy of the proof of service of the notice sent to the licensee in order to counter any
questions as to whether the notice was indeed sent to the licensee by the local
governmental unit.

D.

A certified copy of the resolution adopted by the local governing body objecting to the
renewal of the license or requesting that the license be revoked. If a separate statement of
findings is made, then a certified copy of that document must also be included. The
resolution should not include both an objection to renewal of the license and a request that
the license be revoked. If such a resolution is received, the Commission will proceed with
the objection to renewal only.

Because all retail licenses expire on April 30, if your legislative body is objecting to renewal of a
license, the request and all substantiating documents (as outlined above) must be received by
the MLCC no later than March 31 to be in compliance with the law.

Differences between Objecting to Renewal and License Revocation
! Objecting to Renewal- When the proper documentation is received, the MLCC will stop
renewal of the license. The existing license expires on April 30, preventing the licensee from
legally selling alcoholic beverages after that date. The license will remain in escrow for one
year, and cannot be placed in operation or transferred to another person or corporation unless the
local legislative body adopts a resolution approving the renewal.
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After one year, the lic
e may request an extension - but the
mayor may not be
approved by the Commission. If the extension is denied and the licensee does not request a
hearing regarding the denial, the license is permanently canceled. If an extension is granted, the
license remains in escrow for another year but cannot be placed in operation or transferred to
another person unless the local legislative body adopts a resolution approving renewal.
There is no immediate effect on the local license quota as a result of objecting to renewal as long
as the on-premises liquor license is held in escrow. It still counts toward the limited number of
licenses available in the city, township or village. However, the local unit will not receive the 55%
share of the licensing fee that it normally would have received had the license remained active.
Local legislative bodies may adopt a resolution approving the license renewal at any time. The
licensee may then renew the license and resume operation.

! Revocation of a License - A resolution requesting revocation of a retail liquor license may
be submitted at any time during the year. When proper documentation is received, the Commission
is required by law to hold a hearing to consider the resolution. The local legislative body will be
notified of the hearing, and a representative of the body or its legal counsel should attend. The sole
purpose of this hearing is to determine if the licensee was afforded "rudimentary due process" as
required by the courts. If it is found that due process was given the licensee, the license is
immediately revoked by the MLCC. Revocation is a permanent action, and means that the
licensee loses all ownership rights to the license.
The former licensee cannot transfer the revoked license.
for another liquor license for at least two years.

Also, the former licensee cannot apply

License revocation can also have an effect on the number of licenses available under the quota in
the local governmental unit. If the city, township, or village is over the license quota (due to
shrinkage in population), then revocation of a license means that one less license is available.
As long as the city is at quota or below, a new license becomes available when one is revoked.

TEST YOURSELF: Objection to Renewal or Revocation of a License
Q.

Our city council wants to object to the renewal of a license for a bar because of non-payment of
taxes. Can we do that?

A.

If your city council has developed standards or guidelines that state that non-payment of
taxes is a reason that will be considered for objecting to renewal of a license, and if the
other requirements of due process are followed, then your legislative body has complied
with the requirements as far as the Liquor Control Commission is concerned. Remember
that the city council must pass a resolution and have all of the required documents on file
with the Commission no later than March 31. Following a review of the documents the
Commission will determine whether or not it is appropriate to renew the license.

Q.

What kinds of standards should be in the guidelines?

A.

While the Commission does not presume to tell local governmental units what should be
in their guidelines, some local units of government have inserted articles into their
guidelines dealing with non-payment of taxes and other bills to the local governmental
unit and articles dealing with excessive police calls, citizen complaints, and other
nuisance-type problems. Others have incorporated certain violations of state laws into
their guidelines.

Q.

Our township board is reluctant to get involved in objecting to a renewal or requesting revocation of
licenses. Are we required to pass guidelines and act on them?
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A.

No. The objection to
and revocation of license pro
st for those units of
government that want to use them. You may find, however, that it is worthwhile to adopt
guidelines now so that you do not have to react in a manner that could be construed as
arbitrary or capricious should a problem develop in the future (retroactive application of
your guidelines would not be legally binding).

Q.

Our city council has decided to pass a resolution and we have followed a/l of the provisions outlined. Our
problem is that we are unsure whether to object to the renewal of a license or go so far as to request a
license revocation. What should we do?

A.

The Commission does not advise local governmental units of the action they should take. The due
process requirements for the licensee are the same regardless of whether the local government
legislative body chooses to object to renewal of the license or decides to request revocation of the
license. Remember that revocation is final, while objecting to renewal can be reversed if the
licensee remedies the problem that prompted the action.

Q.

Our charter township board has followed all of the guidelines shown here and requested a revocation of a
Class C license. Can we assume that this will end our involvement?

A.

No. In most instances, licensees will begin court actions against both the local unit of government
and the Liquor Control Commission to enjoin the Commission from acting on the local legislative
body's resolution, and to challenge the action of the local government. The Commission's role in
the procedure is to determine whether the licensee was given "rudimentary due process" by the
local unit of government. The Commission does not - and cannot - consider whether or not the
reasons for the actions of the local governmental body are justifiable. This is up to the courts to
decide.
The Commission strongly recommends that if your local government is considering objecting to
renewal or requesting revocation of a license, you consult your attorney before beginning the
action. The local governmental unit should recognize that there may be substantial legal costs
involved in requesting that the Commission not renew or revoke a license because litigation may
take months or years to complete.

Q.

Our township board objected to the renewal of a Class C license for non-payment of local property taxes. All
of our actions were reviewed by the Commission and the license was not renewed. Yesterday the licensee
paid the taxes. What should we do now?

A.

If you no longer object to renewal your local governing body must adopt a resolution approving
the renewal before the license will be issued by the Commission.

Q.

We have had problems with complaints about noise and crowds around a bar which sponsors Friday and
Saturday dance contests. Our city council has considered asking the MLCC to revoke the dance and
entertainment permits granted to the establishment. Is this possible to do without reVOking their license?

A.

Yes. Local Legislative actions may be limited to permits. Your city council can take action to ask
the Commission to revoke specific permits granted to a licensee, but the same recommendations
regarding due process and careful consideration of costs involved should be followed.

Enforcement of Michigan Liquor Laws
This section is directed more specifically to local law enforcement officials who work with the Liquor
Control Commission to ensure that the provisions of the Liquor Control Code are enforced. Because
there are other publications which more thoroughly cover the Code and the Administrative Rules of the
Commission, this section of the guide focuses on those areas where local law enforcement officials and
private citizens have concerns about enforcement and jurisdiction.
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Local Responsibility for

ment Mel 436.1201 (4)

The primary responsibility for enforcement of Michigan's liquor laws lies with local law enforcement
agencies. This means that the local law enforcement officials who have jurisdiction within the township,
village, city and county boundaries are responsible for primary enforcement of the liquor laws.

Funding for Local Enforcement MCl 436.1543
The Liquor Control Commission returns to local units of government 55% of the retail licensing fees
received during the fiscal quarter. Each local unit of government is required to certify to the MlCC (using
a form provided for that purpose) that the fees are being used for the enforcement of Michigan's liquor
laws.
Failure to use the returnable license fees in the manner prescribed by the law - or failure to return the
certification form - can result in the MLCC withholding the funds. The Michigan Treasury Department,
Local Government Audit Division, may review how these funds are spent.

Liquor Control Commission Enforcement Investigators MCl 436.1201 (4)
The Liquor Control Commission's investigators have concurrent responsibility for enforcement of the
liquor laws. However, this authority is limited to actions against liquor licensees. Investigators spend the
majority of their time reviewing applicants for liquor licenses and doing routine inspections. However,
they also do undercover surveillance work throughout the state. Because they are not armed, and are
not vested with the power of arrest, MLCC investigators will always request local or state police
support when laws are being broken by someone other than a licensee or in cases where the
potential for violence exists.
Upon request, the Commission will also provide technical investigative assistance to local law
enforcement agencies to help with unusual or complex investigations of suspected liquor law violations.

State Police MCl 436.1201 (4)
The State Police have concurrent jurisdiction for enforcement of all of the state's liquor laws.

Right to Inspect Licensed Premises MCl 436.1217
Liquor licensees are required to make their licensed premises available for inspection and search by a
Commission investigator or local law enforcement officer at any time during its regular business hours,
or when the licensed premises are occupied by a licensee or an employee.

MLCC Jurisdiction MCl436.1217
Because the Liquor Control Commission's jurisdiction is limited to MLCC Licensees, violations
involving non-licensees are the responsibility of the county prosecutor and the local police agency. For
example, the MLCC cannot take action at private parties unless minors are observed buying alcoholic
beverages from a licensee. Action by the MLCC can be taken only against the licensee - not the
unlicensed hosts or guests.
In cases involving illegal drug sales on the licensed premises, local, state and federal agents can seize
the licensed premises and sell the property under the forfeiture proceedings of state and federal laws.

Citizen Complaints
Local law enforcement officials and the MLCC frequently receive complaints from citizens regarding
suspected violations of the liquor laws. These complaints typically involve:
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A.

B.
C.
D.
E.

F.

Sales to min
Sales to into
persons.
Violations of restrictions on the days and hours of operation.
Various illegal activities on the licensed premises such as gambling, drug dealing and prostitutic
Private parties for minors where alcoholic beverages are being furnished at non-licensed locatic
(not MLCC jurisdiction).
Sales of alcoholic beverages to non-members in a licensed club.

Citizen complaints should be treated seriously. It is the experience of commission investigators that a
good job of enforcement of the state's liquor laws serves to minimize a multitude of other social
problems.

Semi-Annual Public Hearings
The Liquor Control Commission holds public hearings twice each calendar year for the purpose of taking
complaints and receiving the views of the public regarding administration of the Liquor Control Code.

Mel436.1215

Responsibility for Licensing Activities
Investigation
As mentioned in the previous licensing chapters, the local law enforcement agency is also responsible for:
A.

B.
C.

Conducting investigations of applicants in order to determine whether to recommend that the license (rE
and wholesale) be granted.
Fingerprinting the applicant and collecting the State Police processing fee (currently $15).
Providing information regarding whether the proposed business location meets local codes and ordinan
This function may be conducted by various inspectors employed by the governmental unit or the county
their reports being included in the law enforcement investigation report.

The Liquor Law Violation Administrative Process
The Violation Report
When law enforcement officers believe that a violation of Michigan's Liquor Code has occurred, they are
authorized to write a Violation Report using the LC 600 form (forms provided by MLCC Enforcement).
Violation Reports are sent to the MLCC where they are reviewed by an Assistant Attorney General (AAG)
to determine whether the facts, as presented, indicate a violation of the Liquor Control Code or the
Administrative Rules of the Commission.
If the AAG determines that there is insufficient evidence to support the charge, MLCC staff will request
additional information from the concerned parties. If, based on the report (and subsequent information),
the AAG still cannot find evidence that a specific section of the Code or Rules was violated, no further
action will be taken.
If you write a Violation Report, you should be as specific as possible and try to answer any questions that
you think may come up during the review by the AAG. Remember, the licensee will receive a copy of

the Violation Report and all attachments that are with it.
Violation Complaint
If the AAG finds sufficient evidence to show a violation has occurred, a formal Violation Complaint is
issued. It is common practice for the AAG to file a separate charge for each section of the Liquor Control
Code and Administrative Rules which was allegedly violated.
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For example, if a lawe
t officer observes a bartender sel
holic beverage to someone
under 21 and the person
observed consuming the beverage,
will cite (1) a violation of
the Liquor Code for the sale of the alcoholic beverage, and (2) a violation for allowing the person under 21
to consume.

Formal Hearings
The licensee is given the choice of acknowledging the complaint by mail and receiving
MlCC without a hearing, or contesting the allegation by requesting a formal hearing to
and testimony regarding the alleged violation. The licensee may be represented by an
complaint was filed by a law enforcement official, the officer will receive a notice of the
the complaining witness, must appear at the hearing.

a penalty from the
present evidence
attorney. If the
hearing and, as

Possible Actions Against Licensees under the Liquor Control Code
Admin istrative
After an acknowledgment or finding of a violation at a hearing, the Hearing Commissioner may suspend
or revoke a license, assess a fine on some or all of the charges, order a transfer (forced sale) of the
business ownership, or some combination of these penalties.
In those cases where the MlCC finds a licensee responsible for violations of selling or providing
alcoholic beverages to minors or intoxicated persons on three occasions within any 24 month period, the
MlCC is required to hold a hearing to suspend or revoke the license. This penalty is in addition to any
imposed as the result of the individual hearings. MCl436.1903
Criminal
The Liquor Control Code provides that licensees who violate that statute may also be charged with
misdemeanors for those same violations. MCl436.1909
Civil
Under Michigan law, a licensee may also be held liable in civil suits when the sale or furnishing of
alcoholic beverages to a minor or intoxicated person is found to be the proximate cause of damage,
injury or death of an innocent party. MCl436.1801

Independent Criminal Complaint
At the same time as a liquor law violation is being pursued through the Liquor Control Commission
administrative process, the law enforcement officer can obtain authorization for a complaint and warrant
through the local prosecuting attomey for any criminal violations by a licensee or other individual.
Any prosecution on criminal charges is independent of MlCC actions. A finding of guilt or innocence in
the criminal matter does not necessarily affect the MlCC's violation proceedings.

Training in Liquor Law
Training Classes
The MlCC works closely with community colleges, universities, police training academies, and inservice programs to provide training on Michigan's liquor laws. As time permits, the MlCC is willing to
conduct special training sessions.
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For more information on
call the MlCC Enforcement

ng sessions are available, or to req
nat (517) 322-1370.

special training session,

Other MlCC Publications
A.

The Michigan Liquor Control Code, Rules, and Related Laws Governing the Sale and Manufacture of
Alcoholic Beverages. This publication contains the statutory language for the laws and rules governing
alcoholic beverages. Due to its size, a printing cost of $5 is required. It is also available for download fr
the MLCC website at "-'-'-'-~,="~~-"-==-'-'=

B.

Michigan's Liquor Laws and Rules- A Guide for Retail Licensees. This guidebook, written in
conversational style, covers the laws and MLCC rules that historically have caused the most problems f
retail licensees.
Law Enforcement Officers' Field Guide on the Liquor Control Code and Administrative Rules of the
Commission. This pocket-sized reference manual provides excerpts from, and information on, Michigar,
liquor laws and rules, along with other material such as how to complete and file a Violation report. Thi~
booklet is designed specifically for use by law enforcement personnel in day-to-day activities. It is also
available for download from the MLCC website.

C.

Contact a MlCC Enforcement District Office (see last page) for information on obtaining a copy of any of
these publications.

Law Enforcement Official Prohibited from Holding a Liquor License
Law enforcement officials are prohibited from having a direct or indirect interest in a liquor license in their
jurisdiction. This means that if you are responsible in any way for the enforcement of criminal laws, you
cannot rent, own a licensed establishment, or lease a building to a liquor licensee. Court cases have
also extended this prohibition to local elected officials who may be responsible for law enforcement. If
the Commission has any questions as to the individual's responsibility for law enforcement, the local
govemmental charter is used to determine eligibility. MCl 436.1523

Test Yourself: Enforcement of Michigan Liquor Laws
O.

I am a vii/age constable. Am I responsible for enforcement of the liquor laws?

A

That depends on your responsibilities under the village charter. If you are authorized to
bear arms and make arrests, then you are also responsible for enforcement of the liquor
laws. If your position is more of an honorary position, then the township police or county
sheriff will have the responsibility.

O.

As city officials, we sometimes receive letters or telephone complaints about local bars or night
clubs. What should we do with citizen inquiries?

A

It is advisable to pass these complaints or reports on to your local law enforcement
agency for investigation. You may also report the information you receive to the MlCC
for investigation by the Commission's enforcement staff.

O.

Is training on the liquor laws available for our village police?

A

Yes. Contact the MlCC Enforcement Division in lansing at (517) 322-1370 for training
information.
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LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION OFFICES
Michigan Liquor Control Commission
7150 Harris Drive, P.O. Box 30005
Lansing, Michigan 48909

Lansing -

General Information
Enforcement Division
Financial Management
Licensing
Commission Office

Farmington -

(517) 322-1345
(517) 322-1370
(517) 322-1382
(517) 322-1400
(517) 322-1355

Commission Office(248) 888-8840

FAX
FAX
FAX
FAX

(517)
(517)
(517)
(517)

322-1040
322-1016
322-6137
322-5188

FAX (248) 888-8844

Enforcement District Offices

Farmington
24155 Drake Road
Farmington, MI48335

(248) 888-8710

FAX (248) 888-8707

Escanaba
State Office Building
305 S. Ludington, 2 nd floor
Escanaba, MI49829

(906) 786-5553

FAX (906) 786-3403

Gaylord
699-B S. Wisconsin
Gaylord, MI49735

(517) 732-6797

FAX (517) 732-5321

Grand Rapids
2942 Fuller, NE
Grand Rapids, MI 49505

(616) 447-2647

FAX (616) 447-2644

Visit us on the world-wide web at www.cis.state.mLus/lcc
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313
Attorney at Law
S4~ North Avenue H
Post Office Box 419
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419
Telephone (208) 343-3851
Facsimile (208) 343-4188
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Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff
Daniel S. Fuchs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control,

CASE NO. CV 2009-3914
(Consolidated with Case No. CV 20094185)
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES

Respondent.
DANIEL S. FUCHS,
Plaintiff,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Idaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control,
Defendant.

ORIGINAL
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Page f Ji:
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COMES NOW, Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), by and through his attorney of
record, Brian Donesley, and submits the following Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control's ("ISP") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies:

I.
INTRODUCTION
This Court has permitted additional briefing regarding whether Fuchs has a "property
interest" in his application for a Retail Alcohol Beverage License and in particular directing the
parties' attention to a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F. 3d

600 (6 th Cir. 2001).
In Wojcik, the Sixth Circuit, following Michigan law, explained that a first-time liquor
license applicant did not have a property interest in a liquor license. Michigan law, however, is
vastly different than Idaho law.

In Michigan, cities are given the initial decision whether to

approve or deny a party's application for a first-time license. A city's decision is discretionary.
According to a publication issued to local governments from the Michigan Liquor Control
Commission, a city may approve a later applicant over a prior one or approve no one at all,
waiting for a more favorable applicant to come along. I Moreover, while Michigan has a quota
system, it is a flexible one, allowing a party to transfer an unused "escrowed license" from
another city within the county to the city of his or her choosing. Consequently, there are no
priority list rules, such as those in Idaho ensuring an applicant's place in line.

I See, infra, GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE LIQUOR CONTROL
CODE, November 2000, pp. 3-4, State of Michigan, Liquor Control Commission. (Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Brian

DOl1csley).
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In Idaho, ISP is given the responsibility to issue liquor licenses. It is not a discretionary
but ministerial obligation. If an applicant complies with all legal obligations under the Idaho
Code and the Rules Governing Alcohol Beverage Control, a license must issue. Moreover, ISP
promulgated rules, ensuring an applicant's position on a waiting list and giving additional
property characteristics to the application such as the right of assignment by bequest.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a liquor license is a privilege and not a property
right.,,2 At the same time, however, it has held that a license has attributes of property and that a
licensee is ensured due process protection by the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a license applicant has
procedural rights when an agency considers license eligibility requirements.
This Court need not detern1ine whether a liquor license applicant has a property interest.
The question here is much nan·ower. That is whether a license applicant's place in line, as set
forth in the Rules Governing Alcohol Beverage Control, is a "substantive" or "vested" right.
Idaho law provides that a statute or mle cannot be applied retroactively, if it affects a substantive
or vested right. What determines whether a right is substantive or procedural is whether the
statute or mle is mandatory or discretionary. ISP's rules governing priority lists are mandatory
or contractual in nature. Once an applicant pays one-half the annual license fee, he is guaranteed
a place in line. This is unlike the Michigan liquor licensing scheme, where local government
units have unfettered discretion whether to approve or deny an application. Because Fuchs's
place in line on the priority list is substantive, ISP cannot retroactively apply its rules removing
his name from the priority lists without proper statutory authorization.

Crazy Horse v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762, 765 (1977). As discussed, illli'a, the "archaic rights/privilege distinction no
long has any applicability in the area of procedural due process." Bundo v. City of Walled Lake, 238 N.W. 2d 154
( 1976) (ciling Board of Regen Is v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972».
2
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And, this Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies.

There are no administrative remedies to exhaust.

Rather, ISP's

retroactive application of its rules is contrary to Idaho law. This Court should allow this action
to proceed to Declaratory Judgment.
II.
IN MICHIGAN, CITIES HAVE DISCRETION WHETHER TO APPROVE
A FIRST-TIME APPLICANT FOR A LIQUOR LICENSE
th

In Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F. 3d 600,610 (6 Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals observed that "first time liquor license applicant was not entitled to procedural due
process rights under Michigan law." The Wojcik court quoted a previous Sixth Circuit case,
th

Shamie v. City o.!,Pontiac, 620 F. 2d 118 (6 Cir. 1980) for its holding distinguishing a first-time
application from an actual licensee:
Under Michigan law an applicant for a liquor license, as distinguished from a
license holder facing renewal or revocation proceedings, does not have a
protected interest. The holder of a liquor license may well have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to renewal. One applying for a liquor license has no such claim of
entitlement. In the former case, there is a "property" interest; in the latter, there is
none.

Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F. 3d 600,610 (6 th Cir. 2001) (quoting Shamie v. City of Pontiac,
443 F. Supp. 679, 683 (E.D. Mich. 1977), ajJ'd, 620 F. 2d 118 (6 th Cir. 1980)).

Shamie, and the Michigan cases and statutes that underlie it, clarify why applicants in
Michigan do not have protected property interests: the decision to grant or deny a first-time
application is wholly discretionary.

A Michigan state statute, MCL 436.1501 (2), provides that

the initial decision whether to approve or deny a liquor license rests with the local unit of
government:
... An application for a license to sell alcoholic liquor for consumption on the
premises, except in a city having a population of 750,000 or more, shall be
approved by the local legislative body ill which the applicant's place ofbllsiness
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is located before the license is granted by the commission, except that in the case
of an application for renewal of an existing license, if an objection to a renewal
has not been filed with the commission by the local legislative body not less than
30 days before the date of expiration of the license, the approval of the local
legislative body shall not be required ...
MCL 436.1501 (2) (emphasis added).

It is within the discretion of local unit of govemment to approve or deny an application.
"[T]here is no statutory requirement that a local unit of government must approve any
application or authorize issuing all or any licenses available under the quota." GUIDE TO THE
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE LIQUOR CONTROL CODE,
November 2000, pp. 3-4, State of Michigan, Liquor Control Commission. (Emphasis in original)

(Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Brian Donesley).
There are no priority list rules in Michigan. A city may deny a prior applicant in favor of
another applicant or approve none at all, waiting for a better applicant to come along. For
example, in "Test Yourself: On-premises Retail Licenses," the MLCC posed the following
hypothetical question:
Q
There is an opening in the on-premises quota for our township. We have
heard that a large restaurant is interested in a piece of prime property. Must we
approve one of the applicants we currently have on file for the available license?

A.
No. The local governmental unit can decide when and if it wants to
approve issuance of the available license. If you prefer to wait until a later time,
you may.
GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE
LIQUOR CONTROL CODE at p.l1. (Exhibit 1).

Further, licenses may be transferred from one city within a county to another:
On-premises escrowed licenses issued under this subsection may be transferred
subject to local legislative approval under section 501(2) to an applicant whose
proposed operation is located within any local governmental unit in a county in
which the escrowed license was located.
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MCL 436.1531 (1 ).3
Because there are no priority lists in Michigan, there are no property rights to first-time
applications. And, in reverse, since there are no rules, there is no argument that an applicant has
a property right.

Because the local government units have unfettered discretion whether to

approve or deny applications, applicants have no expectation that a license may be approved.
In Wojcik, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that unilateral expectations are
insufficient to trigger due process protection:
Unilateral expectations of a property interest are insufficient to trigger due
process concerns. Instead, property interests "are created and their dimensions
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits."

Wojcik, 257 F. 3d 600 at 609 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,529 n.1 (1981)
(quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
In Shamie, the applicant apparently conceded that Michigan law did not give him a
protected interest in his application absent additional facts. The applicant argued that a city
attomey's assurance that he would be told the basis for rejection gave him a protected interest.
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, holding that the city attorney's "promise to tell [the first-time
applicant] why his application might be rejected does not automatically confer upon him a
'propeliy interest' protected by constitutional due process." Shamie, 620 F .2d at 120-12l. In
short, not only was the city without obligation to approve his application, it was not even
required to provide the basis for its denial. It could have acted arbitrarily. It could have acted

3 Michigan has a separate statutory scheme for off-premises licenses which, under Michigan law, may be issued to
supermarkets, convenience stores and drug stores where alcoholic beverages, including liquor, are sold for
consumption off the premises. See MCL 436.1111 (II). This Memorandum, and the Michigan and Sixth Circuit
cases discussed herein, pertains only to on-premises licenses.
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unreasonably. It could have approved a subsequent applicant or none at all, waiting for a more
promising applicant to come along, based upon the sole discretion of the city.
Michigan has given local govemments unfettered discretion whether to approve or deny a
first time application for a liquor license. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit, in Wojcik and Shamie
held that a first-time applicant has no property interest protected by constitutional due process.
As is discussed,

il~fi'a,

Idaho law is the opposite.

III.
IN IDAHO, NEW LICENSE APPLICATIONS ARE GOVERNED
BY PRIORITY LIST RULES
The Idaho Legislature has established a quota system, which limits the number of retail
alcohol beverage licenses to one (1) license for each one thousand five-hundred (1,500)
population of said city or fraction thereof, as established in the last census. I.e. § 23-903. ISP
has promulgated rules establishing priority lists for each city in which the number of applicants
exceeds the number of available licenses. IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01. These rules further dictate
prioritization (first in time, first in right), how places in line are reserved, how these places in line
may and may not be transfened, and what an applicant must do to obtain a license once he is
notified that one has become available. IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01-05. ISP has no discretion but
to apply these rules uniformly to each applicant on each list. Based on these rules, an applicant
has a legitimate expectation or legal entitlement that, once he bas secured a position on a priority
list, he cannot be removed, unless he fails to comply with the statutes or rules. Furthermore, the
applicant has a legitimate expectation or legal entitlement that he or she shall be notified, after
waiting in tum, when a new license becomes available off the priority list. This legal
expectation, based upon state law, is a substantive or vested right. ISP's retroactive application
of its 2007 amendment to its IDAP A rules, removing multiple listings of Fuchs's name fr0111 five
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priority lists violated this legal entitlement. This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss and
permit this action to proceed to Declaratory Judgment.
ISP has promulgated mles establishing priority lists for each city in which the number of
applicants exceeds the number of available licenses. IDAPA 11.05.0l.013.0l. Further, ISP has
promulgated rules governing priority lists for incorporated city liquor licenses. IDAPA
11.05.01.013.()l-05. IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01 sets forth the criteria governing the process an
applicant must follow to be placed on a priority list and the manner in which applicants are given
priority. Priority is given to the earliest application:
The Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau maintains a priority list of applicants for
those cities in which no incorporated city liquor license is available. A separate
list is maintained for each city. A person, partnership, or corporation desiring to
be placed on a priority list shall file a completed application for an incorporated
city liquor license, accompanied by payment of one-half (1/2) of the annual
license fee. Such application need not show any particular building or premises
upon which the liquor is to be sold, nor that the applicant is the holder of any
license to sell beer. Priority on the list is determined by the earliest application,
each sllcceeding application is placed on the list in the order received
IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01. (Emphasis added).
IDAPA 11.05.01.013.02 provides the manner in which ISP shall notify an applicant of an
available license off a priority list and an applicant's obligations to respond to the notice:
If the applicant does not notify the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau in writing
within ten (10) days of receipt of the notice of his intention to accept the license,
the license is offered to the next applicant in priority. An applicant accepting the
license shall have a period of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of
receipt of Notice of License Availability in which to complete all requirements
necessary for the issuance of the license. Provided, however, that upon a showing
of good cause the Director of the Idaho State Police may extend the time period in
which to complete the necessary requirements for a period not to exceed ninety
(90) days.
IDAPA 11.05.01.013.02.

U0
U 2: 47
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IDAPA 1l.05.0 l.0 l3.03 governs an applicant's obligations once he has been notified of
an available license:
An applicant refusing a license offered under this rule or an applicant who fails to
complete his application may have his name placed at the end of the priority list
upon his request. Should the applicant holding first priority refuse or fail to accept
the license or to complete the application within the time specified, the applicant
shall be dropped from the priority list, the deposit refunded, and the license
offered to the applicant appearing next on the list
IDAPA 1l.05.0 1.0 l3 .03.
IDAPA 1l.05.0l.0l3.04 prohibits inter vivos transfers of priority list positions but
specifically provides that a place in line may be inherited:
An applicant for a place on an incorporated city liquor license priority list may not
execute an inter vivos transfer or assignment of his place on the priority lists. For
the purposes of this rule, "inter vivos transfer or assignment" means the
substitution of any individual; partnership; corporation, including a wholly owned
corporation; organization; association; or any other entity for the original
applicant on the waiting list. An attempt to assign inter vivos a place on an
incorporated city liquor license priority list shall result in the removal of the name
of the applicant from the lists. An applicant, however, may assign his or her place
on an alcoholic liquor license priority list by devise or bequest in a valid will. A
place on an incorporated city liquor license priority list becomes part of an
applicant's estate upon his or her death.
IDAPA 1l.05.0l.013.04.
Once ISP notifies an applicant an available license, the ISP Director has ninety (90) days
upon receipt of a liquor license application to investigate a liquor applicant and that if "such
applicant is qualified to receive a license, that his premises are suitable for the carrying on of the
business, and that the requirements of tbis act and the rules promulgated by the director are met
and complied with, [the director] shall issue such license ... " I.C § 23-907. As the rules
demonstrate, ISP has established precise criteria ensuring an applicant's place in line on a list if
the applicant has paid one-half of an annual license fee and ensuring him a license if he is not
otherwise disqualified during the investigation process. ISP has provided precise requirements
('

(
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as to the applicant's obligations, once notified of an available license. And, ISP has provided the
only manner in which that place in line may be trans felTed. Consequently, applicants have a
legitimate expectation of entitlement that, if the applicant complies with the rules, the applicant
shall be notified of an available license, in turn.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the due process requirements "apply not only to
courts but to state administrative agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses."

Eacret v. Bonner County, l39 Idaho 780, 784 (2004). It has so held in a variety of circumstances
involving applicants for licenses or permits. In Eacret, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution entitles an applicant to an
impartial and disinterested tribunal. Id. In Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho

774 (2009), the Court held that building permit holder, regardless of whether having a property
right, has a right to due process, including prompt administrative or judicial review of an interim
suspension. In Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433 (1997), held was that due process
requirements apply to proceedings of local land use boards, including decisions on applications
for conditional land use permits. In Rincover v. State Department of Finance, 124 Idaho 920

(1994), held was that an applicant for registration of securities salesperson was entitled to due
process safeguards before being deprived of opportunity to practice one's profession.
With respect to liquor licenses, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained in dicta that
"[a]lthough a liquor license is a privilege and not a propeliy right; the licensing procedure cannot
be administered arbitrarily." Crazy Horse, Inc. v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762, 765 (1977) (internal
citations omitted).4 It has "also held that a liquor license is a right of property as between a

Significantly, the Michigan Supreme Court formerly had held that a liquor license was not a "property right" but a
"privilege granted by the state." Bundo v. City of Wa!!ed Lake, 238 N.W. 2d 154, 159 (1976). See e.g. People v.
Seli a/i"WI , 134 N. W. 29 (1912). However, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled Selzaf]i"an and similar Michigan
cases in Bundo: "Those cases which have relied upon this doctrine of finding no property interests in liquor licenses

4
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licensee and third persons in that it has 'attributes of value and assignability.'" BHA
Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 355 (2003) (quoting Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386,
394 (1963». The distinction between privileges and rights clearly is no longer applicable. See
Board oj'Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 57l (1972) (the U.S. Supreme Court indicating that it
had "fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once
seemed to govern the applicability of due process rights.") Consistent with modern due process
jurisprudence, an Idaho liquor licensee is afforded all the process protection provided under the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. I.e. § 67-5254. 5 Given Eacret, Boise Tower Associates,
and Comer, an applicant is entitled to due process protection.
Again, however, this Court need not determine whether an applicant has a "property
interest." because the question here is much nalTower. Mr. Fuchs is seeking a declaration from
this Court that ISP cannot retroactively apply IDAPA11.05.01.013.04, removing all but one of
his listings from priority lists in each of five Idaho cities. The Idaho Code provides that "[n]o
part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." I.e. § 73-10 l. "An
application is deemed retrospective if it affects substantive rights." Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho
85,87 (Ct. App. 1988). "Among the rights characterized as substantive are those which are
'contractual or vested' in nature." Id. (Citing City o.fGarden City v. Cityoj'Boise, 104 Idaho
512,515 (1983». "Statutes which do not 'create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual rights'
are deemed to be remedial or procedural as opposed to substantive." Id.

can no longer be followed for this purpose." Bundo, 238 N .W. 2d at 160. See also Bisco 's Inc. v. Mich. Liquor
Control Com '/I, 238 N .W. 2d 166 (1976).
5 67 -5254 (I) provides: "[a]n agency shall not revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw or amend a license, or
refuse to renew a license of a continuing nature when the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for
renewal, unless the agency first gives notice and an opportunity for an appropriate contested case in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter or other statute."
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Myers demonstrates why IDAPAl1.05.01.04 may not be applied retroactively. Ifa
person files his application and waits his turn, he shall be notified when a new license becomes
available. In Myers, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a mandatory attorney fees statute
could not be applied retroactively but that a discretionary statute could be so applied:
When this classification scheme is applied to statutes authorizing discretiollary
awards of attorney fees, such statutes are generally held to be remedial or
procedural. Consequently, they are given retroactive effect. ... However, we
think a different analysis is required for I.C Si 12-120. Unlike I.e. Si Si 12-121 and
61-617A, I.C 12-120 provides for a malldatory~ not discretionary award of
attorney fees to the prevailing party in commercial litigation. The automatic
nature of an award under I.C § 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the
underlying commercial agreement between the parties. It establishes an
entitlement. In this respect, an award under the statute is closely akin to other
"contractual or vested" rights contained in the agreement itself.

Myers, 114 Idaho at 87 (emphasis in original).
Here, the IDAPA rules governing priority lists are not discretionary. "Priority on the list
is determined by the earliest application, each succeeding application is placed on the list in the
order received." IDAPA 11.05.01.01.

"When an incorporated city liquor license becomes

available, Alcohol Beverage Control offers it in writing to the applicant whose name first
appears on the priority list." IDAPAl1.05.01.02. "If the applicant does not notify the Alcohol
Beverage Control Bureau in writing within ten (10) days of receipt of the notice of his intention
to accept the license, the license is offered to the next applicant in priority." Id. Compare this
compulsory language to Michigan's liquor laws, where a city has unfettered discretion whether
to approve or deny a liquor license applicant and, if it wishes, may deny an application in favor
of a subsequent application, or not approve one at all. MCL 436.1501 (2). See also GUIDE TO
THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSlBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE LIQUOR CONTROL CODE
at p.ll. (Exhibit 1). As with the mandatory attorney fees statute in Myers, which guarantees an

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUSTADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Page 12 of 17

U L5

applicant his place in line on a priority list, IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01, "establishes an
entitlement." Myers, 114 Idaho at 87.
This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss and allow this action to proceed to
Declaratory Judgment.

IV.
THIS MATTER FALLS SQUARLYWITHIN THREE EXCEPTIONS TO THE
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
ISP's attempt to retroactively apply its 2007 amendments to its priority list rules without
notice to Mr. Fuchs or others is a matter properly before the Court, because of three exceptions
to the exhaustion doctrine. First, it would be futile for this Court to remand the matter back to
the agency, when it is clear a decision has already been made. Second, ISP provided no notice to
Mr. Fuchs of its decision retroactively to apply the amendments, until after the decision had been
made. Finally, the lAP A provides that parties seeking to challenge the validity or applicability
of a rule may do so by filing a declaratory judgment action in district court.
In Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234 (Ct. App. 1990), the Idaho Court of
Appeals set forth three exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, two of which apply here:
Illustrative of the circumstances which require an exception to the exhaustion
doctrine include: (1) where resort to admillistrative procedures would befutile;
(2) where the aggrieved party is challenging the constitutionality of the agency's
actions or of the agency itself; or (3) where the aggrieved party has 110 notice

of the initial admillistrative decision or no opportunity to exercise the
administrative review procedures. McConnell v. City of Seattle, 44 Wash.App.
316,722 P.2d 121,124 (1986)

Peterson, 117 Idaho at 23 7 (emphasis added). See also Grever v. Idaho Telephone Co., 94 Idaho
900, 903,499 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1972).
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First, resorting to administrative procedures would be futile in this case. There is no
proceeding to which this Court could "remand.,,6 There is no contested case or prior proceeding,
because ISP made its decision retroactively to apply the amendments, and it calTied the decision
out, only notifying Mr. Fuchs and other applicants after the deed was done.

There is no

proceeding to which to "remand". Second, Fuchs had "no notice of the initial administrative
decision or no opportunity to exercise the administrative review procedures." Fuchs was notified
only after the decision was made by a letter that included a check refunding the money he had
deposited to reserve his place inline.

7

ISP's actions fall squarely within Peterson's exception to

the exhaustion doctrine for parties given no notice the "initial agency decision." Peterson, 117
Idaho at 237.
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that there is an additional exception to
the exhaustion doctrine regarding agency rules:
While the general rule is that a contestant must first exhaust administrative
remedies before filing a complaint in district court, there is an exception for
declaratory judgments regarding agency rules. The IAPA provides:
"The validity or applicability of a rule may be detemlined in an action for
declaratory judgment in the district court if it is alleged that the rule, or its
threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or
impair, the legal rights of the petitioner .,. a declaratory judgment may be
rendered whether or not the petitioner has requested the agency to pass upon the
validity or applicability of the rule in question."

Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003) (quoting I.e. §§ 67-5278 (l), (3).
Here, Mr. Fuchs is challenging the validity of the retroactive application of an agency
rule that has interfered with his legal rights and the legal rights of all applicants who had mUltiple
listings on city priority lists.

This challenge, attacking a broad agency action, expressly

() "Remand" is defined as "[t]o send (a case or claim) back to the court or tribunal from which it came for some
th
further action." BLACK'S LA W DICTIONARY, 8 Ed. (2004).
7 See July 24, 2009 letter from Lt. Robert Clements to Daniel Fuchs; Exhibit 1 to Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs, filed
September 4,2009.
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authorized litigants to file a declaratory judgment action
Administrative Procedures Act,

111

district court under the Idaho

I.e. § 67-5278.

ISP argues that the 2007 amendment to IDAPA 11.05.0l.013.04 was properly
promulgated.

But, Fuchs is not challenging the amendment as promulgated in 2007.

Presumably, applicants who seek placement on priority lists after its effective date, March 6,
2007, "shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city priority list." However,
ISP's July 24, 2009 letter, retroactively applying the 2007 mle amendment, was a new rule. In

Asarco, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a DEQ pollutant standard known as a "TMDL"
constituted an agency mle and the plaintiff mining companies properly "sought a declaratory
judgment regarding the validity of the TMDL as a rule." Asarco, 138 Idaho at 725. Although
DEQ had not promulgated the TMDL, it was still a rule, albeit an informal and invalid one,
because it was "an expression of agency policy not previously expressed." Asarco, 138 Idaho at
724. Likewise, Mr. Fuchs is challenging agency action "not previously expressed." The July 24,
2009 letter implemented a new expression of policy.

Nothing in IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04

suggests that the new mle was to be applied retroactively. ISP did not attempt to do so until
2009. This kind of informal rulemaking the Idaho Supreme Comi rejected in Asarco. It is a
matter properly before this Court.
There are no administrative remedies to exhaust.

ISP made its initial decision

retroactively to apply its 2007 amendments, without notice to Mr. Fuchs or any other similarly
situated applicants.

This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust

Administrative Remedies and allow this action to proceed to Declaratory Judgment.
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V.
CONCLUSION

In Michigan, local governments have unfettered discretion whether to approve or deny an
application for a first-time liquor license.

In Idaho, ISP has promulgated rules providing

applicants' places in line on priority lists, whereby applicants shall be notified of new licenses as
they become available. There is no discretion. ISP's administration of the lists, under the rules,
is ministerial. Under Idaho law, statutes and rules cannot be applied retroactively, if they affect
substantive or vested rights. Fuchs's place in line on the affected priority lists is a substantive,
vested right.
This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies.

There are no administrative remedies to exhaust.

Rather, ISP's retroactive

application of its rules is contrary to Idaho law. This Court should deny ISP's Motion and allow
this action to proceed to Declaratory Judgment.

Brian Donesley
Attomey for Petitioner/Plaintiff Daniel S.
Fuchs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 20 th day of November, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above document on
the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to the following party by method indicated
below:

] U.S. Mail
] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ X] Facsimile (884-7228)

Cheryl Meade, Deputy A.G.
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian,ID 83642-6202
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CHERYL E. MEADE
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Dr,
Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone: (208) 884-7050
Facsimile: (208) 884-7228
Idaho State Bar No. 6200
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
DANIEL S. FUCHS,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of )
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol
)
Beverage Control,
)
)
Respondent.
)
)

v.

Case No. CV-2009-03914
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

COMES NOW, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho State Police,
Alcohol Beverage Control ("ABC") and hereby files its Supplemental Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to the Court's direction given to counsel on November 2,2009.

I. SUMMARY OF THE :FACTS
1. Fuchs applied for numerous retail liquor by the drink licenses between June 2, 1994
and February 13, 1995, in Blaine, Idaho Falls and Twin Falls Counties, to wit; in Blaine County
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Fuchs remains on the Bellevue, Idaho priority list once and was issued a refund for a second
position on the list; Fuchs remains on the Hailey, Idaho priority list once and was issued a refund
for a second and third position on the list; Fuchs remains on the Ketchum, Idaho priority list once
and was issued a refund for a second and third position on the list; Fuchs remains on the Sun
Valley, Idaho priority list once and was issued a refund for a second and third position on the
list; Fuchs remains on the Idaho Falls, Idaho priority list once and was issued a reflmd for a
second position on the list; Fuchs remains on the Twin Falls, Idaho priority list once and was
issued a refund for a second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth position on the list.
2. On or about July 24, 2009, ABC, in accordance with IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04,
returned Fuchs' applications where his name appeared more than one time on each incorporated
city priority list. Mr. Fuchs' money was returned to him for the numerous application fees he
submitted. ABC, per its rule, allowed Fuchs to retain the highest place he held on each list
mentioned above in paragraph number 1.
3. On November 2,2009, the court directed the parties to file a memorandum addressing
the opinion of a Sixth Circuit Comi of Appeals case and any subsequent cases. See, Wojcik v.

Romulus, 257 F.3d. 600 (2001).
II. ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE DENIED WHEN:
A. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAI~LY PROTECTED PROPERTY
INTEREST EXTENDED TO A LIQUOR LICENSE APPLICANT, WHOSE
NAME APPEARS ON A PRIORITY LIST. NEITHER IDAHO'S LIQUOR
ACT NOR ABC'S RULES PROVIDE FOR SUCH AND ANY EXPECTATION
OF SUCH, ON THE PART O"F THE APPLICANT IS UNILATERAL IN
NATURE.
B. IF THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY
INTEREST BETWEEN THE STATE OF IDAHO AND A LIQUOR
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OF MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

LICENSE APPLICANT, THEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ARE
INFRINGED UPON AND THE STATE OF IDAHO CAN APPLY AN
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE RETROACTIVELY IN ORDER TO CARRY
OUT LEGISIJATIVE INTENT TO DISCOURAGE SPECULATION IN
LIQUOR LICENSING.
C. AI,TERNATIVELY, IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE AGENCY'S
ACTION GIVES RISE TO A CONTESTED CASE, THE APPLICANT HAS
STILL FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ANI>
THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED SO THAT A COMPLETE
RECORD MAY BE DEVELOPED FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW ON
APPEAl...
APPLICABLE LAW AND ARGUMENT ON THE ISSUES
A. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST
EXTENDED TO A LIQUOR LICENSE APPLICANT, WHOSE NAME APPEARS
ON A PRIORITY LIST. NEITHER IDAHO'S LIQUOR ACT NOR ABC'S
RULES PROVIDE FOR SUCH AND ANY EXPECTATION OF SUCH, ON THE
PART OF THE APPLICANT IS UNILATERAL IN NATURE.
This Court invited counsel for both sides to submit additional briefing for a case handed
down from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, arising from the State of Michigan, However, in
order to more effectively compare similarities and differences of Michigan's liquor law, a
foundation ofIdaho's laws and regulations is provided below.
IDAHO CODE § 23-901 declares the legislature'S policy in the regulation and sale of
alcoholic beverages by and through the state's liquor stores and the director ofIdaho State
Police. The director, along with the county commissioners and the councils of cities in the state
of Idaho, are "empowered and authorized to grant licenses to persons qualified under this act ...
and under the rules promulgated by said director ... "
Much like Michigan's code provisions, a duality in the granting ofliquor licenses exists
also in Idaho. The final decision, to issue a liquor license in Michigan, appears to rest with the
state's liquor control commission. Municipalities in Michigan appear to play an initial role in the
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permitting process. In Idaho, it appears the final authority in granting a liquor license is vested
in the director of Idaho State Police. Likewise, a liquor license applicant in Idaho must also seek
approval from the county and city where the license is to be placed. See, IDAHO CODE §§

23~

903,23-916 and 23-1009.
IDAHO CODE §§ 23-905 and 23-910 covers the larger portion of requirements that an
applicant must meet in order to be granted a liquor by the drink license from ABC. At anyone
of these points, the director (through ABC's delegated authority) could deem a premise
unsuitable or an applicant unqualified.
Another relevant statute is IDAHO CODE § 23-907. It states in pertinent part,

If the director shall determine that the contents of the application are true,
[that the applicant's premises are suitable and that the requirements of this
act and the rules promulgated by the director are met], that such applicant
is qualified to receive a license; otherwise the application shall be denied and
the license fee, less the costs and expenses of investigation, are returned to
the applicant. (emphasis added)
The placement of the word "if' before the director's determination creates a conditional
clause bringing into question whether the contents of an application are true or not, or if an
applicant may have met other requirements. What this means grammatically, is that the director
must determine: 1) whether the contents of an application are true or not, 2) if an applicant
qualifies by ABC's rules, and 3) if an applicant's premises are suitable.
While some elements may be answered more definitively, such as the truthfulness of the
contents of an application, other elements may not be identified so easily. For example, a
premise may not be suitable for a number of reasons. Some reasons include proximity to a
church or school, does the premise have a history of numerous calls for service by law
enforcement, what types of other businesses are close to the premises, and is there a residential
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area in close proximity that will be impacted negatively. Reasons such as these may require the
director to use discretion in deciding whether a license will be granted.
Even the word "determine" is defined as: "to establish or asceliain definitely, as after
consideration, investigation, or calculation." Dictionary.com (December 2,2009), As the
language plainly states, the director's determination must be made prior to issuing a liquor
license to an applicant. The director's determination is based upon an investigation and his
further consideration of whether or not an applicant is qualified to receive a license.

The

legislature's use of the word "determine," lends extra support in symbolizing the amount of
discretion the director has in approving liquor license applicants. To think otherwise would lead
to an absurd contortion of the law, i.e. that anyone who applies for a liguor license is guaranteed
to receive a liquor license, regardless of the statutory requirements. Clearly this is not the case.
When an application is denied by the director, then the applicant's license fee is returned
minus any costs associated with an investigation. The requirement to return the application fee
or a portion of it clearly demonstrates that any type of contractual relationship is absent.
Fm1hermore, an applicant is on notice that an application can be denied. Therefore, there can be
no expectation on the part of an applicant that a license is guaranteed.
Furthermore, in an instance such as this one, an applicant merely wishing to be placed on

a waiting list may do so with a minimal investment. The only requirements to be placed 011 the
waiting list are that one-half (112) of the application fee is paid at the time a two-page application
is submitted. Additionally, persons such as Mr. Fuchs desiring only to be placed on the waiting
list are not required to name or show any pmticular building or premises upon which liquor is to
be sold nor are they required to show that they are the holder of a license to sell beer. IDAPA
Rule 11.05.01.013.01 and IDAHO CODE § 23-910(5).
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMOR1\NDUM fN SUPPORT
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In fact, such persons are not even required to submit the lion's share of the application
materials as required by IDAHO CODE § 23-905 until a person's name comes to the top of the
waiting list. Therefore, up until this point, any effort in relation to time and expense on the part
of said person to get their name on the waiting list is nominal at best.
IDAHO CODE § 23-932, provides additional evidence in the amount of discretion that the
director has in liquor licensing. It states in relevant part,
[D]irector shall be empowered and it is made his duty to prescribe ... , the
proof to be furnished and the conditions to be observed in the issuance of
licenses ... the conditions and qualifications necessary to obtain a license ...
The language is plain in giving the director the discretion over the proof to be furnished
and conditions an applicant is to observe in obtaining a liquor license. The director also has the
discretion in prescribing the conditions and qualifications needed by an applicant to obtain a
liquor license. Because the Idaho Legislature granted such expansive authority to the director of
Idaho State Police, any other interpretation would lead to a distortion of the law. Surely, the
legislatLue did not intend for liquor licenses to be issued to anyone and everyone who asked to be
placed on the waiting list. Nor did the legislature intend that it be involved in the discretionary
decisions of who obtains a liquor license. Any claims made by Mr. Fuchs that the director acts
only in a ministerial capacity and has no discretion in the issuance of liquor licenses, is without
merit.
Against this similar legal backdrop, the United States Court of Appeals, in the Sixth
Circuit held,
A first time (enteliainment pelmit) applicant had no constitutionally
cognizable property interest in said permit, where state law required approval
of the permit by the state liquor commission and city; pennitee was not
entitled to any procedural or substantive due process rights." Wojick v. City
of Romulus 257 F.3d 600,610-612 (2001).
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Wojick built its holding upon the foundation established in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.

527,529 n. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1908,68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth_408
U.S.S64, 577, (1972»; see also, Verba v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 851 F.2d 811, 813 (6 th
Cir.1988),
Even though individuals often claim property interests under various
provisions of the Constitution, such interests are not created by the
Constitution; nor may individuals manufacture a propeIiy interest. Unilateral
expectations of a property interest are insufficient to trigger due process
concerns. Instead, property interests "are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law~rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. (emphasis added).
In Roth, the court stated where there was no state statute entitling an assistant professor to
reemployment, or any other creation of a legitimate claim to

such~

there was no property interest

in the position. Therefore, the assistant professor was not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the University was not required to grant a hearing to this employee.

In order to get to the merits of a due process claim, the Supreme Court's analysis in Roth
clearly shows that a cognizable propelty interest must be established first. This appears to be in
contravention to the position taken by Mr. Fuchs.
In Wojick, the court also looked to another Michigan case for support of its mling that
first time applicants of enteltainment penuits have no rights giving rise to due process. Shamie
v. City of Pontiac, 443 F. Supp. 679,683 (E.D.Mich.1977), aff'd in part, 620 F.2d 118 (6 th Cir.
1980) ("Where state law required approval of state liquor commission and city [U]nder
Michigan Jaw a first time applicant for a liquor license, as distinguished from a license holder
facing renewal or revocation proceedings, does not have a protected interest.") (emphasis
added).
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While Idaho has never specifically addressed the issue of whether or not a liquor license
applicant has an alleged property interest in a position on a municipal priority list, there are
several Idaho cases that are germane to this limited discussion. They are as follows:

BHA Investments, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 348, 354 (2003) (reaffirming the Idaho
Supreme Comi's previous holding, "that a liquor license is not a right of property,
implying that it is not property in any constitutional sense.")
Crazy Horse, Inc. v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762, 765 (1977) ("A liquor license applicant
can be denied a license because there is no constitutional guarantee [in] the right to
compete in the retail liquor markeC')(citing, Gartland v. Talbott" 72 Idaho 125,131
(1951) ("the selling of intoxicating liquor is a proper subject for control and regulation
under the police power. It is likewise universally accepted that no one has an inherent or
constitutional right to engage in a business of selling or dealing in intoxicating liquors.")
(citations omitted)
Nampa Lodge No. 1389 v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 215~16, (1951) A liquor license is
simply the grant or permission under govenm1ental authority to the licensee to engage in
the business of selling liquor. Such a license is a temporary permit to do that which
would otherwise be unlawful; it is a privilege rather than a natmal right and is personal to
the licensee; it is neither a right of propeliy nor a contract, or a contract right.

Cf Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 394, (1963) ("a liquor license is a right of
propeliy as between a licensee and third persons in that it has "attributes of value and
assignability. ")
Idaho's high comi has consistently ruled numerous times, over the span of 45 plus years,
that a liquor licensee has no constitutional property right or interest in a liquor license as between
a licensee and the state. ABC argues that a mere applicant could never expect to have more
rights than a card carrying licensee and any such expectation would be completely and totally
unilateral on the part of the applicant.
B. IF THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED I>ROPERTY
INTEREST BETWEEN THE STATE OF IDAHO AND A LIQUOR LICENSE
APPLICANT, THEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ARE INFRINGED UPON
AND THE STATE OF IDAHO CAN APPLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
RETROACTIVEL Y IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT LEGISLA TIVE INTJ1~NT TO
DISCOURAGE SPECULATION IN LIQUOR LICENSING.
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Beginning with the enactment of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IOAP A")
itself, the bill's authors, Michael S. Gilmore and Dale D. Goble, wrote a comprehensive
explanation and analysis of how administrative rule writing and contested cases before state
agencies was to be carried out. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer for the

Practitioner, 30 Idaho Law Rev. 273, 367 (199311994).
According to IDAHO CODE § 67-5224(5)(a), "[a] rule which is final and effective may be
applied retroactively, as provided in the rule." Gilmore and Goble go on to state that some of
those occasions of when a rule may be applied retroactively, i.e. where the agency is correcting a
mistake or where retroactivity is unlikely to pose constitutional problems. ld. at 303.
Idaho's high court has also examined the tension between prospective and retroactive
application of statutes/rules. See, City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 515

(1983), (citing Ohlinger v. Us., 135 F. Supp. 40 (D.C. Idaho 1955), Remedial or procedural
statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights are
generally held to operate retrospectively.") See also, Floyd v. Board of Commissioners of

Bonneville County, 131 Idaho 234, 238 (1998), ("patiies do not have a substantial vested right in
a particular standard of review by a court.") See also, Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of

Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statues are to be Construed, 3 Van.L.
Rev. 395,402 (1950), identifying the conflict between the canon t.hat,
[a] statute imposing a new penalty or forfeiture or a new liability or
disability, or creating a new right of action will not be construed as having a
retroactive effect;
And the countervailing rule that
[r]emedial statutes are to be liberally construed and if a retroactive
interpretation will promote the ends of justice, they should receive such
construction. (citations omitted).
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IDAPA rule 11.05.01.013.04 ("Rule .04") is the rule upon which the agency's action in
this case turns. It provides in pertinent pati,
An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city
priority list. An applicant must be able to demonstrate 10 the Director the
ability to place an awarded lkense into actual use as required by Section 23908(4), Idaho Code and these rules.
As noted by the limited agency record, ABC asserts that Rule .04 is purely a procedural
rule and is remedial in nature. Rule .04 states that an applicant is required to show that the
license will be put into actual use according to IDAHO CODE § 23-908. ABC directs the attention
of this COUlt to the Statement of Purpose drafted when IDAHO CODE § 23-908 was moving
through the legislature. Agency Record ("A.R.") 22, attached and incorporated herein. While
we are not privy as to any nefarious acts associated with liquor licensing speculation, we do
know this piece of legislation was not created in a vacuum. According to this document, the
legislatU1'e surely must have felt the issue important enough that the state should control the
speCUlation in liquor licensing.
As the record reflects Rule .04 was drafted in the summer of 2006. A.R. 2. It was
disseminated to a working ad hoc group, consisting of community partners and interest groups,
whose goal was to reform Idaho's liquor laws. ABC sought input fl'om this group as pmt of its
informal rule making process. A.R. 3 and 4. A second draft of the rule was composed based
upon those suggestions. A.R. 6
The only change made to Rule .04 happened when the words "at a time" was inserted.
The essence of the rule was left unchanged. A.R. 2 and 6. Rule .04 was sent out again to the
same ad hoc group where a discussion of the rule took place. A.R. 8 and 9. Rule .04 was
published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin on October 4,2006. A.R. 13. ABC's rule
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORA.NDUM IN SUPPORT
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changes went before the respective House and Senate subcommittees for commentary. A.R. 16,
17 and 19.
According to the testimony by ABC during the I-louse presentation, the new licenses
being issued were either not being used or they were being used illegally. A.R. 16, pg. 2.
Comments, fro111 certain members of the ad hoc group, about Rule .04 included testimony that
they felt a change in this section was discriminatory and Ulmecessary.ld., pg.3. The House
voted to approve ABC's rules, but struck the rule addressing the allowance of a multi-purpose
arena. Id.
ABC's Rules were also presented to the Senate subcommittee. A.R. 17 and 19.
According to the testimony given by Brian Donesley, "Rule ,013.04 issue was the waiting list."
A.R. 17, pg. 2. Mr. Donesley explained to the committee that "[t]he priority list is first in time,
first in line, and ISP's complaint is that persons have more than one place on the waiting list
within a city. This rule change addresses that." ld. The subcommittee then rescheduled another
time for additional testimony to be taken. ld. At the following meeting, Mr. Donesley spoke
about Rule .04 stating there had been litigation 25 years earlier over the priority list. A.R. 19, pg.
4. However, it is unknown if ABC has been able to locate any documents to date evidencing
this action. Like the House, the Senate subcommittee voted to approve ABC's rules as written,
but moved to reject the multi-purpose arena rule. Id., pg.7.

It is obvious that as Rule ,04 was making its way through the rulemaking process, there
was ample opportunity by the legislative subcommittees, to either change the rule or completely
reject this rule in its entirety. However, knowing now that the legislature had previously sought
to limit the speculation of liquor licenses, it is no surprise that the legislature passed Rule ,04 as
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it was written. It is clear that Rule .04 is remedial in nature as to correct the overpopulation of

waiting lists by speculators.
As the testimony reflects, Rule .04 was drafted to correct a procedure that allowed the
speculation ofliquor licenses. Applicants' actions in submitting their names numerous times for
each municipal priority list is in violation OfIDAHO CODE § 23·908. Therefore, applicants should
have no expectation of being able to maintain a position on a waiting list due to their unclean
hands.
Furthem10re, if one were to look at the context of the entirety of ABC's IDAPA rules
addressing priority lists, the fundamental nature of this group of rules implicitly demonstrates
only how ABC is to process applications as they are received. See IDAPA 11.05.0 I.O 13 et seq.
There are no substantive or implied contract rights found in any of these rules. When the rules
are read alongside the statutes discussed above, it is clear that a mere applicant on a waiting list
has no property interest in a position on that list.
C. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE AGENCY'S ACTION
GIVES RISE TO A CONTESTED CASE, THE APPLICANT HAS STILL FAILED
TO EXHAUST HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND THE MATTER
SHOULD BE REMANDED SO THAT A COMPLETE RECORD MAY BE
DEVELOPED FOR THIS COURT'S REVIE\V ON APPEAL.

As argued before, in ABC's Response to the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Judicial
Review, IDAHO CODE § 23-933 provides the statutory mechanism to be applied in contested
cases brought by ABC before the director. It states that such a procedure shall be in accordance
with the provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("lAP A") found in Title 67,
chapter 52, IDAHO CODE. See also, ABC's Response to the Petitioner's Amended Petition for
Judicial Review.
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IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(6) defines a contested case as "a proceeding that results in the
issuance of an order," Additionally, IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(12) defines an order as "an agency
action of particular applicability that determines the ... privileges ... of one or more specific
persons." Finally, agency action is defined by IDAHO CODE § 67-5201(3) as "an agency's
perfonnance of: or failure to perform, any duty placed on it by law."
Mr. Fuchs claims that because ABC sent only a letter to him stating the action it was
taking, i.e. removing him from various priority lists, that ABC did not issue a formal order giving
him notice of the agency action. As a result, Mr. Fuchs asserts that because of the way ABC
applied Rule .04 to his case, he should be able to seek relief directly to the district court. Such an
assertion completely disregards the law stated above.
If this COUli were to apply the doctrine of liberal construction, it would construe the
lAP A's language, so as to give full legislative effect in this immediate action. The reasoning
found in American Falls Reservoir District No.2, v. Idaho Department qlWater Resources, 143
Idaho

862~

871-873 (2007) is likewise, proper in this instance. In American Falls, the Idaho

Supreme Court held, "IDAHO CODE § 67~5278 .. , [provides] standing to challenge a rule, but
does not eliminate the need for completion of administrative proceedings for an as applied
challenge." Cf Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 147 Idaho 232 (2009) (finding that ifno
administrative remedy for the agency action exists to contest an agency's action, then a party can
seek declaratory relief without exhausting administrative remedies first).
Fuchs clearly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in this matter as required by
statute and case law. The absence of discovery and testimony taken before a hearing officer in a
case such as this clearly violates the policy provisions set [ol1h found in the Arnerican Falls
opinion.
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Unquestionably, ABC was performing a duty placed on it by Rule .04, which was to
ensure that those who may be granted the privilege of selling alcohol be able to show that they
could truly put a liquor license into actual use and were not just speCUlating in liquor licensing.

III. CONCLUSION
The terms and conditions under which a liquor license is granted are subject to the
pleasure of the legislature. Most importantly, in the State ofIdaho, a liquor license is a grant or
permission under government authority to the licensee to engage in the business of selling liquor.
Such a license is a temporary permit to do that, which would otherwise be unlawful. No
property rights, as between the state and a licensee, have been established either in law or rule.
The Michigan cases above, clearly distinguishes the difference between a license holder
and a license applicant in the State of Michigan.

In Michigan, while a liquor licensee may

have some protected interest in an already issued liquor license, an applicant for a liquor license,
does not have a protected interest and does not have any entitlement in such.
ABC respectfully asks this court to find, that based upon Idaho's laws, regulations and
case law, a liquor license applicant can have no expectation of having any property rights in a
position on a waiting list and that Mr. Fuchs' petition be dismissed in its entirety per I.R.C.P.
12(b)(1) and lor 12(b)(6).
If this COUli should find that Mr. Fuchs' has some protected interest in a position on a
waiting list, then ABC respectfully requests that Mr. Fuchs' petition be dismissed for failure to
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exhaust administrative remedies.
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Dated this _1_ day of December, 2009.

A E

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
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Attorney at Law
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_Hand Delivery
__ Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
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exemptions.
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COMES NOW, Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), by and through his attorney of
record, Brian Donesley, and submits the following Supplemental Reply MeJlnorandum in
opposition to Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol.
Beverage Control's ("ISP") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies:

I.
INTRODUCTION
This Court has permitted additional briefing, regarding whether Fuchs has at "property
interest" in his application for a Retail Alcohol Beverage License. Fuchs filed his Supplemental
Memorandum In Opposition To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies ("Fuchs' Supplemental Memorandum?1) on November 23 1 2009. ISF'
filed Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss ("ISP's
Supplemental Memorandum") on December 7, 2009. Fuchs submits this Reply Nlemorand1.Il:rl,
because ISP bas demonstrated in its briefing that there are no disputes as to any mat~~rial facts,

and that no additional discovery or briefing is necessary. J This Cou.rt has all uf the applicable
facts and legal authority before it and may issue its ruling declaring that rSF.' may not

retroactively apply IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 in violation ofLC. § 73-101.
II.
ISP DOES NOT H,<\.VE DISCRETION TO APPROVE OR DENY
QUALIFIED LIQUOR LICENSE APPLICATIONS

In Michigan, local governmental units have unfettered discretion to decide whetht~r to
grant any particular first-time liquor license applicant the right to sell retail liquor for

consumption on its premises. (Fuchs' Supplemental Memorandum at 4-7). In Idaho, by corif:rru;t,

J

In ISP's Suppleme:ntal Memorandum has made several irrelevant faotual assertions, citing the "Agency Reoord,"

(lSP's Supplemental Memorandum at 10). Fuchs assumes these facts to be true for the purposes of this brieting, As
a practical matter, any facts beyond Mr, Fuchs' placement On the five city priority lists and the July 24, 2009 letter

removing his name from the lists are irrelevant to these proceedings.
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ISP promulgated IDAPA rules establishing a priority system, first in time, first in right, that
guarantees that a liquor license applicant shall be notified of an available license if 111e applic:mt
complies with specific requirements and waits in tum. IDAPA

11.05.01.01~5.

(Fuchs'

Supplemental Memorandum at 7-11). Moreover, once an applicant submits an application for a
liquor license, the ISP Director has a must issue the license within ninety (90) days, if the
applicant has demonstrated that he is qualified and no disqualifying circumstancel:> t:xi~~t. I.e. §

23-907. ISP has argued to the contrary~ that it has complete discretion whether to approve or
deny an application, similar to the discretion provided to Michigan cities and townships oveT
first-time applicants. (Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum at 4-6). This is wrong:. ISP's
role in administering liquor license applications is purely ministerial.
In Mickelson v. City o/Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Cottrt rejected

a city~ s attempt to apply a 1940 beer licensing ordinance over a 1968 zoning ordinance s:o that it
could deny a beer license to an otherwise qualified applicant. The Idaho Supreme Court held

that the later ordinance controlled but, mote importantly to this case, explained that if an

applicant is qualified to receive the license, the license must issue:
The record also indicates that Mickelson possessed all tile other qualifications,
and none of the disqualifications, set by statute and ordinance as prerequisite)s for
the issuance of a license to operate a beer tavern. The city council therefore had
no discretion to deny him a license; its duty to issue the license was pure~y
ministerial, and the district court erred in not issuing its writ of mandate to
compel the city council to perform its duty.

Mickelson, 101 Idaho at 308 (emphasis added).
While Mickelson involved a city's issuance ofa beer license, ISP's role is likewi:;e
ministerial. Once ISP notifies an applicant an available license) the ISP Director has ninety (90)
days upon receipt of a liquor license application to investigate a liquor applicant. IffOl.U]d thal

"such applicant is qualified to receive a license, that his premises are suitable for the carJ:ying On
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of the business, and that the requirements of this act and the rules promulgated by the director are
met and complied with, [the director] shall issue such license ... "

I.e. § 23-907.

Further, ISP does not dispute that, under Idaho law, license applicants have due process
rights. In Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court
explained that due process requirements "apply not only to courts but to state administrative
agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for licenses.".2 (fuchs's Supplemental

Memorandum at 10-11). Instead of addressing Eacret and the other Idaho cases providing due
process protection to applicants, ISP continues to argu1e what it always argues: that a liquor
license is a "privilege" and not a "property right." (Respondent's Supplemental Memor,andum at
7-8). ISP's position misses the point. Both applicants and licensees have due process protection.

Moreover, ISP's position is antiquated, having been dispensed with many years agO', when the
United States Supreme Court "fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights'
and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of due process rights." Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 u.s. 564, 571 (1972).
ISP established a set of rule governing priority lists. As a result, first-time

appHc:aJO.t~;

who

place their name on these priority lists have a legal expectation, based upon state law, that, if
they comply with the legal requirements set forth in the nIles and statutes and wait their 1:1.1111,
they shall be notified of new license when it becomes available. Because there was no limitation
011

the nwnber oftiln<::;5 any particular applicant's nam~ may appear on a priority list until 2007,

those applicants who placed their names on lists before that date are entitled to each oftheir
places in line.

2 See

also, Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. H08land, 147 Xdaho 774 (2009) and Comer v. County o/Twill.Falls, 130

Idaho 433 (1997).
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III.
ABSENT EXPRESS AUTHORITY, ISP CANNOT RETROACTIVELY APPLY ITS
RULES AFFECTING SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
It is established Idaho law that unless a statute expressly so provides, it cannot be: applie:d

retroactively, if it affects a substantive right. The Idaho Courts specifically have explained that a

statute that affects a substantive right is one that affects rights which are "contractual or vested."
Myers v. Vermass, 114 Idaho 85,87 (1988). Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish o:r

destroy contractual or vested rights are deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed to
substantive."

[d.

Without explaining any basis for its position, ISP argues that IDAFA

11.05,01.04 is a procedural or remedial tule and tberef,ore it can be applied retroactively, This

argument makes no sense. IDAPA 11.05.01.01 through .05 establish a priority list system. It
creates or enlarges a substantive right, the right to a place in line on a priority list. IDAPA
11.05.01.04 cannot be applied retroactively.

ISP argues that it may apply its rules retroactively, based upon I.e. § 67-5224 (5) (a).
(ISP's Supplemental Memorandum at 9). Not only was no I'finar' rule promulgated, this statute

provides "[a] rule which is final and effective may be applied retroactively as provided in the

rule." (Emphasis added). This statute does not apply on its face. I.C. § 67-5224 (5) (a) provides
that retroactivity is pennitted if the "final" rule itself provides. This is consistent with I.e. § 73101, which states "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so deelal'ed.,,3
Nothing in IDAPA 11.05.01.04 suggests any kind of retroactive application. ISP knows this. In

fact, it did not even attempt retroactive application until two years after the nlle was
promulgated. That ISP would suggest that LC. § 67-5224 (5) (a) supports its condu<;t
demonstrales to what length it will go to justify its actions.
3 It sh()uld be further noted that ISP takes 1. C. § 67~5224 (5) (a) out of its context. The purpose of tlw statute was to
address potential probJem!1 created by the time between the publication of a pending rule and its final adoption. The
title of the statute makes that obvious: "Pending Rule -- Final Rule - Effective Date,"
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REME.DlES
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Finally, ISP does not even address the mandatory/discretionary distinction tJlat tl:u~ },1yers
court uses to demonstrate the difference between substantive and procedural statutes. (Fuchs'
Supplemental Memorandum at 12). Statutes that are mandatory affect substantive rights;
statutes that are discretionary are procedural or remedial. Myers, 114 Idaho at 87. The! m.APA
rules governing priority lists are mandatory and not discretionary. "Priority on the list is
determined by the earliest application, each succeeding application is placed on the list: in the
order received.~' IDAPA 11.05.01.01. Moreover, IDAPA 11.05.01.01 creates a rigM because it
establishes a priority system that had previously not existed. ISP's position that IDAP A
11.05.01.04 is a procedural rule is without merit.
This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore) because it has :all ofthe~
necessary facts and legal authority before it, the Court should declare that ISP's attempt
retroactively to apply IDAPA 11.05.01.04 is void and prohibited as a matter of law.
IV,
ISP DOES NOT CRAI,LENGE FUCH'S ~RGUMENT THAT THIS CASJE F'}.!J:"I,S
WITHIN THREE EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

There is no dispute that the general rule is that a party must first exhaust administrative
remedies before resorting to district court. American Palls Reservoir Dist. No.2, v. ldAi!flO Dept.

o/Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862,871.873 (2007). In his Supplemental Memorandum, Fuchs
asserted three exceptions to that rule that apply here. (Fuchs' Supplemental Memorandum at 13·
15). Firsl, courts do not require exhaustion, when remand would be futile. Peterson v. City of

Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 237 (et. App. 1990). Second, courts do not require remand 'wh,~n the
agency provided the party no notice of its intended action, only infonning him of it after the
action was completed. Id. Finally, courts do not require exhaustion when tbe party is challenging
the validity ofa rule. Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003); I.e. §§ 67-5278 (1), (3).
SUPPLEMEN'l'AL REPLY MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION to RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
DXSMlSS :FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATXVE REMEDIES
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ISP ignores these exceptions. Instead, ISP does nothing more than reiterate the general.
rule that exhaustion is required. (ISP's Supplemental Memorandum at 12-13). ISP's faihlre
even to respond to Fuchs' arguments is a tacit admission that these three exceptions apply. By

failing to argue otherwise, ISP concedes that this case falls squarely within the thre:e exc.eptions
to the exhaustion doctrine.
Instead ISP argues that this Courl should dismiss this action based upon e:roaustion and
return it to a non-existent hearing officer so that ISP may conduct discovery.

(ISP's

Supplemental Memorandum at 13, "the absence of discovery and testimony taken before a

hearing officer in a case such as this clearly violates the policy provisions se forth foun.d [sic] in
the American Falls opinion.") ISP fails to demonstrate why such discovery would be

necl~ssary

or beneficial. ISP already made its decision retroactively to apply IDAPAl 1.05.01.04. There is
no hearing officer to which this Court may remand this matter, nor is there any reason t'o appoi,nt
one nOw. ISP has already made its decision.

This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Admill:istrative
Remedies and hold that ISP is prohibited from retroactively applying IDAPA 11.05.01004.
V.

CONCLUSION

Further, this Court has all of the material, undisputed facts before it and all of the
pertinent legal authority.

ISP violated Idaho law when it retroactively applied mAPA

11.05.01.04, removing Fuchs' name and the names of other applicants from five city priority

lists. This Court should declare ISP's retroactive application null and void and order IS? to
restore each listing of Fuchs , name On each of the priority lists to the place they secured prior to
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July 24,2009. This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this 9th day of December, 2009.

Brian Donesley
Attorney for PetitionerlPlaintiff
Daniel S. Fuchs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this 9th day of December, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above doc1.lment on
the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to the following party by method. indicated
below:

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ X] Facsimile (884-7228)

Cheryl Meade, Deputy A.G.
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642-6202
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Barbi McCary Crowell
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Daniel S. Fuchs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

E ruTa JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND OR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. CV 2009-3914
(Collsolidated with Case No. CV 2009-

v.

418~)

STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMTh'lSTRA TIVE REMEDIES

Control,

Respondent.
J) ANlEL

S. FUCHS,

Plaintiff,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage

Control,
Defendant.
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COMES NOW, Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), by and through his attorney of

record, Brian Donesley, and submits the followiug Second Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol
Beverage Control's ("ISP") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies:

"It is significant that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is
procedure that marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat." Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,436 (1971) (cited by State ex rei., Richardson v, Pierando:z.zi, 117
Idaho 1,5-6 (1989»,

I.
INTRODUCTION
. This Court pennitted additional briefing following oral argument, allowing, inter alia,

Fuchs to address an Idaho Supreme Court decision ISP raised at argument, State ex rei.
Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1 (1989), ISP argued that Pierandozzi held that ISP has

such broad and unlimited authority under the Twenty-First Amendment that ISP rules supersede
other Constitutional provisions or statutory authority. In fact, Pierandozzi holds that the Twenty-

first Amendment gave the Idaho legislature, not ISP, a "broad sweep" of authority, and it also

explained that all Constitutional provisions are on equal footiug and that each "must be
considered in light of the other." 117 Idaho at 5. As confirmation of this principle, Pierandoni
cited to Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), in which the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down a Wisconsin liquor statute as being in violation of the Due Process Clause ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment.
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ISP's citation to Pierandozzi is an attempt to distract this Court from the sole issue
involved in this case: whether ISP may retroactively apply a 2007 amendment to its priority list
rules~

IDAPA

11.05.01.01~5,

contrary to the Idaho Code's express prohibition against

retroactivity, I.C. § 73-101. This Court should prohibit it from doing so. This Court should deny

ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
II.
PIERANDOZZI DID NOT GIVE ISP UNBRIDLED AUTHORITY

In its oral argument, ISP suggested that this matter is controlled by State ex reI.
Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1 (1989). ISP argued that Pierandoz:zi provided ISP some
kind of supreme authority that trumps other constitutional and statutory concerns. This is not
true.

In Pierandozzi, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that the "tenus and conditions under

which a liquor license is granted are subject to the pleasure of the legislature under the 'broad
sweep' of authority granted to the states under the Twenty-First Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution." 117 Idaho at 4 (emphasis added). Further, it reconciled one Constitutional
provision, the First Amendment, with another, the Twenty-First Amendment, holding that the
"Twenty First Amendment power over alcohol is broad enough to embrace state power to zone
strong sexual stimuli away from places where liquor is served." ld. at 6. What matters to the
present case, however, is that Pierandozzi explained that there was nothing in the Twenty-First

Amendment that made it superior to any other Constitutional provision:
[F]ar from declarhlg the Twenty,First Amendment alone to be the supreme law of

the land, the [U.S. Supreme] Court recognized that each of the provisions in the
Constitution "must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context ofthe
issues and interests at stake in any concrete case. II ••• [California v. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109 (1972)] should not be understood to st.and for the proposition that the
Twenty-First Amendment overrides the First Amendment, but rather for the
notion that "the Twenty-First Amendment pow~r ov~r alcohol consumption is
broad enough to embrace state power to zone strong sexual stimuli away from
places where liquor is served."
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORAN))trM L.~ OPPOSnION to RESPONDENt'S MOtION to
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Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho at 5.
To demonstrate that the Twenty-First Amendment does not pre-empt other constitutional
provisions, Pierandozzi cited Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) in which the U.S.
Supreme Court held to the contrary, striking down a state liquor statute that violated the Due
Process clause by permitting officials to post names of suspected inebriates at liquor stores,
without an opportunity of notice and hearing, subjecting them to stigma and ridicule:
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential. "Posting" illlder the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely the mark of
illness, to others it is a stigma, an official branding of a person. The label is a
degrading one. Under the Wisconsin Act, a resident of Hartford is given no
process at all. This appellee was not afforded a chance to defend herself. She may
have been the victim of an official's caprice. Only when the whole proceedings
leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive
results be prevented.

Conslantineau, 400 U.S. at 437. 1
While the Idaho Supreme Court has he.ld that a liquor license is a privilege and not a
property right/ there can be no dispute that a liquor licensee is afforded all the due process
protections of any license bolderunderthe IAPA~ I.e. § 67·5254. Northern Frontiers v. Slate ex

reI., Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 440 n. 3 (Ct. App. 1996) (agency actions involVing liquor licenses
"must be reviewable by courts oflaw, inasmuch as they affect property rights.") (citing State v.

Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 280 (1957». Furthennore, the Idaho courts have repeatedly held license or
pennit applicants are also entitled to due process rights during consideration of el:igibility of a

1 Pierandozzl also cites Liquor Corp. v. Duffy. 479 U.S. 335 (1987) (Twenty-First Amendment does not provide
exception to anti-trust laws); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Twenty-First Amendment does not override the
Equal Protection Clause); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc" 459 U,S, 116 (1982) (Twenty-First Amendment does not
fre-empt the Establishment Clause).
Crazy Horse v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 76'2, 765 (1977) (Although a liquor license is a privilege and not a property right,
licensing procedure cannot be "administered arbitrarily").
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
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license or permit Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784 (2004); Boise Tower Associates,

LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774 (2009).
Pierandozzi does not stand for any notion that the Twenty-First Amendment preempts
other Constitutional provisions. Nor does it hold that the ISP has any kind of super-authority.
This Court should reject ISP's attempt to override the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and deny its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

llI.
IDAPA 11.05.01.01 CREATED A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT WmCH CANNOT BE
AMENDEDRETROACT~LY

The Idaho Courts have specifically explained that a statute that affects a substantive right
is one that affects rights which are "contractual or vested." Myers v. Vermass, 114 Idaho 85,87
(1988). Statutes which do not "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights
are deemed to be remedial or procedural, as opposed to substantive." Id. ISP' s suggestion that
its 2007 amendment to the rules was "remedial/' that it is an attempt to discourage speculation in
liquor licensing, misses the point. IDAPA 11.05.01.01-5 created a vested or contractual right to
an applicant's place in line on the priority lists. The Idaho Legislature's prohibition against
retroactive application of statutes should apply with even greater force to agency rules,

I.e. §

73·101.
The only issue that is before this Court is whether ISP can retroactively apply
11.05.01.01-4, remOVing Fuchs's name from the priority lisls. This is why ISP's suggestion that
it must conduct "discovery" to detennine whether Mr. Fuchs is qualified to be issued a license is

without merit. That issue, whether Mr. Fuchs is qualified, is not ripe. Mr. Fuchs's then actual
qualifications only become an issue once he has been notified of an available license off a list
and he has made a timely application in response.
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ISP's retroactive application of its 2007 amendment to its priority list rules violated I.e. §
73~101.

This Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies.

IV.
ISP HAS NO DISCRETION. IT MUST ISSUE LICENSES
TO QUALIFIED APPLICANTS

ISP is required, pursuant to the Retail Sale of Liquor-by-the-Drink Act, I.e. § 23-901 et
seq., to issue licenses to applicants who possess all of the qualifications and none of the

disqualifications of a liquor license. Once ISP has detennined that an application is true, that the
applicant possesses all of the qualificalions and none of the disqualifications, and that the
premises is suitable, the director may, in his discretion, issue the license. Uptick Corp. v. Ahlin,

103 Idaho 364, 369 (1982). If the ISP director abused his discretion and refused to issue a
license to a qualified applicant, that applicant would have reCOurse in a court oflaw. Northern
Frontiers v, State ex rei., Cade, 129 Idaho 437, 440 n. 3 (Ct. App, 1996).3

ISP is limited in its administration of liquor licensing by the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho
Code, its own rules, and the oversight of the Idaho legislature. This Court should deny ISP' s
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

v.
. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should deny ISP's Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

~ This is in stark contrast to Michigan where ~ocal government units have unfettered discretion to approve or deny
ftrst-time applications. At oral argument, ISP argued that Michigan and Idaho law are similar because ISP claimed
that cities larger than 75,000 people do not have the right offJIst refusal over a [JIst-time applicant In facl, iliis is
true only for cities larger than 750,000 people, i.e. Detroit. MCL 436.1501(2); U,s. Census Bure.au. Regardless of
the error, the two cases that discuss the rights of a fJI$t-time applicant, involve a city'S denial ofa first-time
application. See Wojcik v. City ofRomulus, 257 F, 3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2001); Shamie v. City of Pontiac, 620 F: 2d
118 (6th Cir. 1980).
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Brian Donesley

Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff
DanielS, Fuchs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this
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day of December, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above document
on the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to the following party by method indicated
below:
Cheryl Meade, Deputy A.G.
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642-6202

[ ] U.S. Mail
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Idaho State Bar No. 6200
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
DANIEL S. FUCHS,

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

)

)
)

v.

)

)
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of )
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol
)
Beverage Control,
)
)
Respondent.
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-03914
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE'S RESPONSE TO
DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND)
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO ABC'S MOTION TO
DISMISS

)

Daniel S. Fuchs

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

v.

)
)

STA TE OF IDAHO, Department of )
)
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol
Beverage Control,
)
)
Defendant.
)

ABC's RESPONSE TO DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO ABC'S MOTION TO DISMISS" 1

'

COMES NOW, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho State Police,
Alcohol Beverage Control ("ABC") and hereby responds to Daniel S. Fuchs' Supplemental
Reply Memorandum in Opposition of ABC's Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to the Court's
direction given to counsel on December 14, 2009. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court may even consider whether or not ABC may apply IDAPA Rule
11.05.01.013.04 as it was written, it is imperative that Mr. Fuchs be able to overcome a primary
hurdle; whether or not he has enough of a propeliy interest, as a mere applicant for a liquor
license, to obtain standing.
Mr. Fuchs seeks to convince this Court that standing, or his lack thereof, is of little
consequence in this matter. Mr. Fuchs makes several claims in his briefing, all of which are
questionable when viewed in the proper context. ABC will attempt to address each asseliion
made by Mr. Fuchs, in the order presented and will incorporate its briefing on the Pierandozzi
case as appropriate.

II. ABC's DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY
Mr. Fuchs attempts to differentiate Michigan liquor licensing law from Idaho's. His
further attempt to persuade this Couli that the two U.S. District Court cases should not be
similarly applied in this case is without a basis in law.
Mr. Fuchs attributes an inordinate amount of validity that a local governmental body, in
the state of Michigan, is the ultimate decision maker in the granting of liquor licenses in that

I The Court directed ABC to respond to Mr. Fuchs' (Second) Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition To
Respondent's Motion To Dismiss For Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, dated December 9,2009. The
parties were also directed to submit additional, but limited, briefing for the case of State, ex. rei. Richardson v.
Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho I (1989), by January 8,2010.
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state, Mr. Fuchs implies that all first-time liquor licenses, in Michigan, are granted exclusively
by local governmental units. This is not so according to Mr. Fuchs' own exhibits. For example,
Mr. Fuchs' Exhibit 1 states, "Local units of government. , . and the Michigan Liquor Control
Commission ("MLCC") work together in both the licensing process and the enforcement of the
state's liquor laws." 12& i. See also, pp. 3,4,10, and 21.2
Mr. Fuchs asserts that

rsp established a priority system through its rules and therefore

"guarantees that a liquor license applicant shall be notified of an available license if the applicant
complies with specific requirements and waits in tmn." (Fuchs' Reply at 3). Mr. Fuchs must be
implying there is some guarantee to remain on the waiting list to begin with so that the futme
notification he refers to may be had. This assertion fails for two reasons.
First, in looking at the plain language of the rules, there are no written words of guarantee
that an applicant's name shall remain on the list. In fact, besides the rule stating that an applicant
shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city priority list, other rules provide
an additional means to remove an applicant from a priority list.
Furthermore, there is no implied guarantee that an applicant's name shall remain on the
list either. If anything, the fact that other rules exist that allow for the removal/disqualitlcation of
an applicant implies there really is no guarantee that an applicant has an interest in remaining on
a municipal priority list.
Similar to the authority vested in ISP's Director, Michigan's Liquor Control Commission
considers many of the same factors when granting new licenses to its applicants. While the list is

2 Michigan's Liquor Control Code 436,120 I (2) states, "Except as otherwise provided in this act, the commission
shal1 have the sole right, power, and duty (0 control the alcoholic beverage traffic ... within this state, including the
... sale thereof. (J 998)

ABC's RESPONSE TO DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN
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actually more extensive, some of the more relevant factors the MLCC considers in granting a
liquor license are set forth below:
The commission shall consider all of the following factors in determining
whether an applicant may be issued a license or permit
(a) The applicant's management experience in the alcoholic liquor
business.
(b) The applicant's general management experience.
(c) The applicant's general business reputation.
(d) The opinions of the local residents, locallegisiative body, or local
law enforcement agency with regard to the proposed business.
Ce) The applicant's moral character.
Ci) The order in which the competing initial application forms are
submitted to the commission; however, this subdivision shall not apply to an
application for a resort license authorized by section 531 of 1998 PA 58,
MCL 436.1531. (emphasis added). Mich. Admin. Code r. 436.1105 rr. 5
( 1979).3

See, J&P Market, Inc.v. Liquor Control Com 'n, 199 Mich. App. 646, 652 (1993),
("Opinion of local authorities is only one factor to be considered in deciding whether to grant
carryout license."); T.D.N Enterprises, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Commission, 90 Mich.
App. 437, 440 (1979), (Commission found that four applicants for [1] available SDD [liquor]
license all of whom, were all eligible and qualified equally, except as to priority in time of filing
requests for license, did not act arbitrarily or capriciously nor did it abuse its discretion in
awarding the license [based on applicants' priority].); cl, Semaan v. Liquor Control
CommiSSion, 136 Mich. App. 243 (1984), aff'd, 425 Mich. App. 28 (1986).
As shown by the above, it is clear what degree of authority a local governmental entity
has, in the state of Michigan, in the liquor licensing process. See, Mich. Const. art. IV, § 40;
Mich. Compo Laws § 436.1201 (1998), (setting forth the authority of the MLCC to regulate the
possession and sale of alcoholic liquor) and; Mich. Compo Laws § 436.1501 (1998), ("An
application for a license to sell alcoholic liquor for consumption on the premises, except in a city
having a population of 750,000 or more, shall be approved by the local legislative body in which

3 Michigan Administrative Code, Rule 436.1105 at:
hJ:tr2:llwww.michigan.gov/documents/dleg/AACS4 J&. 10 I0 I 493.120 297622 7.ndf document pp. 1484-1485;
Adobe pdf pages 93-94.
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the applicant's place of business is located before the license is granted by the commission ... ")
(emphasis added).
Secondly, by Mr. Fuchs' own admission, an "applicant must comply with specific
requirements set forth in the rules and statutes and wait their turn ... " (Fuchs' Reply at p. 4). In
this case, Mr. Fuchs held more than one position at a time on several incorporated municipal
priority lists. He was listed two (2) times on the priority list for Bellevue, Idaho; three (3) times
for Hailey, Idaho; three (3) times for Ketchum, Idaho; three (3) times for Sun Valley, Idaho; two
(2) times for Idaho Falls; and nine (9) times for Twin Falls, Idaho. The fact that his name
appeared for a total of twenty two (22) times on the named incorporated city priority lists
constitutes a disqualifying event according to lDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04.

It should be noted that ifMr. Fuchs sought to obtain a similar type liquor license in the
state of Michigan, the process in Michigan would be almost identical to Idaho's. For a side-byside comparison, the table below briefly outlines the similarities and some differences between
the licensing processes in both states:
IDAHO
One (on-premises} liquor license per 1,500 people
in any municipality. I.e. §23-903.

c--

Applicant submits application (for on-premises,
liquor license) with one-half of an annual fee
(approx. $400.00} along with two-page application.
IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01. No prior approvals from a
county, city or planning and zoning permits are
required to be submitted at this time.

Applicant placed on waiting list, in order received.

MICHIGAN
One (Class C, on-premises) liquor license per 1,500
people or major fraction in any municipality (with
a few exceptions for the MlCC to grant another
limited number} MCl 436.1531 and 436.1533.
Applicant submits "completed" application (for
Class C, on-premises, liquor license) with fee
~;~i6fu"@f:11lQ~fmiRW$~mlJ.~,~®~(;3'U10'r~0r)
MCl
t ,!(~al;.<:l::,;~'k}.,!ti0dJ~fu:., ~lL"!i{,~M'.;"'f;i!1{'~l- i i;}j"".;,v."Wk-~J,l\l~ffi"I\':t.""~.t~.l\ ~!\;t •
436.1525(1)(0). A completed application, means
an application complete on its face and submitted
with any applicable licensing fees as well as any
other information, records, approval, security, or
similar item required by law or rule from a local
unit of government... Includes background checks,
fingerprinting, submission of financial statements,
insurance documents, place where alcohol is to be
served. Mich. Admin. Code r. 436.1105.
Applicant is placed on waiting list, in order
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IDAPA 11.05.01.013.01.
Newly issued license becomes available based
upon increase in population. Applicant is notified
to accept or decline offer and to produce all other
application materials, such as fingerprint cards,
background check, submission of financial
statements. IDAPA §§ 11.05.01.013.02,
11.05.01.013.03 and 11..05.01.013.04. I.e. §23905.
Enforcement investigates the applicant to ensure
applicant is qualified.
Director (ABC) reviews all of the above and either
grants or denies the license. I.e. § 23-907.
Licensee also seeks local approval. I.C. § 23-933B.

received. Mich. Admin. Code r. 436.1105.
Enforcement investigates the applicant and makes
recommendation to MlCe. MlCC also notifies local
law enforcement for input and approval.

Applicant gets approval, by resolution, from local
governmental entity and submits it to MlCe.
MlCC reviews all of the above and either grants or
denies the license. Mich. Admin. Code r.
436.1105 and MCl 436.1525(3).

As much as Mr. Fuchs would like to asseli othenvise, one can see the similarities in the
licensing process between the two states are striking.
Mr. Fuchs fmiher relies on Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, (1980), for the
proposition that the issuance of a license to sell alcohol is purely a ministerial act, in which a city
has no discretion in either accepting or rejecting the applicant. It should be noted that the
Mickelsen Court clearly distinguished the amount of discretion a city has in licensing liquor as
opposed to beer. ld. at 307.
Therein, the COUli stated, "unlike the rather broad "local option" afforded local
government in the case of liquor, the right to sell beer may not be denied by local govenunent
arbitrarily; and in fact local government may only place 'reasonable' restrictions on the sale of
beer." Id. This authority for local agencies to control liquor licensing, to which the Mickelsen
Comi is referring, comes from IDAHO CODE § 23-933B. It states,
The licensing authority of any county or incorporated municipality shall have and
exercise the same power to revoke, suspend, or to refuse to grant or renewal of a
retailer's license issued or issuable by it, as are granted to the director in this act
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In this case, the application for the license in question is not only for beer but also for
liquor. Therefore, Mr. Fuchs' assertions that a city or the director's liquor licensing authority is
purely ministerial are laid bare. As noted above, the Mickelsen Court clearly recognized the
existence of some kind of discretionary authority that local cities have in controlling liquor
licensing. Idaho's beer licensing statute found in IDAHO CODE § 23-1010 mirrors much of the
code provisions that ISP's director must follow for liquor licensing. It states in relevant part,
(1) Every person who shall apply for a state license to sell beer at retail shall
tender the license fee to, and file written application for license with, the
director. The application shall be on a form prescribed by the director which
shall require such information concerning the applicant, the premises for which
license is sought and the business to be conducted thereon by the applicant as
the director may deem necessary or advisable, and which shall enable the
director to detemline that the applicant is eligible and has none of the
disqualifications for license, as provided for in this section. (emphasis added)
Mr. Fuchs' mischaracterizes ISP's position that "ISP does not dispute that license
applicants have due process rights." Instead, Mr. Fuchs attempts to bypass the hurdle of
determining if any Fourteenth Amendment property interests exist first for a mere applicant for a
liquor license that would give rise to due process as set out in the Board of Regents v. Roth,408
U.S. 564,569-571 (1972). The court stated if there was no Fourteenth Amendment property
interests found, university authorities would not be required to give the employee a hearing when
they declined to renew that employee's contract. ld.
In order to suppOli his position that he is entitled to due process as a liquor license
applicant, Mr. Fuchs' insinuates that the Fourteenth Amendment trumps the Twenty-First
Amendment. See, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), (finding, that a person has
a fundamental interest in their name, that gives rise to due process); but, cf California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109 (1972), (holding, in the narrow context of liquor licensing "the state has the power
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to regulate nude and sexually explicit conduct in licensed establishments without offending the
[First Amendment of] the Constitution")
LaRue was eventually disavowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of, 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, 517 U.S, 484, 514-516 (1996). Therein the Court
found,
[AJpart from the Twenty-first Amendment, the State has ample power to
prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages in inappropriate locations, Moreover, in
subsequent cases, the COUlt has recognized that the States' inherent police
powers provide ample authority to restrict the kind of "bacchanalian revelries"
described in the LaRue opinion regardless of whether alcoholic beverages are
involved.
As argued previously, it appears the 44 Liquormart case has merely shifted the states'
source of authority away from the Twenty-First Amendment to a state's police power, such
authority to regulate liquor licensing is still intact.
Therefore, Mr. Fuchs' stance still fails for a couple of reasons. 1) Fuchs fails to
acknowledge that in order to obtain due process to begin with, one must have a cognizable
property interest first as set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra. As ABC argued before,
Mr. Fuchs does not have a fundamental propelty interest in a place on a waiting list as a mere
applicant that would allow him the benefit of due process. (Respondent's Supplemental
Memorandum in SUppOlt of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 3-8).
Secondly, Mr. Fuchs' position totally discounts the context of the issues and interests at
stake according to State, ex. rei. Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1,6 (1989) and the state's
police powers to regulate liquor licensing. It is reasonable to assume, while the Twenty-First
Amendment may apply nanowly in cases involving liquor licensing, the state's police power to
regulate is also a factor to be considered. To accept Mr. Fuchs' position, even on such a nanow
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issue, would clearly violate and do substantial harm to the Twenty-First Amendment and would
undermine the state's authority to regulate liquor licensing. 4
Mr. Fuchs' fmther allegations that the Director ofISP lacks the authority to control and
regulate liquor licensing are unfounded. IDAHO CODE §§ 23-901 and 23-903 clearly provide the
Director of ISP with a broad grant of authority to regulate and control the sale of liquor within
Idaho's borders.
Fmthermore, Mr. Fuchs' enoneously wishes to have this Court extend a blanket
reliance on Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784 (2004), in order to nullify the
significance of the state's authority to regulate liquor licensing. Unlike a (planning and) zoning
application for a land use permit, the business of selling intoxicating liquors is one which the
legislature has the power to impose such conditions and restrictions as in its judgment may seem
wise. To categorize a zoning application the same as an application for a liquor license would
disregard the legislature's authority and intent to regulate an industry so unlike many others.
Two cases presenting somewhat similar issues before this Court are also found in the
State of Michigan. While not controlling in Idaho, these cases established:
1) A city's resolution establishing priorities for [Class C liquor] license approval, in
order to avoid the problem of specu1atory use, was not in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Jones v. City a/Troy, 405 F. Supp. 464 ,470-472 (E.D. Mich. 1975), and;
2) Where application for a license to sell liquor is made and before a license is granted
an ordinance prohibiting saloons is passed, a writ of mandamus will not thereafter be granted to

ART. III SECTION 26. POWER AND AUTHORITY OVER INTOXICATING LIQUORS. From and after the
thirty-first day of December in the year 1934, the legislature of the state ofIdaho shall have full power and authority
to permit, control and regulate or prohibit the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and transportation for sale, of
intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes.

4
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compel the issuance of a license. Fuchs v. Common Council of Village of Grass Lake, 166 Mich.
569(1911).
ABC contends that a conect ruling would include a finding that a liquor license
applicant does not have a property interest in either the application itself or a place on a priority
list. Therefore, the issue of due process is not even reached according to Board of Regents.
Thus, Mr. Fuchs is without a remedy and his action should be dismissed. To find otherwise,
would be an enor in the law.

III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF IDAPA RULE 11.05.01.013.04
Mr. Fuchs' response adds nothing new to the position already offered by him. His
reliance on Myers v. Vermass, 114 Idaho 85, 87 (1988) (that statutes that are mandatory affect
substantive rights), fails to account for the exception found in case law in Idaho's liquorlicensing realm. i.e. no substantive right exists in a liquor license, as between the state and a
licensee.
The Idaho Supreme Court has continually held that even a liquor licensee has no socalled property rights as between the licensee and the state. (Respondent's Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 8.) Therefore, any assertion by an applicant
to have some form of due process afforded to them, because of substantive right, clearly lacks a
basis in law.
Furthermore, any assertion that some type of contractual agreement between an
applicant and the state exists is also without merit. Such an assertion would be considered
completely unilateral on the part of the applicant. Even a bona fide-card-carrying licensee is
subject to suspension or revocation of the license at any moment when a violation of the law is
discovered.
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The authority to take away such a privilege only further supports the existence of a
unilateral relationship between a licensee and the state. A mere applicant cannot expect to be
entitled to a more extensive remedy than what an actual licensee has.
Moreover, it is unclear how Mr. Fuchs can show that IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 is
anything but substantively procedural and/or remedial in nature. As ABC argued previously,
because no contractual or vested rights in an application exist in the first place, this rule does not
create, enlarge, diminish or destroy any contractual or vested rights. (Respondent's
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp.8-II.) The relevant IDAPA
Rule(s) only instructs ABC in hO\v to process the applications it receives. [do
The intent ofIDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 was in fact to discourage the speculation of
liquor licenses. ld. The rule was approved by legislative fiat. Jd. Mr. Fuchs' name appeared
twenty two (22) times on the municipal priority lists named above in only six Idaho cities. One
must ask is he seeking relief with unclean hands?

IV. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
Again, Mr. Fuchs' appears to mischaracterize ABC's position of the exhaustion
doctrine. 5 ABC reiterates that if no Fourteenth Amendment propeliy interest exists, then this
Court cannot reach the exhaustion doctrine as

110

administrative or judicial remedy exists and the

petition for judicial review must be denied.
If, however, the Court finds that Mr. Fuchs has due process in an liquor license
application that results in a contested case, then the exhaustion doctrine should be applied for

5 Such assertion by Mr. Fuchs' may be due in part to the fact that briefing, previously directed by the Court, was to
be submitted eonculTently and not in responsive fashion as undertaken by Mr. Fuchs. Any implication asserted by
Mr. Fuchs that ABC was non-responsive to his Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition To Respondent's Motion
To Dismiss For Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, and/or that ABC agreed with the same should be
disregarded.
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many reasons. While Mr. Fuchs asserts the three exceptions, he fails to meet the burden of
showing of how remand would be futile. Just because he says it would be, doesn't necessarily
make it so. In this case, remand for further proceedings is the more reasonable course of action
on the grounds set forth below.
While Mr. Fuchs would like this COUlt to believe that discovery in a case such as this is
utmecessary, he himself denied his involvement as a speculator in liquor licensing. IDAPA Rule
11.05.01.013.04 was promulgated to specifically eradicate the problems associated with the
speculation of liquor licenses. ABC believes discovery is more essential now than before as this
is an outstanding issue of fact that should be established.
Testimony, be it through deposition or through an administrative hearing, has not been
taken. Again, other than the number of times that Mr. Fuchs' name appeared on the priority lists,
such testimony could reveal the extent to which Mr. Fuchs is a liquor license speculator.
Testimony as to the purpose ofIDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 should also be taken so
that either the administrative hearing officer or this Court can make a fully informed decision on
the issue of the rule's remedial nature.
The Court only has in its possession a partial record. Therefore, any determination
based upon an application of law to factual circumstances that mayor may not support Mr.
Fuchs' claims is made more difficult. Mr. Fuchs' asseltion that remand would be futile is
therefore without merit.
Additionally, Mr. Fuchs' assertion that he received no notice of the alleged agency's
action is without merit as well. Mr. Fuchs was provided notice in two possible ways.
The first and more obvious notice occurred when Mr. Fuchs received the letter, along
with his refund, stating that his name was being removed from the municipal priority lists.
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It is apparent from the filing of the petition for judicial review that Mr. Fuchs enlisted
the assistance of counsel to advise him on how he should proceed in this matter once he received
that letter. Instead of seeking an immediate reconsideration or moving the case into an
administrative appeals process, Mr. Fuchs decided to wait and try to bring his case before this
Court instead.
Such action taken by Mr. Fuchs does not appear to be a qualifying situation that would
allow him to circumvent the administrative process at this point. Especially in light of the
holding(s) found in American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2, v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143
Idaho 862 (2007).
The second and less obvious form of notice occUlTed when the IDAPA Rule was
moving through the legislative approval process. Again, ABC believes that developing some
testimony in this area would not only be reasonable, but would be extremely helpful to the
decision maker.
Finally, Mr. Fuchs relies on the Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719 (2003) for the
proposition that a court does not require exhaustion when the party is challenging the validity of
a rule. It is arguable that Mr. Fuchs is not per se challenging the validity of IDAP A Rule
11.05.01.013.04. He is merely challenging the fact that it cannot be applied retroactively.
Nevertheless, IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04 was in faet promulgated according to the
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and obtained legislative approval as required by law. The
rule was promulgated to fulfill the legislature'S purpose to eurb the speculation ofliquor licenses.
Any issue with how ABC was to implement that purpose should have been addressed during the
legislative rule-making proceedings and hearings.

ABC's RESPONSE TO DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND) SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM lN
OPPOSITION TO ABC'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 13

U. . 300

Again ABC asserts that discovery and/or testimony could reveal much to establish the
underlying facts upon which this case and the law may turn. Mr. Fuchs' assertions that
discovery is mmecessary or not beneficial is clearly without merit.
V. SECTIONS III AND IV OF DANIEL S. FUCHS' (SECOND) SUI>PLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESIJONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
DATED: DECEMBER 24, 2009
ABC contends that Mr. Fuchs' most recent filing is incolTectly entitled as a "Second
Supplemental Memorandum ... ," and contains material and argument that is outside the scope
of briefing directed by the Comi on December 14, 2009.
Mr. Fuchs' briefing dated December 24,2009, would be a more accurate
characterization if it were entitled "Third Supplemental Memorandum ... " \\lhile the Court
allowed ABC to respond to Mr. Fuchs' previous and (Second) Supplemental Memorandum ... ,
Mr. Fuchs was directed to limit his briefing to the State, ex. reI. Richardson v. Pierandozzi case
in his December 24,2009 submission to the COUli. See, Footnote 1 above.
In reviewing that submission, ABC discovered that Mr. Fuchs has once again exceeded
the Court's directives. ABC respectfully requests that the COUli disregard Sections III and IV of
Mr. Fuchs' most recent Supplemental Memorandum as they are outside the scope of this Court's
December 14,2009, directives.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Vv'bile Mr. Fuchs would like us to believe he has a legal remedy, this is not the case.
Before reaching the relief he seeks, he must prove he has standing to obtain relief As case law
clearly indicates, he cannot provide any legal authority to SUppOli his claim that, as a mere
applicant for a liquor license, he has a Fourteenth Amendment property interest on a priority list
that would allow him due process.
Both Idaho and Michigan's liquor licensing regulations are similar in nature when it
comes to obtaining a liquor license. Like Michigan, this Court should find that Mr. Fuchs has no
such interest or standing as a mere applicant and therefore, any legal relief through due process
is not available to him. lfthe COUli makes such a finding, ISP respectfully requests that Mr.
Fuchs Petition for Judicial Review be denied in its entirety.
In the alternative, if the COUli finds that Mr. Fuchs has some type of propeliy interest
that would give rise to due process, then ABC would respectfully request that its Motion to
Dismiss For Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies be granted, and that the matter be
remanded for further proceedings.
Dated this

-If-

day of January 2010.

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
t1_ day of January 2010, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ABC's RESPONSE TO DANIEL S. FUCI-IS' (SECOND)
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO ABC'S MOTION TO DISMISS
by the U.S. Mail, first-class postage as follows to:

Brian Donesley, Esq.
Attorney at Law
548 North Avenue H
PO Box 419
Boise, ID 83701-0419

!<u.S. Mail
_Haild Delivery
_Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
_Overnight Mail
_Facsimile: (208) 343-4188
Statehouse Mail
_ Electronic Delivery

Deputy Attorney General
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COMES NOW, Plaintiff/Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), by and through his
attorney of record, Brian Donesley, and submits the following Supplemental Memorandum re:
Consolidation Issues:
At the telephone conference ofFebnlary 19,2010, this Court expressed concern about the
possible implications of the Idaho Supreme Court case, Euclid Avenue Trust v. City a/Eoise, 146

Idaho 306 (2008), on the consolidation of a Petitlon for Review case with the Declaratory Relief
case. In Euclid Avenue Trust, the Idaho Supreme Court held that actions seeking civil damages

or declaratory relief may not be combined \vith petitions for judicial review under the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act. In Euclid Avenue Trust, the plaintiff filed a pleading entitled
"Complaint, Petition for Judicial Review and Request for Jury Trial." The fee category indicated
on the pleading was that for a civil complaint more than $l >000. The Court observed that there
had been an "increasing tendency, particularly in land use cases, for counsel to combine civil
damage claims with their administrative appeal." 146 Idaho at 308. By its ruling in Euclid
Avenue Trust, the Court put an end to that trend:

The separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is supported by good
policy underpinnings. After all, one proceeding is appellate in nature and the
other is an original action. They are processed differently by our courts ... Thus
we are consLrained to hold that actions seeking civil damages or declaratory relief
may not be combined with petitions for judicial review under rDAPA.

Euclid Avenue Trust, 146 Idaho at 309.
Here, Fuchs did not combine a civil action and a petition for review in tbe same
pleading. Instead, Fuchs filed separately a Petition for Review in Case No. CV 2009~
3914 and a Complaint for Declaratory Reliefin Case No. CV 2009-4185. There are two

separate actions, two separate filing fees. Once the two separate actions were filed,
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Fuchs moved for consolidation pursuant to Rule 42(a), LR.C.P, ISP stipulated to
consolidation. And this Court issued the Order of Consolidation on September 17,2009.
Euclid Avemte Trust should have no impact on this matter. The Idaho Supreme

Court long ago held that whenever it may expedite the business and further the interests
of the litigants, at the same time minimizing the expense of the public and litigants alike,
the order of consolidation should be entered. Branom v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc. 83

Idaho 502 (1961). Both a petition for review and an action for declaratory relief were
necessary actions, given that a state agency was involved and which had engaged in
improper rulemaking. If Fuchs had not filed a timely petition for review, he risked
forfeiting rights and remedies provided in the Idaho Administrative Code. An action for
declaratory relief, however, is independently proper since I.e. § 67-5278 specifically
authorizes such an action as an exception to the exhaustion requirement when a party is
challenging the validity of a nde. See, Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003).

It comports with sound judicial economy for this Court to retain both matters.
The Court is able to sort out which procedures and remedies are proper for each action,
while minimizing costs to litigants and the public by (;onsolidation of the actions into one
case,
DATED this

~

day of March, 2010.

Brian Donesley
Attorney fOT Petitioner/Plaintiff
Daniel S. Fuchs
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On thi.s;..0dJIay QfMarch, 2010~ I hereby certify that I served th~ above document on the
addressee indicated, by delivering the same to the following party by method indicated below:
Cheryl Meade~ Deputy A.G.

Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642-6202

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ X] Facsimile (884-7228)

~/f1'~ ~
Barbi McCary Crowell
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,
Petitioner,

)

) Case No. CV 2009-3914
)
CV 2009-4185
)

vs.

)
) MEMORANDUM DECISION
STATE OF IDAHO, Department of State) AND ORDER DISMISSING
Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
) PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
Control,
) REVIEW AND COMPLAINT FOR
) DECLARA TORY AND
Respondent.
) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

THIS MATTER is before the court on the motion of the State of Idaho to dismiss
the petitioner's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Oral argument
was conducted on December 14, 2009, with Brian Donesley representing Daniel S. Fuchs
and Cheryl E. Meade representing the State of Idaho, Department of State Police,
Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control. The parties filed supplemental briefing on
December 24,2009 and January 8, 2010. The matter was initially taken under
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advisement on January 11, 2010. However, due to questions which arose regarding
issues raised in the parties' briefing, the court held a status hearing on March 4,2010.
During the hearing the parties agreed to submit both of the above-numbered cases for
determination by the court, as set forth below. Therefore, the court took both cases
under advisement as of March 5, 2010.
The court has considered the briefing and pleadings of the parties, together with
the oral arguments of counsel. Based thereon, and for the reasons stated herein, the
court hereby GRANTS the state's motion to dismiss as to both cases.

I. BACKGROUND

There are two cases pending before this court regarding disputes between Mr.
Daniel Fuchs (Fuchs) and the Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control. (ABC).
Based upon the parties' stipulation, the court considers the state's motion to dismiss in
each case.

A.

Legal Posture.

Pursuant to Idaho Code §23-903, the Director of the Idaho State Police has been
"empowered, authorized and directed by the Idaho Legislature to issue licenses to
qualified applicants whereby the licensee is authorized to sell liquor at retail by the
drink." The number of liquor licenses available throughout the state is finite; the
licenses issued for any incorporated city shall not exceed one license for each one
thousand five-hundred population. Id. ABC maintains a priority list of applicants for
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those cities in which no city liquor license is available. A separate list is maintained for
each city.
To obtain a place on such a list a person or entity is required to file a completed
application, accompanied by payment of one-half of the required annual license fee.
Priority on the list is determined by a "first in time, first in right" system, with the
earliest application having priority. Each succeeding application is placed on the list in
the order it was received.
B.

Factual Background. 1

Between 1994 and 1995, Fuchs applied for and was placed on the incorporated
city priority lists for each of the following cities: Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum,
Hailey, Bellevue and Idaho Falls. Fuchs' name appears twenty-two times as a liquor
license applicant on these cities' lists.
In 2006 the ABC began to promulgate administrative rules to be presented
during the 2007 Idaho legislative session. As part of that process, ABC amended the
rule regarding the number of times any applicant may place their name on the priority
list for each incorporated city. See IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.042 (hereinafter the "Rule").
ABC followed the proper process for rule making and ultimately the Idaho Legislature

1 The court's statement of facts is gleaned from the pmiies' briefing and factual statements in this case. There is no
agency record filed with the cOUli at this stage of the proceedings, although the state has attached several documents
to its motion to dismiss. To the extent that neither party has moved to strike the other's factual recitations or
affidavits, this court will rely upon such facts as accurate.
2 The amended Rule provides: "An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city priority
list. An applicant must be able to demonstrate to the Director the ability to place an awarded license into actual use
as required by Section 23-908(4), Idaho Code and these rules."
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passed the rule as written in January 2007. These rules were also published by the
Director of the Idaho State Police (ISP) pursuant to Idaho Code §23-932. The rule
contains no "grandfather" clause.
On or about July 24, 2009, the ISP sent a letter to Fuchs, informing him that it was
removing all but one listing of his name from the priority lists for the above-referenced
cities, citing the Rule and stating, an applicant shall hold only one position at a time on
II

each incorporated city list." The ISP also returned Fuchs' applications for each city
where his name appeared more than one time on the priority list. Fuchs' application
fees were likewise returned 3 to him at that time. Despite the removal of Fuchs'
duplicate applications, Fuchs retained the highest place he held on each city's list as of
July 24.
C.

Procedural Posture.

Fuchs thereafter filed two legal proceedings with this court: 1) a Petition for
Judicial Review(Case No. CV 2009-3914) (hereinafter referred to as the "Judicial
Review"), filed August 19, 2009, pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 52 of the Idaho Code (the
Administrative Procedure Act); and 2) a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief4 (Case No. CV 2009-4185), filed September 4, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the

] Fuchs attempted to tender the check to the court during argument on the state's motion to dismiss. The check was
returned to counsel for the state.
4 The court originally granted injunctive relief to Fuchs based upon a stipulation of the parties on November 5,2009.
The original order was later amended on January 5, 2010.
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"DEC action."). Fuchs never sought administrative review before the ABC prior to
filing these two cases.
ABC responded to the Judicial Review by filing a Response and Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. ABC also filed a response to
the complaint for declaratory relief.
The parties briefed the matter and the court granted oral argument, which was
held on December 14,2009. Both Fuchs and ABC thereafter filed supplemental briefing,
with ABC's final Memorandum filed January 8,2010. The court then took the matter
under advisement on January 11, 2010.
In Fuchs' supplemental memoranda, he argues that this court should grant the
relief he seeks in the DEC action. Neither party filed any motion for summary
judgment in the DEC action, and ABC's response memoranda did not indicate a desire
for this court to rule on the DEC action as part of the state's dispositive motion in the
Judicial Review.
The court therefore sought clarification from the parties in a telephonic status
hearing held March 4,2010. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that due to the
"confusion resulting from a conglomerated proceeding[,]" claims for judicial review
and for declaratory judgment and/or damages should not be combined. See Euclid Ave.

Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 309, 193 P.3d 853,856 (2008). Nevertheless, the
court made the parties aware of this case, and each stated their position that the court
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could consider the state's motion to dismiss as if made in both cases. Therefore, based
upon the court's conclusion during the telephone conference, this court is ruling upon
the state's motion to dismiss both the Judicial Review and the DEC action. The Court's
concern for confusion referenced in Euclid Ave. is not an issue given the procedural
posture of this case.

II. ANALYSIS
1.

The Petition for Judicial Review Is Dismissed.
A.

Introduction.

When a district court entertains a petition for judicial review, it does so in an
appellate capacity. Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd. of County Com'rs, __
Idaho - . - J - . - J 214 P.3d 646, 648 (2009) (citing Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun

Valley, 144 Idaho 584,588, 166 P.3d 374, 378 (2007); Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational
Licenses, 144 Idaho 281,284, 160 P.3d 438, 441 (2007)).
A party's right to appeal an administrative decision, i.e., to obtain judicial review,
is governed by statute. Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 133, 139 P.3d 732, 735
(2006) ("Judicial review of an administrative decision is wholly statutory; there is no
right of judicial review absent the statutory grant."). Section 67-5270 allows judicial
review for a "person aggrieved by final agency action ... if the person complies with
the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code."
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B.

Standard of Review.

A motion filed in judicial review proceeding is processed "in the same manner as
motions before the district court." LR.C.P.84(0). As noted above in footnote I, this
court has no agency record, although neither party has objected to the other's affidavits
and/or filings. The court therefore relies upon those documents in analyzing the issues
before the court. Neither party has contested the facts set forth in the documents filed
with the court, see Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Com'n, 141 Idaho 129, 133 n.l, 106 P.3d 455,
459 n.l (2005); therefore, this court applies the standard of a 12(b)(6) motion, construing
any disputed facts, to the extent that there are any, in favor of Fuchs.

C.

Fuchs' Petition for Judicial Review is Dismissed for Failure to

Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

1.

Judicial Review is only available as provided by statute.

Any party seeking judicial review must satisfy the principal requirement that
they exhaust all administrative remedies required by the Administrative Procedure Act
prior to seeking judicial review. See Idaho Code §67-5271 (2006). "[T]he exhaustion
doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction because a district court does not acquire
I

subject matter jurisdiction until all the administrative remedies have been exhausted.'

Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Com'n, 141 Idaho at 135,106 P.3d at 461 (quoting Fairway
Development v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 125,804 P.2d 294, 298 (1990)).
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"Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought
from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act.
Absent a statutory exception, the exhaustion of an administrative remedy is a
prerequisite for resort to the courts." Pounds v. Denison, 115 Idaho 381, 383, 766 P.2d
1262, 1264 (Ct. App. 1988). The Administrative Procedure Act thus "requires an
exhaustion of the 'full gamut' of administrative remedies before judicial review may be
sought." Lochsa Falls, L.L.c. v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 237, 207 P.3d 963,968 (2009). If a
claimant fails to exhaust administrative remedies, dismissal of the claim is warranted.

Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 724, 100 P.3d 615, 618 (2004).
However, this doctrine is not absolute; under unusual circumstances a court may
circumvent this rule, but only where the interests of justice so require or where the
agency acts outside its authority. Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236, 786
P.2d 1136, 1138 (Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted).
There is no dispute here that Fuchs did nothing, prior to filing this administrative
appeal, to exhaust the remedies 5 that he has before ABC. Pursuant to Idaho Code §23932, ISP's director has sweeping authority to "make, promulgate and publish such rules
and regulations" as the "director may deem necessary for carrying out the
provisions of [the statute]." The director has the authority to establish "the proof to

5 Those remedies are governed by the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General, IDAPA
04.11.01 and IDAPA 11.05.01.003.
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be furnished and the conditions to be observed in the issuance of licenses . ..

ff

as well as

lithe conditions and qualifications necessary to obtain a license .... " Id. "Procedures for
the suspension, revocation, or refusal to grant or renew licenses issued under this [Retail
Sale of Liquor by the Drink] chapter shall be in accordance with the provisions of [the
Administrative Procedure Act]" Idaho Code §23-933(1) (2009). As part of this
comprehensive authority, the director has determined, with legislative approval, to limit
potential applicants for liquor licenses to one application per incorporated city.
Fuchs does not dispute the director's authority to so rule; he disputes the validity
of the rule as given retroactive application in his circumstances. The question here is a
legal one: whether this court should exercise jurisdiction at this time, or require Fuchs
to pursue his claims before the administrative body that is charged with authority to
interpret and apply the rules and statutes that govern liquor licensing in the state of
Idaho. This court concludes that Fuchs must return to the agency to state his initial
claims and to make an adequate record for judicial review, if any, in the future.

2.

The exceptions to the general rule are not applicable here.

As noted above, Idaho recognizes exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies rule
where an agency acts without authority, or where the interests of justice otherwise
require. This court concludes that these exceptions do not apply in this case.
a.

The ISP/ABC did not act without proper authority in
adopting the Rule in question.
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There is no support for Fuchs' claim that the 15P/ABC acted outside the scope of
their authority in adopting the rule in question. Indeed, Fuchs does not dispute the
validity of the rule itself, he disputes its enforcement in a retroactive way.
The limited record before this court clearly establishes that the agency
promulgated the rule as required by law, that the rule was published appropriately,
and that the legislature passed the rule as now constituted. As noted above, the 15P's
Director has extensive authority to "make, promulgate and publish such rules and
regulations" as the" director may deem necessary for carrying out the provisions of" the
statute. Idaho Code §23-932 (2009). As such, the rule was properly adopted and this
exception to the exhaustion requirement does not apply.
b.

The interests of justice do not require this court to
consider Fuchs' claims before exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

The Idaho Court of Appeals noted in Peterson v. City of Pocatello, supra, that the
circumstances which require an exception to the exhaustion doctrine include: (1) where
resort to administrative procedures would be futile; (2) where the aggrieved party is
challenging the constitutionality of the agency's actions or of the agency itself; or (3)
where the aggrieved party has no notice of the initial administrative decision or no
opportunity to exercise administrative review procedures. See Peterson, 117 Idaho at 236,
786 P.2d at 1138.
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i. Futility.

This court concludes that return to the agency in this case would not be futile for
Fuchs. Upon remand the agency, or its designated hearing officer, the applicability of
the Rule to Fuchs' situation may be determined with establishment of a proper record.
The Director of the ISP is the administrative tribunal charged with enforcement
of the provisions of Title 23, chapter 9, Idaho Code. By rule, the Director has delegated
his authority for licensing establishments to ABC IDAPA 11.05.01.011.02. The issue
here is one which the specialization of ABC is particularly suited to manage. That factfinder should be presented with the question whether there is some compelling reason
for Fuchs' name to appear twenty-two times on priority lists in six Idaho cities,
particularly in light of the statutory purpose "to deal with issues of licensees involved in
alleged acts of hidden ownership, i.e. unlawful transfers of liquor licenses, in violation
of I.C §23-908(4)." Affidavit of Robert Clements in Support of State's Response, etc., 1110.
Moreover, ABC has specific jurisdiction for enforcement and determination of
licensure issues.

/I

An agency must be granted the authority to administer the statute

before it [and it] is impliedly clothed with the power to construe the law." Hamilton ex

reI. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 571, 21 P.3d 890, 893 (2001) (citing

J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991)). "[G]reat weight should
be given to an agency's interpretation of its own rules." Angstman v. City of Boise, 128
Idaho 575, 578, 917 P.2d 409, 412 (Ct. App. 1996).

'Q

\~,
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This court also accepts the legal proposition that the Rule's application is
remedial. As such, additional facts should be established before a fact-finder to
determine what extent, if any, the Rule should apply to Fuchs' situation. This is
particularly the case since Fuchs applied for multiple licenses fifteen-plus years ago.
Finally, the record in the judicial review proceeding does not exist, other than as
stated in footnote 1, above. An adequate record is obligatory for this court to provide
appropriate judicial review. See I.R.c.P. 84(f)(3); see also Workman Family Partnership v.

City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 36-37, 655 P.2d 926,930 - 931 (1982) (in order for there to
be effective judicial review of agency decisions, there must be a record of the
proceedings and adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law).
This court cannot substitute its judicial judgment for administrative judgment.
At this juncture there is no way to determine whether the administrative agency has
applied the criteria prescribed by statute and by its own regulations or whether it acted
arbitrarily or on an ad hoc basis. See also South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board

of Commissioners, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977) (quoted in Workman Family
Partnership): "What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what,
specifically, the decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all the
evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its decision is based.
Conclusions are not sufficient."
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11.

Applicants hold no vested rights for multiple
places on the priority lists for each city; thus,
Fuchs has no right to notice and no constitutional
claim.

The court also concludes that Fuchs does not have a sufficient property interest
in his position on the lists in question to raise a constitutional question, or a question of
notice. Idaho's Supreme Court has held that a I/liquor license is simply the grant or
permission under governmental authority to the licensee to engage in the business of
selling liquor. Such a license is a temporary permit to do that which would otherwise be
unlawful; it is a privilege rather than a natural right and is personal to the licensee; it is
neither a right of property nor a contract, or a contract right." Nampa Lodge No. 1389 v.

Smylie 71 Idaho 212, 215-216, 229 P.2d 991,993 (1951). See also BHA Investments, Inc. v.
State, 138 Idaho 348, 354-355, 63 P.3d 474, 480 - 481 (2003) (liquor license transfer fee
does not amount to an unconstitutional taking, reaffirming Nampa Lodge No. 1389).
This court recognizes that the statutes/rules in question have been amended and
updated since the Court's ruling in Nampa Lodge 1389. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court
has held that a liquor license is a right of property as between a licensee and third
persons in that it has attributes of value and assignability." Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho
1/

386,394,379 P.2d 792, 797 (1963). However, these rights of aSSignability and value in a

licensee do not give rise to a sufficient vested interest to grant Fuchs the relief he seeks
here.
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In the first place, this court concludes that being on a list is deserving of even
lesser legal status than actually holding a license. See Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 P.3d
600 (6 th Cir. 2001) (applying Michigan law, holding that one applying for a liquor license
has no such claim of entitlement; as such, there is no 'property' interest in a place on the
list).
Secondarily, while a statute will not generally be applied retroactively in the
absence of clear legislative intent to that effect, I.c. § 73-101, it also is the rule in Idaho
that retroactive legislation is only that which affects vested or already existing rights.

City of Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512,515,660 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1983) (citing
Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc., v. Allred, 102 Idaho 623, 624, 636 P.2d 745, 746 (1981);
Buckalew v. City of Grangeville, 100 Idaho 460, 600 P.2d 136 (1979)). Thus, remedial or
procedural statutes which do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or

vested rights are generally held to operate retrospectively. Id. (citing Ohlinger v. U.S., 135
P.5upp. 40 (D. Idaho 1955)). As the Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
"A retrospective or retroactive law is one which takes away
or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a
new disability in respect to transactions or considerations
already past." 82 c.J.5. Statutes § 407 (1999). "[I]n Idaho, a
statute is not applied retroactively unless there is 'clear
legislative intent to that effect.' " Gailey v. Jerome County, 113
Idaho 430, 432, 745 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1987) (quoting City of
Garden City v. City of Boise, 104 Idaho 512, 515, 660 P.2d 1355,
1358 (1983)). However, in the absence of an express declaration

of legislative intent, a statute, which is renwdial or procedural in
nature, and which does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy
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contractual or vested rights, is generally held not to be retroactive,
even though it was enacted subsequent to the events to
which it applies. Id.
University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence 104 Idaho 172, 174, 657 P.2d 469,
471 (1982) (emphasis added).
In this instance Fuchs has no vested rights. "[T]he selling of intoxicating liquor is
a proper subject for control and regulation under the police power. It is likewise
universally accepted that no one has an inherent or constitutional right to engage in a
business of selling or dealing in intoxicating liquors." Crazy Horse v. Pearce, 98 Idaho
762, 765, 572 P.2d 865, 868 (1977) (citations omitted). The mere fact that the person holds
a liquor license does not vest him with any property right that would entitle him to any
damages by reason of the revocation or cancellation of such license. Nims v. Gilmore, 17
Idaho 609, 107 P. 79, 81 (1910). See also, O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 44,202
P.2d 401, 405 (1949) (a license to operate a beer parlor does not confer any vested
property right).
Therefore, Petitioner has no vested property right for being on the list. Thus, he
has no right to notice and a hearing, and the agency action was not retroactive.
Therefore, the exceptions to the statutory requirement of exhaustion are not established
in this case. The Judicial Review is therefore DISMISSED.
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2.

The Complaint for Declaratory Relief is Dismissed.

As noted above, the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act provides that "[a]
person is not entitled to judicial review of an agency action until that person has
exhausted all administrative remedies required in this chapter."

I.e. § 67-5271 (2006).

The doctrine of exhaustion requires that where an administrative remedy is provided
by statute, relief must first be sought by exhausting such remedies before the courts will
act. This doctrine is applicable not only to petitions for judicial review, but to actions
for declaratory judgment as well. See American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2 v. Idaho Dept. of

Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 871-872, 154 P.3d 433, 442-443 (2007); Regan v. Kootenai
County, 140 Idaho 721, 724-725, 100 P.3d 615, 618-619 (2004). "If a claimant fails to
exhaust administrative remedies, dismissal of the claim is warranted." Regan, 140 Idaho
at 724, 100 P.3d at 618.
The court concludes that the analysis set forth above regarding the Judicial
Review is equally applicable to Fuchs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. As
the Court noted in Regan:
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act provides that
"[a] person is not entitled to judicial review of an agency
action until that person has exhausted all administrative
remedies required in this chapter." I.e. § 67-5271. The
doctrine of exhaustion requires that where an administrative
remedy is provided by statute, relief must first be sought by
exhausting such remedies before the courts will act. . . . No
one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened
injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been
exhausted. . "
Furthermore, the doctrine of exhaustion
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generally requires that the case run the full gamut of
administrative proceedings before an application for judicial
relief may be considered ....

Id. (case citations omitted).
These considerations are applicable to Fuchs' declaratory judgment action for
good reason. As the Court noted further, important policy concerns support the
requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies: :
As we have previously recognized, important policy
considerations underlie the requirement for exhausting
administrative remedies, such as providing the opportunity
for mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention,
deferring to the administrative process established by the
Legislature and the administrative body, and the sense of
comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative
body

Id. at 725, 100 P.3d at 619 (quoting White v. Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396,
401-02,80 P.3d 332, 337-38 (2003)).
These considerations are applicable to Fuchs' declaratory judgment action. As
noted above, the ISP and particularly the ABC have the specialized function to review
and determine a wide variety of issues surrounding liquor licensing in this state. It is
that body's expertise to which this court defers in dismissing the declaratory judgment
claim. "Actions for declaratory judgment are not intended as a substitute for a statutory
procedure and such administrative remedies must be exhausted." V-I Oil Co. v. County

of Bannock, 97 Idaho 807,810,554 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1976) (citation omitted). "The courts
are loath to interfere prematurely with administrative proceedings and thus they will
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not, as a rule, assume jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings until
administrative remedies have been exhausted, except where the administrative remedy
is not adequate." Regan, 140 Idaho at 725, 100 P.3d at 619 (quoting 22A Am. Jur.2d

Declaratory Judgments § 83 (2003)). As noted above, the court finds the administrative
remedy adequate in this case. See supra, p. 11-12.
The courts analyzing declaratory judgment actions have also recognized the
same two exceptions set forth previously to the application of this rule, namely: 1)
when the interests of justice so require; and 2) when an agency has acted outside its
authority. See American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2, 143 Idaho at 872, 154 P.3d at 443;

Regan, 140 Idaho at 726, 100 P.3d at 619.
The court has discussed both of these exceptions in detail previously in this
opinion. See supra, pp. 9-15. The nature of Fuchs' constitutional claims do not change
this analysis. See American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2, 143 Idaho at 871, 154 P.3d at 442
(" Although a district court has jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues,
administrative remedies generally must be exhausted before constitutional claims are
raised."). Thus, this court will not exercise jurisdiction over any constitutional claims
stated by Fuchs in any greater detail than has already been addressed regarding notice
and retroactivity. "[R]aising a constitutional challenge does not alleviate the necessity
of establishing a complete administrative record." Id. Fuchs' declaratory judgment
claims are therefore DISMISSED.
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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court concludes that Fuchs has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Therefore, both the Judicial Review and the DEC
action are DISMISSED without prejudice. Accordingly, the Order RE Preliminary
Injunction issued on November 5,2009 as amended on January 5, 2010 is likewise
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this /C"1ay of March, 2010.

District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL - Page 19

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

-1L-

day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy of
I hereby certify that on the
the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following
persons:

Brian Donesley
Attorney at Law
548 North Avenue H
P.O. Box 419
Boise, ID 83701-0419

Cheryl E. Meade
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642

k(1},~
Deputy Clerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL - Page 20

BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313
Attorney at Law
548 North Avenue H
Post Office Box 419
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419
Telephone (208) 343-3851
Facsimile (208) 343-4188

ZDlDAPR19 Pri2:36

Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff/Appellant
Daniel S. Fuchs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control,

CASE NO. CV 2009-3914
(Consolidated with Case No. CV 20094185)
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Respondent.
DANIEL S. FUCHS,
Plaintiff,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control,
Defendant.

I (]

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Page 1 of 4

32f)

oRJ GLf\JAL
I

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ITS ATTORNEYS, AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Appellant, Daniel S. Fuchs, appeals against the above-named

Respondent, Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control, to the Idaho Supreme
Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Dismissing Petition for Judicial Review and
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief entered in the above entitled action on the 10th
day of March, 2010, the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, District Judge, presiding.
2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order described
in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1) (2) and (f) I.A.R.
3. The appeal is based upon the July 24, 2009 notice from Respondent, Idaho State
Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control, to Appellant that it was removing listings of his
name from Retail Alcohol Beverage License Priority Lists for new issue licenses for the Idaho
cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hailey and Bellevue.
a. This notice was in violation of Appellant's rights to due process of law guaranteed by
the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and arising under
the law and statutes of the State of Idaho, specifically but not exclusively: the Idaho Constitution,
Article I, § 17.
b. This notice was an administrative rule not formally promulgated in accordance with
procedures specified in the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq.
Consequently, this notice was void and of no effect.
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
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5. (a) No reporter's transcript is requested.
6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included m the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
•

Motion for Consolidation: Rule 42(a), I.R.C.P., filed September 8,2009;

•

Petitioner's Motion for Order of Stay, I.R.C.P. 84(m), filed September 8, 2009;

•

Affidavit of Robert Clements in Support of State's Response and Motion to
Dismiss Petitioner's Amended Petition for Judicial Review filed September 10,
2009;

•

Respondent's Response to Amended Petition for Judicial Review and Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed September 10,
2009;

•

Order for Consolidation entered September 17, 2009;

•

Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed September 21, 2009;

•

Order re: Preliminary Injunction entered November 5, 2009;

•

Affidavit of Brian Donesley in Support of Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies filed on November 23,2009;

•

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed on November 23, 2009;

•

Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed
on December 8, 2009;

•

Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed on December 9,
2009;

•

Second Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed on December 24,
2009

•

ABC's Response to Daniel S. Fuchs' (Second) Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to ABC's Motion to Dismiss filed on January 11,2010;

•

Supplemental Memorandum re: Consolidation filed on March 3,2010.
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7. Appellant does not request additional documents, charts, or pictures offered or
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court, other than those documents
referenced above.
8. I certifY:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
(b) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule
20 (and the attorney general ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code).
DATED this t/~day of April, 2010.

\~")

(L"~ (1,~-, (",

Brian Donesley
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this ) ltfLday of April, 2010, I hereby certify that I served the above document on the
addressee indicated, by delivering the same to the following party by method indicated below:

Cheryl Meade, Deputy A.G.
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642-6202

NOTICE OF APPEAL

] U.S. Mail
] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ X] Facsimile (884-7228)
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
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CHERYL E. MEADE
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive

Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone: (208) 884-7050
Facsimile: (208) 884-7228
Idaho State Bar No. 6200
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
DANIEL S. FUCHS,

)
)

Appellant,

)

Case No. CV-2009-03914

)
)

)
)
)

v.

ALCOHOL BEVERAGE'S REQUEST FOR
DOCUMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE
CLERK'S RECORD
I.A.R. 28

)
)

STAIE OF IDAHO, Department of )
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol
)
Beverage Control,
)
)

Respondent.

)
)
)

Daniel S. Fuchs

)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO, Department of )
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol
)
Beverage Control,
)
)

Defendant.

)

ABC's REQUEST TO INCLUDE DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S RECORD
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COMES NOW, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho State Police,
Alcohol Beverage Control ("ABC") and hereby requests that the standard record be prepared
pursuant to tA.R. 28 (b). Additionally, pursuant to tA.R. 28(c) that the following documents be
specifically included in the clerk's record:

1. Daniel Fuchs' Petition for Judicial Review, filed on August 19, 2009.
2. Daniel Fuchs' Amended Petition for Judicial Review, filed on August 20, 2009.
3. Court's Procedural Order Governing Judicial Review, issued by the District Court,

filed on August 21, 20094. Petitioner's (Daniel Fuchs') Statement oflssues for Judicial Review, filed on August
25,2009.

5. Affidavit of Brian Dones)ey, filed on September 4,2009.
6. Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs, filed on September 4, 2009.
7. Daniel Fuchs' Motion for Consolidation, filed on September 4,2009.
8. Daniel Fuchs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction~ fiJed September 4,2009.
9. Daniel Fuchs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
filed September 4, 2009.

10_ Daniel Fuchs' Complaint for Declaratory Relief: filed September 4,2009 (with
Fuchs' Exhibits 1-2 attached).

11. Respondent's (ABC's) Response To Amended Petition for Judicial Review and
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, filed September
8,2009 (with ABC's Exhibits 1-21 and Affidavit of Robert Clements attached),

ABC's REQUEST TO INCLUDE DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S RECORD
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12. ABC's Response to Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, filed September

10,2009.
13. Defendant's (ABC's) Objection to Motion for Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction, filed September 10, 2009.
14. Respondent's (ABC's) Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss,
filed December 7, 2009 (with ABC Exhibit 22 attached).
Dated this

2.. q day of April 2010.

. ~ MfL~ a ~Clkh6=

it { CHERYL E. MEADE

o-

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r HEREBY CERrlFY that on this ~q day of April, 201O~ I caused to be served a tnle and
correct copy of the foregoing ABCsREQUEST TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS
IN THE CLERK'S RECORD by the U.S. Mail, first-class postage as follows to:
Brian Donesley, Esq.
Attorney at Law
548 North Avenue H
PO Box 419
Boise, ID 83701-0419

_U.S. Mail
_Hand Delivery
_Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
_Overnight Mail
~Facsimi1e: (208) 343-4188
Statehouse Mail
_ Electronic Delivery

~ 4.v":' cd. W 8CHeRYL

. MEADE

Deputy Attorney General
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Case: CV-2009-0004185 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0

Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0
Date

Code

User

9/4/2009

NCOC

SCHULZ

New Case Filed-Other Claims

SCHULZ

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Randy J. Stoker
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings
below Paid by: Fuchs, Daniel S. (plaintiff)
Receipt number: 9023905 Dated: 9/4/2009
Amount: $88.00 (Cash) For: Fuchs, Daniel S.
(plaintiff)

COMP

SCHULZ

Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief

Randy J. Stoker

MOTN

SCHULZ

Motion For Temporary Restraining Order And
Preliminary Injunction, I.R.C.P. 65 (a)

Randy J. Stoker

MOTN

SCHULZ

Motion For Consolidation: Rule 42(a), I.R.C.P.

Randy J. Stoker

AFFD

SCHULZ

Affidavit Of Daniel S. Fuchs

Randy J. Stoker

AFFD

SCHULZ

Affidavit Of Brian Donesely

Randy J. Stoker

MEMO

SCHULZ

Memorandum In Support Of Motion For
Temporary Restraining Order And Preliminary
Injunction

Randy J. Stoker

APER

SCHULZ

Plaintiff: Fuchs, Daniel S. Appearance Brian N
Donesley

Randy J. Stoker

CESV

NIELSEN

Amended
Certificate Of Service
fax

Randy J. Stoker

NIELSEN

ABC's Response to Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief

Randy J. Stoker

OBJC

NIELSEN

Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for
Randy J. Stoker
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and
Stipulation to Consolidate Cases

OBJC

NIELSEN

Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for
Restraning Order and Preliminary Injunction and
Stipulation to Consolidate Cases

Randy J. Stoker

NIELSEN

ABC's Response to Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief

Randy J. Stoker

9/8/2009

9/10/2009

9/14/2009

Judge
Randy J. Stoker

9/17/2009

ORDR

COOPE

Order for Consolidation

Randy J. Stoker

9/21/2009

OBJC

NIELSEN

Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to
Change Venue
fax

Randy J. Stoker

MEMO

NIELSEN

Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies
fax

Randy J. Stoker

CHJG

COOPE

Change Assigned Judge

G. Richard Bevan

NIELSEN

Amended Certificate of Service
fax

G. Richard Bevan

9/22/2009

9/23/2009

OBJC

NIELSEN

Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to
Change Venue

G. Richard Bevan

9/28/2009

REQU

NIELSEN

Request of Petitioner for Setting of Hearing
fax

G. Richard @etc)~

n
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Case: CV-2009-0004185 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0

Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0
Date

Code

User

9/29/2009

REQU

NIELSEN

Request of Petitioner for Setting of Hearing

G. Richard Bevan

9/30/2009

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/02/200909:00
AM) for TRO, preliminary injunction and change
venue

G. Richard Bevan

10/512009

NOHG

NIELSEN

Notice Of Hearing on Motions:
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction, I.R.C.P. 65(a)
2. Respondent's (Alternative) Motion to Change
Venue

G. Richard Bevan

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Service of PetitionerlPlaintiffs First Set G. Richard Bevan
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of
Documents

10/28/2009

NOSV

NIELSEN

Notice Of Serving
fax

G. Richard Bevan

11/212009

CMIN

COOPE

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 11/2/2009
Time: 1:02 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey
Minutes Clerk: Sharie Cooper
Tape Number:

G. Richard Bevan

DCHH

COOPE

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/02/2009
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: for TRO, preliminary injunction and
change venue

G. Richard Bevan

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/14/200909:00
AM) Motion TRO, Prelim Injunc

G. Richard Bevan

CONT

COOPE

Continued (Motion 12/14/200910:30 AM) to
dismiss

G. Richard Bevan

11/512009

ORDR

COOPE

Order RE: Preliminary Injunction

G. Richard Bevan

12/7/2009

MEMO

COOPE

Respondent's Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss

G. Richard Bevan

12/10/2009

MISC

SCHORZMAN

Camera request from Times-News for 12.14.09
hearing GRANTED

G. Richard Bevan

12/14/2009

CMIN

COOPE

G. Richard Bevan
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss
Hearing date: 12/14/2009 Time: 10:39 AM Court
reporter: Virginia Bailey Audio tape number: ct rm
1

DCHH

CO OPE

Hearing result for Motion held on 12/14/2009
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: to dismiss

G. Richard Bevan

APER

COOPE

Defendant: State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State
Police, Bureau 0 Appearance Cheryl E Meade

G. Richard Bevan

2/12/2010

Judge

Cl
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Case: CV-2009-0004185 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau

0

Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0
Date

Code

User

2/12/2010

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/19/201008:30
AM)

G. Richard Bevan

2/19/2010

CMIN

COOPE

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Status
Hearing date: 2/19/2010
Time: 11 :56 am
Courtroom: District Courtroom #1
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey
Minutes Clerk: Sharie Cooper
Tape Number:

G. Richard Bevan

DCHH

COOPE

Hearing result for Status held on 02/19/2010
08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Virginia Bailey
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

G. Richard Bevan

HRSC

COOPE

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
03/04/2010 03:00 PM)

G. Richard Bevan

3/2/2010

COOPE

Judge

Notice Of Hearing

G. Richard Bevan

LETT

COOPE

Letter from Brian Donesley

G. Richard Bevan

MEMO

COOPE

Supplemental Memorandum RE: Consolidation
Issues

G. Richard Bevan

CMIN

COOPE

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Status by Phone
Hearing date: 3/4/2010
Time: 1:07 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Virginia Bailey
Minutes Clerk: Sharie Cooper
Tape Number:
Brian Donesley for Petitioner
Cheryl Meade for Respondent

G. Richard Bevan

DCHH

COOPE

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
G. Richard Bevan
03/04/201003:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

3/5/2010

ADVS

COOPE

Case Taken Under Advisement

G. Richard Bevan

3/10/2010

OPIN

COOPE

Memorandum Decision and Order Dismissing
Petition for Judicial Review and Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

G. Richard Bevan

CDIS

COOPE

G. Richard Bevan
Civil DispositionlJudgment entered: entered for:
State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0,
Defendant; Fuchs, Daniel S., Plaintiff. Filing date:
3/10/2010

3/17/2010

SCND

AIKELE

Scanned

G. Richard Bevan

4/19/2010

NTOA

COOPE

Notice Of Appeal

G. Richard Bevan

APSC

COOPE

Appealed To The Supreme Court

G. Richard Bevan

CCOA

COOPE

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

G. Richard,Bevann

3/3/2010

3/4/2010

4/22/2010

I

U' '
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Case: CV-2009-0004185 Current Judge: G. Richard Bevan
Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau 0

Daniel S. Fuchs vs. State of Idaho, Dept. of ID State Police, Bureau

0

Date

Code

User

4/29/2010

MISC

COOPE

Alcohol Beverage's Request for Documents to be G. Richard Bevan
Included in the Clerk's Record IAR. 28

4/30/2010

CCOA

COOPE

Amended Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

G. Richard Bevan

5/6/2010

NOTC

COOPE

Petitioner/Plaintiff/Appellant's Notice of
Non-Opposition to Request that Documents be
Included in the Clerk's Record

G. Richard Bevan

5/12/2010

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Document(s)
Filed

G. Richard Bevan

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's
Certificate Filed

G. Richard Bevan

SCDF

COOPE

Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record
Due Date Set

G. Richard Bevan

CCOA

COOPE

Second Amended Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

G. Richard Bevan

Judge

!.
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313
Attorney at Law
548 North Avenue H
Post Office Box 419
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419
Telephone (208) 343-3851
Facsimile (208) 343-4188

20D9 S[P -4

;

'L.', .:;'

PH 3: 33

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT 011 THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 01;' TWIN 1''ALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

c~-Oq- ~ \7:/0

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
STATE OF IDAHO, Depaliment ofIdaho
State Police, BUreal.l. of Alcohol Beverage
Control,
Defellda.ut.
COMDS NOW the Plaintiff, Daniel S. Fuchs, by and through his attorney of

record~

Brian Donesley, and alleges and complains as follows:

I. PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1

This action is brought pursuant to Idaho Code Section 10-1201, et seq, Idaho

Code § 67-5278, and 42 USC 1983 for deprivation of federal and state constJhltional1y protected

rights, privileges and immunities without due process of law) contrary to Amendment 14 of tbe
Constitution of the United States, Article I, § 13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and
other applicable law.

2.

Plaintiff Daniel S. Fuchs is and at all times relevant has been. a resident of Tl-vin

Falls, Tvvin Falls County, ldaho.

COMPLAINT T"<;R DECLARATORY AND XNJUNCTIVE RELXEF

3.

Defendant The State of Idaho) Department of Idaho State Police, is a

governmental department of the State of Idaho, subject to suit, \vith constitutional and statutory
responsibilities due and owing to its citizens pursuant to the Idaho Constitution and governing

statutes, rules and regulations peliaining thereto and deriving from such authority. References

to

the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau of Defendant The State of Idaho, Department of Slate
Police (hereinafter: "ISP/ABC") include that administrative subdivision of The Idaho Smre

Department of Idaho State Police.

4.

Venue and jurisdiction are proper

in Twin Falls County, Idaho, as Plaintiff resides

in Twin Falls County, and this action pertains, in part, to Plaintiffs application for a State of
Idaho retail alcohol beverage license for the sale of alcoholic beverages for the city of Twin

Falls.

II. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

Alticle Ill, § 26 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the Idaho Legislature ha~\

the full power and authority to regulate the sale of or liquor:
From and after the thirty-first day of December in the year 1934, the legislatme of
the state of Idaho shall have full power and authority to pennlt, control and
regulate or prohibit the Inanufacture, sale, keeping for sale, and transportation for
sale, of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes.
6.

Pursuant to

I.e. § 23-903, the Director of the Idaho State Police has been

"'empowered, authorized and directed by the Idaho Legislature to issue licenses to qualified
applicants \vhereby the licensee is authorized to sell liquor at retail by the ill-ink." Pursuant to

I.e. § 23-903, the number of licenses so issued for any city shall not exceed one (1) license for
each one thousand five-hundred (1,500) population of said city or fraction thereof, as established
in the last cenSllS. Defendant ISP/ABC maintains a priority list of applicants for those cities in

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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which no incorporated city liquor license is available. A separate list is maintained for each Clty
A person desiring to be placed on a priority list is required to file a completed application for an
incorporated city liquor license, accompanied by payment of one-half (112) of the annual license
fee. Priority all the list 1S detennined by the earliest application. Each succeeding application is
placed on this list in the order received.
7.

From June 3, 1994 to February 13, 1995, Plaintiff applied for and wal:i placed on

the incorporated city priority lists for liquor licenses for each of the follo\ving Idaho cities Twin

Falls; Sun Valley; Ketchum; Haney; Idaho Falls; and Bellevue.
8.

On March 6, 2007, Defendant ISPI ABC caused to be amended the nlles

governmg alcohol beverage control. Among other things, ISP/ABC amended IDAPA

11.05.01.013.04, entitled "Limitations on Pll0rity Lists/' to include language, hmiting the
number of positions to one (1) only that any applicant may ho1d on any city priority list as
follows:

An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city
priority list. An applicant must be able to demonstrate to the Director the ability
to place an awarded license into actual use as requlred by Section 23-908(4),
Idaho Code and these rules.
9.

On July 24, 2009, Defendant ISP/ABC sent a letter to Plaintiff inforrning Plaintiff

that it was rem.oving all but one listing of his name from the priority lists for each of the above-

referenced cities, citing IDAP A 11.01.013.04, stating that "an applicant shall hold only one
po::;ition at a Lime

On

tach incorporaLed city list." (Con'espondence [rom LL R. Clements tu

Plaintiff D. Fuchs, dated July 24, 2009, a true and con-eet copy of which is attached as Exhibit

1). Defendant ISP/ABC summarily enclosed a check refunding Plaintiffs license application
fees for the each of his priority applications which exceeded one (1) for each city named.

COlVIPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCnVE RELIEF
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Plaintiff was entitled to notice and hearing of Defendant ISP/ABC's intention to

apply IDAPA 11.05.01,013.04 retroactively to applicants holding more than one (1) posirion

Oil

each city priority list prior to March 6, 2007, the date the 1ll1e was amended. The Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that "[nJo state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges and inununities of citizens ... nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty; or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person vvithin its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'; Atiicle I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution sirnilarly
states that "[nJo person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."
11.

Aside from any unnecessary property right analysis, the Idaho Administrative

Procedures Act,

I.e.

§§ 67-5201 et seq., and the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure,

IDAPA 04.11.01 et seq., set forth procedural due process requirements for the State to follow,
should it seek to depri.ve a person of a legally protected right, privilege or property interest In
particular,

I.e. § 67-5240 states that a proceeding by an agency that "may result jn the issuance

of an order is a contested case" is governed by the provisions of the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act, unless otherwise provided by law. An "Order" means "an agency action (If
particular applicability that detennines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or otber
legal interests of one (1) or more specific persons." I.e. § 67-5201 (12), Pursuant to the abovereferenced and other applicable law, Plaintiff was entitled to notice and hearing before the order
was issued and/or before the final agency action occ<.Uled which resulted in Plaintiff being
removed from the priority lists.
12.

Defendant ISP/ABC's July 24, 2009 letter was an unlawful "Order" as defined by

I.e. § 67-5201 (12) and/or final agency action issued and implemented without notice or warning

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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to Plaintiff, done arbitrarily, capriciously or as an unreasonable exercise of police power, beyond
the scope of the State's authority, in violation of already established law, including the

Constitution, Amendment 14, the Idaho Constitution, Art. I, § 13, the Idaho Administrative

Procedures Act, Idaho Code § 67-5201 et seq. and the Idaho Rules of Administrative ProccdLu'e,
IDAP A 04.11.01. et seq.
13.

Defendant ISP/ABC has continued to issue Notices of License Availability to

applicants on the priority lists. On August 7, 2009, Nichole Harvey, an employee of Defendant
ISP/ABC, sent Plaintiff a Notice of License A vaUabiliry by certified mail infonnillg Plaintiff that

a new incorporated city alcohol beverage license to sell liquor by the drink had become available
in the City of Twin Falls and that Plaintiff was priority applicant (Correspondence from N,
Harvey to D. Fuchs dated August 7, 2009, a tllle and conect copy of which is attached as
Exhib.it2). Based upon infomlation and belief, Defendant ISPIABC has issued and continues to

issue similar Notices of Lict:nse Availability to other priority applicants on each of the priority
lists from which Plaintiffs name ha.s been removed.

See Affidavit of Brian Donesley;fT1ed

herewith.
14.

Plaintiff shall be ineparably banned, if Defendant is not enjoined from continuing

to notify applicants of the availability of licenses and/or issuing said licenses to other persons,
Plaintiffs na:me was removed from the priority lists, Subsequent applicants may be notified.
Some have already been notified of available licenses. This conduct excludes Plaintiff fiom Ius

lawflll placement on the lists and threatens Plaintiff with the loss of rights, privileges and
immunities, without due process of law, including but not limited to, protected property and
liberty interests pertaining to the liquor licenses and occupations to whicb he is entitJed.
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This matter }s subject to the COll1t's temporalY restraining order and/or

preliminary injuDction and such other declaratory and injunctive relief sought, inasmucb as
issues pertain to matters which involve clearly established law, violations of righTs which an:'
threatening immediate, continuing and irremediable hanns to Plaintiff for which there are no

remedies at law, such as money damages, as any new business profits are speculative, and since
any licenses to be issued are those which are attributable to Plaintiff having lost his position

within a tightly regulated, statutory scheme of allocation ofliquor licenses, the numbers of wbicll

are regulated by

statute~

and, further, involving a substantial1ikelihood of success

011

the merits

by Plaintiff, as established by the filings before the COU1t.

III.

16.

DECLARATORY RELIEF (CQO)lt One)
(IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04)

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 15 as if

fully set f01th herein.

17.

ISP/ABC's July 24,2009 notice constituted a "final agency action," within the

meaning ofIdaho Code §67-5270 (2) ..

18.

Plaintiffis an interested person, whose rights, status or legal relations are affected

by the Defendants

j

interpretation of the Title 23, Idaho Code, as well as by Defendants-

promulgation and application of rules thereunder, including but not limited to IDAP A

11.05.013.04.
19.

Defendant ISP/ABCs July 24, 2009 removal of Plaintiff fronl the above,·

referenced priority lists was an illegal, retroactive application of IDAPA 11.05.0'1.013.04, as
amended, in violation of Idaho law, including but not limited to Amendment 14 of the

u.s

Constitution, Art. I, § 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, the Idaho Administrative Procedures

COIV(PLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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Act)

I.e.

§§ 67-5201, et seq.

I.e. § 73-101, the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure, JDAP.A

04.11.01 et seq, and other applicable law.
20,

Plaintiff seeks a declaration from this Court that Defendant's application of

IDAPA 11.05,01.013.04, as applied to Plaintiff, exceeds and/or is outside the authority granted
to

ISPIABC by the Idaho Legislature, and that Defendant's attempt to apply said rule

retroactively is null and void.

IV.

21,

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Count Two)

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs 1 through 20 as if

fully set forth herein.

22,

Defendant acted outside its administntive authority, when it applied IDAPl\

11.05.01.013.04 to Plaintiff retroactively for applications filed prior to the effective date of the
March 6, 2007 amendment that purported to limit applicants to only one position on a priority

list for any Idaho city.

23,

This Court is respectfully requested to exercise its jurisdiction over this action, to

maintain the status quo before the unlawful actions of Defendant, enjoining Defendants from

issuing notices of license availability and/or licenses to applicants on the priority lists for the
cities of Twin Falls,

SUD

Valley, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, Idaho, other than to

Plaintiff, until further order of this Court.

V.
24.

VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS (Count Three)

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs 1 through 23 as if

fully set forth herein,

COJ,VIPLAlNT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCnYE REUEF
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25.

Plaintiff is infot1l1ed and believes and based upon that information and belief

alleges that the law does not provide an adequate administrative remedy or other relief for tbe
unlawful, retroactive application of the statutes, rules and regulations goveming alcoholic
beverages, as set fotth in Title 23, Chapters 6,7,8,9,10,11 ,12,13,14, and TDAPA 11.0S,(J] oftbe
Rules Goveming Alcohol Beverage Control et seq..

Defendant ISP/ABC's illegaJ and

retroactive application of IDAPA 11.05,01.013,04 results in Plaintiffs denial of substantive and
procedural due process rights arising pursuant to Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the
United States, and Article. 1, § 13 of Constitution of the State of Idaho, relating to Plaintiff s

protected libe11y and property interests.

VI.

ATTORNEX.FEES

Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of Brian, Donesley, Attorney al

26.

Law, in order to prosecute this action alld is entitled to reasonable attomey fees and costs of suit
pursuant to I.e. §§ 12-117, 121, Rule 54(e), LR.C.P., 42 USC 1983 and 1988 and other
applicable law.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
'WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court:

(a)

Issue its temporary restraining order eqjoining Defendants from issuing notices of

license availability and/or licetlses to any license applicants on the incorporated city priority list

for the Tdaho cities of Twin Fa11s, Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, Idaho,
other than to Plaintiff: until the motion for preliminary injunction JTlay be heard;

COlVIPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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(b)

After hearing on the matter, issue its preliminm), injunction enjoining Defendants

fi'om issuing notices of license availability and/or licenses to any license applicants on tIle
incorporated city priority list for the cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, HfliIey, Idaho

Fans and Bellevue, Idaho, other than to Plaintiff, pending tlle final adjudication;
(c)

Declare, adjudge and decree that IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 is null and void and of

no effect, as applied retroactively 1:0 Plaintiff, and that IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 shall not ftlrther
or again be applied retroactively;
(d)

Declare, adjudge and decree that Plaintiff shall be reinstated to the same place~;

Plaintiff held on the priority lists for the incorporated cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum,
Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, Idaho before Defendant ISPJABC issued its July 24, 2009
letter and removed Plaintiffs name from said lists;

(e)

Restore the status quo by ordering that ISPJ ABC shall rescind any hcenses issued

to third party priority list applicants whose names appeared after Plaintiffs name on said priority

lists before July 24, 2009, or the date of Plaintiffs removal from such lists and who were issued
licenses that would not have been so issued but for the wrongful acts of Defendant ISP/ABC as
alleged in doing so;

Cf)

Award to Plaintiff the costs of this action including reasonable attoI11ey fees, in

accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of law, including but not limited to Idaho Code
§§12-117, and12-121; Rule 54, LR.C.P.; 42 U.S.c. 1988; and,
(g)

Award such other and furthet relief as the COUli considers just and proper.

DATED this

l

day of September, 2009.

'2__" c\~ t~"
Brian Donesley
AttoI11ey for Plaintiff Daniel S, Fuchs

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARA TORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF'
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13: 47

20834341

Idaho State Police
S«rice $in,(;e 1939
C.L "Butch" Otter

July 24, 2009

~Of

Daniel Fuchs

526 K Shoup Ave West
Twin Falls, ID 83301
Dear Mr. Fuchs;
We have recently reviewed the priority waiting list for incorporated dty liquor
licenses for the state of Idaho. .The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 11 11tle
OS Chapter 01.013.04 discusses the Ilmltatlons the priority list speclflcalty

on

stating that "an applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each
Incorporated city priority list",
Daniel S. Fuchs appears on the priority list for the following cltles; Twin Falls(
Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls, and Bellevue numerous times. The fee
for your priority applications, receipt numbers 7675, 7676, 7677, 7678, 7679/

7681, 7680, 7538, 7687,7532,. 7531, 7685( 7684, 7534, 7682, and 7692 for the
above mentioned cities of dated June 2, 1994 - February 13( 1995 are being
refunded based on the limitations described above. Enclosed is a check for the
amount of ($5,175.00). Please contact our office if you have any questions.

full

s#~!~~
Lt. Robert Clements
Bureau Chief
Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau

Idaho State Police

P.o. Box 700, Meridian, Idaho 83680-0700
EQUALOPPOltTUNnYliMPlOYER
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Idaho State Police
Service since 1939
Cdooci G. Jerry RUlIf4II1
Dfn:,cw

.c\ugl)"t

7, ZOO')

C.l... "8I1tih" Oftl'r
(;ollm\or

D:uud S, 1'nebs
S26 "K" Sll,)up Ave \Xiest
Twin

Fi!lI~,

TD 1i1.10 I

:m~ herehy notified du( a new fncorponll("'d CIty lIlmhol heverage lict.:nse to sell liqllor l,y Lht: drink h\l~
becoIne' IIVlIUU\"k ill the City ofl'vl'in Falls aod YelU ~tc ;\ priority "l'plkSll1r.

y,-,,,

'I'p apply for the nl,~iJf\J;;,lc litllloI lice:.ut(!,'., ylll! tnmt, \v1thit, ten (10)
wriring of your iULt;nl [0 proceed '\v.ith the Hpplk:I\1 ion pl'oca;;;.

day!! of r(:ccipt ollhitl II:ttel', n(")tjfy rhib office in

if )'Oll npply for ~he liq\lor by the drink !iwIlSt:. you hnvc onc hund~d find cj,g-hry (1 [010) J ays from rhc elmc or
rL'lTipl (j( LItis letter to submit n compJ.ctc. arrli~~\fion whidl yo.u vedfy you hfl.ve cornpl(~f'(~d ~lJ nt:cc~s\tl)'
l'<'quircnwnl'!I for the iol1LI<l.nCe of t:I\' llonuoU license t"or. thr. ~ak of li\.luvt by (he drink. Please nOt.; rh~ t il may l!!:k<.:
lIP LO alf\~ry (90) (h,y!' \o(J pnjL:~1S your completed at'plicncion. F;t;lurc 1.0 mct:l widl all 5t.llturory l'eclllirCnlc:nl', rrmy
fl;;$ult in \\ uenil'll of thr. lic.c·n~(~.
'Upon il1t1u1I,ncl; of the license to scllliquo"r by the drink, yuu., Ule orlgibnlliccnsee, mu"t immcui!lh.:ly
begin ~aJe!l of \i'1IAm hy the drink at le"Gt eight (8) hourI> ;t day, "ix (6) days a weel~ for sn. COflf;('cutivc
This liquor by the drink liccm;e canllot be transferred for a pcrimluf two yea.cs and h sllbjccr I'()
:Intlllul renev,'IlL fdaho Godc requires Cllch J;1t'wl), i~~!wd liqllOf by the dtiok Jjc(.n$(~ to be: [lbcetl itlto ilCtu<1f U6e
by ('he urWI.",llice(].<;t:~ at r.hc time of issuan<;c and .rcmain ill \I~~~ for Ilr )~115t sb:. (6) COrtSCCllfiv(: JTHmlh, or be
r"r(t.:i~ed to the SLltC-. Illhbu elY! It": ~2,"'.1)()P,(4)1, 1\11 alcohol bC"'crai:,>(! li<:t:rm~ t'n ur-r he p romInently disphyt:d in "
~1)ir~hle pn.:miot: where legitimate: s;tlt:~ of uk;vltnlic. bc:vcrl\Ac~ by the ddnk Qk\: plitr.;~\.
llHHllh:o: .

If you fail to notify thix nfficl: in wt1\ing within t;¢il (10 da~ of the rcct::llll of dlis lettcl, OJ: to (.:umplcrc:rh<:;
"'pplic9.tion within the time descrincll herein, yout mllne ~'.!11 be r~,movcd from the priority list and yom
mr.mc)' will he rcfundc;d. P.covidcd, howe,v{',r, thar Ilpon :;h{)willg of good C;l.1.1.:iC the Alcohol licv l'T~'.g~ Comrol
f.,utelLl, ld"ho $trtH: Polke, Illll.y c.".Lcnd the tim/.! in which [0 cQmplc/ c lilt.: w.!ccssary [cquitcn~e-nts to r ~ period 1I0l
[0 ",.;cccd nil1cry (90) dily\'.
.
!\n

,1r rli('.~ rj ()n

i:;

(:[!d()~t;d

for your convenience,

j~~~~·ja.J..Ul~
N ic h,)k Harvey

ManagemcN

}\~~I ,~ r:lnl

/\..lcohQl Bt.'VNllge CQntrnl
Idahu ~ ta( e Police
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313
Attorney at Law
540 North Avenue H
Post Office Box 419

20GS S[P - 4 Pr~ 3: 33

Boise, Idaho 83701-0419
Telephone (208) 343-3851

Facsimile (208) 343-4188
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND .FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,
PJaintiff~

v.

STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage

CASE NO.

C~-

Oq- 4\~')

MOTION FOR TElVIPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,
I.R.C.P. 65 (a) et seq.

Control;

Defendant.
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Daniel S. Fuchs, by and through his attorney of record,
Brian Donesley, and hereby moves this COUli for its Temporaty Restraining Order and,
following a hearing, for the Court's Preliminary Injunction enjoining Defendant Idaho State
Police, Akohol Beverage Control, fi-om notifying third parties of the availability of retail alcohol

beverage licenses) and from issuing any licenses to third parties from the priority lists for the
cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hailey and Bellevue) Idaho, and fionJ continuing allY
other administrative proceedings or actions pertaining to Defendant regarding the priority lisls

for these cities.

MonON FOR TEMpORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND .rru:L1.l\HNARY INJUNCnON, I.RC.P. (6~)
(~) et seq.
.
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Plaintiff,

contemporaneously~

LAW Ur

has filed his Complaint for DeclaratOlY Judgment and

InjlUlctive Relief, Memorandum in support of this Motion and supporting affidavits,
This Motion is brought to restore the status quo pertaining to the parties prior tu
ISPIABC's removal of Plaintiff's name from the priority lists for these designated five (5) cities,
pending the hearing of this motion for preliminary injunction,
The relief requeSTed of the Court is as follows:
(1)

The Court's temporalY restraining order staying, suspending and postponing tI.le

notification to any third party of the availability of retail alcohol beverage 1ioenses, and fronl
issuing any licenses to third p31iies for the cities of Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum" HaiJey and
BcllCYtlC, Idaho, and from continuing any other agency adtninistrativc proceodings or actions

related to the priority lists;

(2)

Expedited hearing on this motion for preliminary injlUlctiot1) suspending and

postponing DefenJ:mt's oth(;r administrative proceedings or actions related to the priority lists,

based upon or related to the facts recited in the Cornplaint and Memorandum, and restoring the
status quo pe11aining to the pal1ies prior to the Plaintiff s removal from the priority lists, pending
final detennination and resolution in this jUdicial action; and,

(3)

Such other and fmiher related relief and orders as justice may require to preserve

Plaintiff's protected legal rights, privileges, immunities and property interests, based upon or
related to the facts alleged in the Complaint and Memorandum.

This Motion is brought in accordance with Rule 65(a) et seq. ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure and is supported by the Complaint by Plaintiff, Memorandum in Support of MotioJl,
Affidavit of Brian Douesley and Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs filed contemporaneously herewitb
and other filings in the Court records in this action,

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, LRC1).
(a) ct seq.

65J 35 2

Concurrently with this Motion, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Consolidate this case will,

Fuchs v State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police, Case No. CV 2009-3914,

UPOll

Petition for Judicial Review. Plaintiff has l1'Aoved the Court in the judicial review case to issue its

stay prohibiting further agency action, until this matter may be adjudicated, or fmther order 0 f
the Court. Should the cases have been consolidated, before this COUl1's ruling on this present
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, the motions may be consolidated conclU1'emly in the

consolidated case.

DATED this

l

day of September, 2009.

~"''''\.A (i~J\ "-"1
Brian Donesley
Attomey for Plaintiff Dal1iel S. Fuchs

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDt":H AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, LR.C.P. 65
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 4th day of September, 2009, I hereby celiify that I served tbe above document on
the addressee(s) indicated, by delivering the same to the following party(s) by method indicated
below:

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General
Office of Attomey General
700 W. Jefferson Street
P.O. Box 83720

(X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ ] Facsimile (334-2530)

Boise, ID 83720

[ J u.s. Mail
[X ] Hand-Delivered

Stephanie Altig, Deputy AG.
Idaho State Police
700 S, Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642-6202

[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ ] Facsimile (884-7090)

Robert Clements
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian,ID $3642-6202

[
[X
[
[

] U.S. Mail
] Hand-Delivered
] Overnight Mail
] Facsimile (884-7096)

4AvLicL
Tina Burke
Legal Assistant

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDE){ AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, l.R.c.P. 65
(ll) et seq.
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313
Attomey at Law
548 North Avenue H
Post Office Box 419
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419
Telephone (208) 343-3851
Facsimile (208) 343-4188
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TRE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF T"iIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,

Plaintiff,
v.

AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL S. FUCHS

STATE OF IDAHO, Department of Idaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control,
Defenda.nt.

STATB OF IDAHO
County of

)
)ss,
)

DANIEL S. FUCHS, being first duly swom OIl oath, deposes and says;

1.

Affiant is the Plaintiffin the above-entitled action and has personal y,now)edge of

the facts contained in this Affidavit.

2.

Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and conect copy of a letter Affiant received frorn

Lt. Robert Clements, Bureau Chief of the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau of the Defendant
Idaho State Police dated July 24,2009,

AFFIDA VIT OF DANIEL S, FUCHS
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3.

Li-1V.,o

rf-1Qc...

ur r

Attached as Ex.hibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a letter Affiant :received from

Nichole Harvey, Management Assistant of the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau of the

Defendant Idaho State Police on August 7, 2009.
4.

Further, your Affiant sayclh naught.

DATED this

1.)

day of September, 2009.

~~gfX
DANlliL S. P CHS
Plaintiff

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me, this _..L........~day of September, 2009.

~~W.W.I~o.'!th,,~
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AF.FIDAVlT OF DANIEL S. :FUCHS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On thisl,tf4 day of September, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above document on
the addressee(s) indicated, by delivering the same to the following party(s) by method indicated
below:

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attomey General
Office of Attomey General
700 'vv. Jefferson Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise) ID 83720

Stephanie Altig, Deputy A.G.
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
MeJidian, ID 83642-6202
Rubert Clements
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642~6202

[ X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ ] Facsimile (334-2530)

[ ] u.s. Mail
[X ] Hand-Delivered

[ J Overnight Mail
[ J Facsimile (884- 7090)
[ ] U.S. Mail
[X J Hand-Delivered
[
[

] Oven-light Mail
] Facsimile (884-7096)

Tina Burke
Legal Assistant

AFFIDA VIT OF DANIEL S. FUCliS
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Idaho State Police
Service since 1939
C.L. "Dutch" Onef
Gmemot

July 24, 2009

DanIel fuchs

. 526 K Shoup Ave West
Twin Fallsi ID 83301

Dear Mr. Fuchs;
We have recently reviewed the priority waiting list for incorporated city liquor
!lcenses for the state of Idaho. The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 11 lltle
05 Chapter 01.013 _04 discusses th~ limitations on the priority list specifically

stating that \\an applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each

incorporated city priority list

ll
,

Daniel S. Fuchs appears on the priority list for the following cities; Twin Falls,
Sun Valley, Ketchum, Hail~y( Idaho Falls, and Bellevue numerous times. The fee

fOr your priority applications, receipt numbers 7675, 7676, 7677, 7678, 7679,
7681, 7680, 7538, 7687, 7532( 7531, 7685, 7684, 7534( 7682 and 7692 for the
1

abOve mentioned cities Of dated June 2, 1994 - February 13, 1995 are being

refunded based on the limitations described above. Enclosed is a check for the
full amount of ($5 t 175.00). Please r;ontact our office if you have any questions.

Lt. RObert Clements
Bureau Chief
AlCOhOl Beverage control Bureau

Idaho Stete Police

P.O. Box 7001 Merldian.Idaho 83680-0700

-=--:.l_
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Idaho State Police
Service since 1939
Colonel G. Jerry RuueU

G.L.. "Botell" Ott"'.
(iovtftlor

.r\uglJ.t 7, 2009

D!rec.tot
DaJliel S. hlChs
526 "K" Slmup Aye We::;t
1\viLl f~lls,

m

R.'BO 1

I\c; NoLice of License Avci1nbility, Cc.r.titid M:lil

Y(llJ m~ herehy notified thaI a new Incorpo{"du;d City 1I1ml101 beverage Ib::nse to scilliqlltlr by Lhl: drink ha,
bcCOmt'lIvllUrtbk ill the City of'l'Vl1n Falls ;J.od you Uc ,\ priority ~l'plir.sl11r.
')'0

apply lor the !'l.\'fl.ihbk litjllOr 1ic~u~~'.., YOll mmt, withili ten (10) day!! of receipt or lhi:J lillIe!', l1C'1tify thl6 office

wri6ng oC your iULt;Ill [Q proceed with the

j"

~\pplktlt ion PI'OCr::i:\.

If you apply for the liquor by the (lrink 1iQ..:lIs~. you have one hundred and cJghry (1[0\0) Jays from the d;uc of
rN:eil'L or Lhis letter to SllbLn1C n compicte. ;!rrli~~(ion which you verifY you h{\.\Ie cornpl(~t(~d :ill m;CI~:;s\try
fC<Juircnwl;l'!! for the i~~Llll.!lCe of nt1 annual license. tOr. rhr. Ral(: of li~Ij()t by the drink. Please nOte th:l r il may Utkc
IIp LO aif\{!~ (On) clijYli 10 pr{icetls your completed applicncion. F~ilnr~:

1.<)

Im:ct with all statlH01), t"ecluircmc:n rs [Tlay

result in 1'1 deni\\l of the licens(:.
Upon ill,nl,um.:c (Jf the license to sell liquor by the drink, yuu, the origiballiccnsee, mUl'i

immcdj~ldy

begin !;:\letl of li(lU{)1" hy Un; drink Pot le~6t eight (8) hours <l day, Itix (6) days a week for six cons«;:.:;utivc
mOl1tb~. This liquor by the drink licc.:11~l~ cafHlot he transferred for a pcriuJ of two ye~(s ~Lld is 8ubjecr f{)
~~ntIlHll renewal. Td."\ho ~odc requires each ~H:wl)' i::;~ll~rlliq\lor by the dtiok Jjccn$(~ ro In: phlCCU into ilCW:U use
by d:zu urigilmllicell.<;t:tt: at t.hc til11.c of issunn<;c and remain itl \I"~' ror nr Jellst sh (6) consccllTivc mOl1 lh ~ or be
[o,r{J,ed to the statt. Ildaho CUI k: »2.V)()R(4)J. AU alcohol bc'7era/:,><.' 1i<.:t:'m~ t'ntl~t he pmmlnenrly disphyed in :,
~I)i r:< hk pn:l!l.i~c where legitimate: sale~ of uk;(,Iltnlic. bc:vc:rl\Ac~ by the drink uk!: pljtc~~.
If you fail to notify thiM offict: in wthing within ttn (10 daY5 of the rccdl'l of Wis leltcl, or to n."Tlph:::lcrh<;
application within th~ time de!>crinctl hcrdn, your 11IillnC will be r~moved from the priority lis1 :md your
money will he rcfulldr:d. Provided, howe,v(',r, rhar IlrOll );huwillg of good cau:;c the Alcohol Iicvera!;1.: Comrol
Buteau, Idnho $t'aH: Police, Illay c~Lclld the time in which [0 comrlek II".: llCCtSSllLY n;l'luircnit'm. to~ :1 pC!r1od !lot
to <:~cccd nil1cty (90) day\'.

!\n .ippli<::<tion i:;
1'1,,,.,1,

yl)U

£:nd()~ed

tor your

tll'l'l.C

for your CQl1veniC!nc:e.

in thi.s mattel. We Jr.J('lk Inrw<ird to receiving your 'wl,itl " .11 r~~l'()IH;e.

\~~.1T

Nichok Harvey
Managemcm .1\~Xll\r;mJ
Alcohol BI..·"\I(!tnge Control 1~1l e,~u

Idaho Sta~e Police
:L!IU,.:I.t)!-\'ln.::I
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313
Attorney at Law
548 North Avenue H
Post Office Box 419
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419
Telephone (208) 343-3851

Facsimile (208) 343-4188
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TVVIN FALLS

DANIEL S ..FUCHS,
Plaintiff,
Y.

AFFIDA VIT OF BRIAN DONESEL Y

STATE O:F IDAHO, Depaliment ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control,

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss.
)

BRlAN DONESLEY, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

1.

Affiant is attorney for Plaintiff in the above-referenced action and has personal

knowledge of the facts contained in this Affidavit.
2.

On September 3, 2009, Affiant was infonned by Lt. Robert Clements, Bureau

Chief, Alcohol Beverage Control of the Deparnnent of Idaho Stare Police that the Alcohol
Beverage Control Bureau of Defendant of Idaho State Police was preparing to issue notices to

applicants on the priority lists of some if not all of the cities from which Plaintiff Daniel Fuchs'
IJ
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name has been removed, that license positions held by Plaintiff Fuchs are now availabJe to tliern.

Lt. Clements suggested that, if Plaintiff intended to seek an injunction against the IdallO State
Police, Akohol Beverage Control or a stay of agency action, Plaintiff should do so as soon as
possible and an injunction obtained, as the notices shall be issued fOlihwith, unless otherwise
enjoined by a court of law.

Affiant told Lt Clements and Jenny Gruoke l Deputy Attomey

General for Idaho State Police, that the Complaint would be filed by no later than September LI,
2009.
3.

Affiant hereby certifies, pursuant to I.RGP, 65 (b), that the following efforts

have been made to give notice to Defendant State of Idaho, Department of Idaho State Police of
Plaintiffs' intent to move for a temporary restrail1ing order and prelirn.jnary injunction in this
matter:
(a)

I contacted met with Lt. Robel1 Clements, Bureau Chiet~ Alcohol

Beverage Control Bureau, Idaho State Police and with Jenny Gnmke, Deputy
Attomey General, Idaho State Police, on September 3, 2009. I told them that, as
attomey for Plaintiff, I was preparing to file a Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctjve Relief, a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction and other filings at the soonest possible time with respect to the

striking of Plaintiff Fuchs' name from the waiting lists for liquor licenses in the
cities of Twin Falls, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue.

(b)

FUliher; on this date, I sent by facsimile a copy of said Motion, the

Mem.orandum in SUpp01t of the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction, the Complaint for Declaratory and InjlU1ctive Relief, the
Motion to Consolidate, the Affidavit of Daniel Fuchs and this Affidavit.

··(ll 361
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FUlther, Affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this __S_<_day of September, 2009.

Brian Donesley
Attomey for Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND S\VORN to before me, this

I/I!;

day of September, 2009.

~jf~~~~--<

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:'¢;Cl''i.{ (:cd<{ito
Commission expires:
(jf;L;/IPI8
<

7 /
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 4th day of September, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above document 011
the addressee(s) indicated, by delivering the same to the following pany(s) by method indicated
below:

Lawrence G, Wasden, Attorney General
Office of Attomey General
700 W. Jefferson Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise,ID 83720

[ X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mai]
[ ] Facsimile (334-2530)

Stephanie Altig, Deputy AG.
Idaho State Police
700 S, Stratford Drive
Meridian,ID 83642-6202

[

] U.S. Mail
[X] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ ] Facsimile (884-7090)

Robert Clements
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642-6202

[ J U.S. Mail
[X ] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ ] Facsimile (884··7096)

\~ie~~~.~~.~""-=--,,,--Thla Burke

Legal Assistant
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RRTAN DONESLEY ISB#2313
Attomey at Law
548 North Avenue H
Post Office Box 419
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419
Telephone (208) 343-3851
Facsimile (208) 343-4188

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S.

FUCHS~

Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

v.

cV- oq -4 \ 2.5

lVIElYIORANDUl\1 IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR TEl\1PORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

STATE OF IDAHO, Department ofIdaho
State Police, Bureau of Alcohol Beverage
Control,

Defendant.
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Daniel S. Fuchs, by and through his attomey of record, Brian
Donesley, and hereby submits the following Mernorandurn in Support of Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction:

I.
INTRODUCTION
This action involves Defendant Idaho State Police's duties and responsibilities to
administer the issuance of retail alcohol beverage licenses in the State of Idaho. The Alcohol
Beverage Control Bureau of Defendant Idaho State Police (hereinafter uISP/ABC") maintains
priority lists for incorporated cities.

Plaintiff secured positions on priority lists by filing

applications and paying fees for five Idaho cities between 1994 and 1995. In 2007, Defendant
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARy RESTRAINING
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY TNJUNCTlON
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ISP/ABC amended the mles govemmg alcohol beverage control, limiting applicants to one
position only on any given priority list. On July 24, 2009, without notice or vvaming, ISP/ABC
removed all but one of Plaintiffs places on tl1e priority list for each Twin falls, Ketchum,

Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, Defendant lSP/ABC's action was an unlawful, retroaclrvc
application of an IDAP A rule, in violation of Plaintiff s due process rights and express
prohibition in Idaho Code against retroactive application of law.
On August 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed his Petition for Judicial Review of ISP!ABC action in

Fuchs

v.

State of Idaho. Department of Idaho State Police, Case No. 2009-39J4. Coneurrently

with this Motion, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and a Motion
lu

Consolidate the Petition for Judicial Review with this action.
By this Motion, Plaintiff moves this Court to enjoin Defendant ISP/ABC frorn notifying

any succeeding applicants on the respective priority lists or issuing licenses to any such
applicants, until further order of .the Court. Should this Coun have consolidated the two cases)
Phlintiff moves this Court, also, to stay agency action, pending resolution of this matter pursuant

to LRCP. 84 (m).
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to LC. § 23-903, the Director of Defendant Idaho State Police has been
"empowered, authorized and directed by the Idaho Legislature to issue licenses to qualified
applicants whereby the licensee is authorized to sell liquor at retail by the drink."

Pursuant to

I.e. § 23-903, the number of licenses so issued for any city shall not exceed one (1) license for
each one thousand five-hundred (1,500) population of said city or fraction thereof, as established
in the last census, Defendant ISP!ABC maintains a priority list of appljcants for those cities in
which no incorporated city liquor license is available. A separate list is maintained for each city.
[\1EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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A person, pminership, or corporation desiring to be placed on a prioIity list is required to .file a

completed application for an incorporated city liquor license, accompanied by payment of ()lle~
half (112) of the required annual license fee. Priority on the list is detennined by the earliest
application. Each succeeding application is placed on this list in th.e order it was received
Between June 3, 1994 and Februa1Y 13, 1995, Plaintiff applied for and was placed o.n the
incorporated city priority lists for the following Idaho cities: Twin Falls; Sun Valley; Ketchum;
Hailey; Idaho Falls; and Bellevue.
On March 6, 2007, Defendant ISP/ABC amended the rules goveming alcohol beverage
control.

Among other things, ISP/ABC amended IDAPA 11.05.01.013.04, "Limitations on

Priority Lists," to inc1u.de the following language, litniting the number of positions to one (1)

only that any applicant may hold on any city priority list:
An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city
priority list. An applicant must be able to demonstrate to the Director the ability
to place an awarded license into actual use as required by Section 23-908(4),
Idaho Code and these rules.
On July 24,2009, Defendant ISP/ABC sent a letter to Plaintiff, mfonning him that it "vas
removing all but one listing of his name from the priority lists for the above-referenced cities,
dUng IDAPA 11.01.013.04, and stating that "an applicant shall hold only one positiou at a lime
on each incorporated city list" (Conespondence from Lt. R. Clements to D. Fuchs, dated July

24,2009, a tme and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Affidavit of Daniel S.
Fuchs.) Defendant ISPIABC summarily mailed to Plaintiff a check refunding PlaintitTs license
application fees for all of his priority appHcations in Twin Falls, Sun Valley, Ketchum, Idaho

Falls and Bellevue exceeding one (1).
Defendant ISP/ABC has continued to issue Notices of License Availability to applicants
on the priority lists. On August 7, 2009, Nichole Harvey, an employee of Defendant ISP/ABC,
;\1ElVIORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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sent Plaintiff a Notice of License Availability by certified mail, lrlfonl1ing Plaintiff that a new,
incorporated city alcohol beverage license to sell liquor by the drink had become available in the
City of Twin Falls and that Plaimiffwas the priority applicant. (Col1'espondence from N. Harvey
to D. Fuchs dated Al.lg1.lst 7, 2009, a true and conect copy of vvhich is attached as ExhibH 2 to

the Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs.) Based upon infoD11atiol1 and belief, Defendant ISP/ABC ha~;
issued and continues to issue similar Notices of License Availability to other priority applicants
on each of the priority lists £1:0111 which Plaintiffs name has been removed, In fact, Defendan(

ISP has infonned Plaintiffs counsel that it intends to issue notices of availability to applicants

Oll

the affected priority lists in the near future.
2. On September 3, 2009, Affiant was infolmed by Lt. Robert Clements, Bureau
Chief~ Alcohol Beverage Control of the Department of Idaho State Police that the
Alcohol Beverage Control Bmeau of Defendant of Idaho State Police was
preparing to issue notices to applicants on the priority lists of some if not all of the
cities from which Plaintiff Daniel Fuchs' name has been removed, that license
positions held by Plaintiff Fuchs are now available to them. Lt. Clements
suggested that, if Plaintiff intended to seek an injunction against the Idaho State
Police, Alcohol Beverage Control or a stay of agency action, Plaintiff shoUld do
so as soon as possible and an injunction obtained, as the notices shall be issued
forthwith, uXJ.less otherwise enjoined by a court of law. Affiant told Lt Clements
and Jenny Grunke, Deputy Attorney General for Idaho State Police) that the
Complaint would be filed by no later than September 4,2009,
Affidavit of Brian Donesley at

~

2.

Plaintiff shall be ilTeparably ham1ed, if Defendant is not enjoined from continuing to

notify applicants of the availability of licenses or issuing said licenses to other persons.
Plaintiffs name was removed fro111 the priolity lists; subsequent applicants shall be notified: and,

others are believed already to have been notified of available licenses. Such conduct excludes
Plaintiff from his lawful positions on the lists and threatens Plaintiff with the loss of rights,
privileges and immunities, withoilt due process of law, including but not limited to property and

liberty interests pertaining to liquor licenses to which he is entitled.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
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III.
PLAINTIFF HAS MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 65 (b) AND (e) AND THIS
COURT SHOULD ISSUE AN INJUNCTION RESTRAINING DEFENDANT FROl\1
FURTHER AGENCY ACTION
Rule 65(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the grounds upon ""hich the
COUl1may grant a preliminary injunction. The granting or denying of a temporary injunction is

left to the sound discretion of the trial court, based upon the circumstances of the particular case,
Such exercise shall not be disturbed on appeal unless a cJear abuse of discretion is shown
TVestern Gas & Power of Idaho v. Nash, 75 Idaho 327, 330-31,272 P.2d 316 (1954).

"An

injunction is an equitable remedy issued under established principles which guide courts of
equity," Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 936 F.Supp. 738, 742 (D. Idabo, 1996).

"The object

of injunctive relief is to prevent injury, threatened and probable to result, unless interrupted,"

Miller v. Ririe Joint School Dis!. No. 252, 132 Idaho 385, 973 P.2d 156 (1999) (quoting Cazier v.
Econorny Cash Stores inc., 71 Idaho, 178, 187 1951

».

Plaintiffs arc entitled to an injlllction, if they demonstrate that they arc "likely to succeed

on the merits of their claims and may suffer in-eparable injury, or that serious questions exist

OIl

the merits and the balance of hardships tips in their favor." Greater Yellowstone Coalition v.
Reese, 392 F.Supp.2d 1234, 1239 (D. Idaho 2005). The two tests arc flot sepa.rate but repre::,enl

"a sliding scale in which the required probability of success on the merits decreases as the degree
of harm increases," Id, (Citing Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda, 59 F.3d 902, 913
(9th Cir.199S». If a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of success on the merits, then
plaintiffs need "only to make a minimal showing of hann to justify the preliminary injunction,"

Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9 th Cit'. 2002). See also Idaho Sporting
Congress Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565 (91,h Cit'. 2000) (the stronger the likeli.hood on tbe
rnerits, the less burdeu is placed on plaintiffs to dern.onstrate irreparable harm),
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOnON FOR TElVJrO'RARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Defendant ISP/ABC summarily removed Plaintiffs name from the priority lists, withoul
waming, and without the opportunity to be heard and to object before the action was taken.

Subsequently, Defendant ISP/ABC has continued to notify priority list applicants of the
availability of new licenses,

Plaintiff received such a notice.

Affidavil of Daniel Fuchs

Plaintiff was entitled to notice and hearing before the order was issued which resulted in PlainlJff
being removed from the priority lists, See

I.e.

§§ 67-5201(12), 5240. Notice and hearing are

particularly irnportant in this case, because Defendant ISPIABC's actions were unlawfuL
There can be no dispute that Defendant ISP!ABC's July 24, 2009 letter ,vas a retroactive

application of law. IDAPA 11.05.01.013,04 was amended in 2007, limiting applicants to only
one position on any city priority list. Plaintiff applied for and was placed on the priority lists in
1994 and 1995. I.C. § 73" 101 provides that "no part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared."

"In the absence of an express declaration of legislative intent that a

statute apply retroactively, it will not be so applied. '· State v. Dateel Chenzical Industries, Ltd,
141 Idaho 102, 105 (2005) (quoting Gailey v, Jerome County, 113 Idaho 430, 432 (1987») "An

application is deemed retrospective ifit affects substantive rights." lvfyers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho

85, 87 (et. App. 1988). "Among the rights characterized as substanhve are those whICh are
'contractual or vested' in nature,"

Id.

(Intemal citations omitted).

Plaintiff has shown

likelihood of success on the merits of this case.
The second prong of the "sliding scale" test requires that Plamtiff demonstrate that be

shall suffer irreparable hann, if the injunction is not granted.

Plaintiff shall be irreparably

ham1ed here, if Defendant ISP!ABC is not enjoined, because, if ISP/ABC continues to notify
succeeding applicants of new licenses and/or issue new licenses, Plaintiff's rightful position

OJ]

those lists shall be lost. Moreover, this situation is unique, in that the irreparable harm would nol

IYJElVWRANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOnON :FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
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be confined to Plaintiff. The rights and legal interests of subsequent applicants who rely on
notices of license availability they receive or license they are issued may be affected. LIcenses
issued to them might be ordered rescinded, cancelled

Or

revoked,

111

order to affect relief sought

here by Plaintiff.
Defendant ISPiABC may argue that Plaintiff should be required to await completion of
agency action before seeking judicial relief. However, ISP/ABC offered Plaintiff no heat'ing or
opportunity to challenge the retroactive application ofIDAPA 11.05.01.013.04 in the first place.
Th.e July 24, 2009 letter was final agency action. An injunction is the proper remedy to prevent
additional hann flowing from it. Wrongs which are the probable result of given mean.s should be
prevented, not awaited. Cazier v. Economy Cash Stores. 71 Idaho 178, 187) 228 P.2d 436, 441
(1951).

Defendant ISPiABC may assert, without merit, that it is impem1issible for this Court to

interfere with its actions. HIn the instances where exercise of the authority transgresses the
bounds of reasonableness, or is arbitrary in result, to the point where there is." a deprivation of
property without due process of law (Idaho Const Art 1, §13), an action would lie

fOL,

injunctive relief." Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 52, 390 P.2d 291, 295 (1964). See also,

Fritchman

v.

Athey, 36 Idaho 560, 211 P. 1080 (1922) C'Courts wiH not interfere by injunction

with the exercise of discretion vested by law in administrative boards, but wiH, in proper cases,

interfere with the action or threatened action by administrative boards outside their discretion
a,n.d beyond their powers); Bedke v. Quinn, 154 F.Supp. 370, 372 (D. Idallo, 1957) ("[A] suit to
enjoin a subordinate official,

01'

to set aside action taken by him ... is allthorizedwhere U1e

subordinate official exceeded his authority. His authority would be exceeded where he exercised

authority granted him arbitrarily or capriciQusly, or where the subordinate employee exceeded
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the statutOlY authority, either directly or under the gmse of an ultra vires m311date of his
superior").
Finally, injunctive relief is proper, because Plaintiff has

nO

adequate remedy at law. "If

threat of injmy is real, an injunction may issue even though the injUlY, if it were to occur, could
be measured only by speculation and conjecture; one reason to issue an injunction may be thaI
damages, being immeasurable, will not provide a remedy at law."

Treasure Val. Potato

Bargaining Ass'n v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 497 F.2d 203 (9 th Cit'. 1974), cen. denied, 95 S.Ct. 314,
419 U.S. 999,42 LEd. 273.

While Plaintiff shall suffer real and ineparable ham; if Defendant

ISP is not enjoined, it would be impossible to calculate damages. Any measure of loss of
potential income from a lost license and prospective business conduct would be speculative in

nature. The threat of haml is real and immediate, however. Defendant ISP has said that it intends
to issue new notices of availability in the near future. See Affidavit of Brian Donesley at 11 2.
This Courl should grant Plaintiff a temporary restraining order pending hearing and a
preliminaIY inj'unction, enjoining Defendant ISP from notifying succeeding applicants on the
affected priority lists of available licenses, or issuing rerail alcohol beverage licenses until fm1ber
Order of this Couli.

IV.

I.R.C.P. RULE 84(m) PROVIDES FOR A STAY OF AGENCY ACTION DURING
THE PENDENCY OF A PETITION FOR nJDICIAL REVIEvV
Plaintiff filed his Petition for Judicial Review of Defendant ISP/ABC's final agency

action on August 19, 2009 in Fuchs v. State of Idaho, Dept. oj Idaho State Police, Case No. CV
2009-3914. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed his Motion to Consolidate the two cases, based upon
the grounds and reasons of C0111111011 issues of law and

fact~

and economy to the Court and the

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOnON FOR TElVIPORl-\.RY RESTRAINING
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parties, and that the interests of justice would best be served by consolidation of these cases
which involve substantially common issues of law and fact between the same parties. Should
this Court consolidate these cases, it may also slay, concllnenLly, Lhe agency [rom [urlher

(ll:lio)l,

pursuant to powers granted to the Court. in Judicial Review proceedings.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(m) provides the Court with a basis to grant Plaintiff a
stay of agency action pending the outcome of this proceeding:
Unkss otherwise provided by statute, the filing of a petition for judiCial revIew
with the district court does not antomatically stay the proceedings and
enforcement of the action of an agerlcy that is subject to the petition. Unless
prohibited by statute, the agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a
stay upon appropriate terms.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(m) (emphasis added).
An injunction or a stay of Defendant ISP/ABC prohibiting notifying succeeding

applicants on the implicated priority lists shall prevent fmther harm to Plaintiff And, Plaintiff s
rights, privileges and legal interests attendant to his positions on the priority lists, hence the
status quo, thereby would be preserved. A stay shall protect the right and lcgal interests of third
padies, as well, because their places on the priority lists shall be preserved, Should Defend3~nt
ISP/ ABC continue to notify succeeding applicants of the availability of new licenses, or issue

licenses to them, such actions may be required to be 'Undone. By contrast, there would be no
ham1 to Defendant ISP / ABC, if enjoined. ISP/ ABC has no substantive stake in whether licenses
are issued.
This Court should issue enjoin Defendant ISP/ABC from notifying to any such

succeeding applicants on the affected priority lists, or issuing retail alcohol beverage licenses.
Concunently) this COUlt should issue its stay order prohibiting Defendant ISP/ ABC from taking

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
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further agency action with respect to the affected priority lists, until this matter has been
adjudicated.
V.
CONCLUSION

Plaintiff requests that this Court issue its Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining

Defendant ISP/ABC from notifying succeeding applicants of available licenses or from issuing
liccnscs in the cities of Twin Falls, Ketchum, Hailey, Idaho Falls and Bellevue, pending hearing.

Plaintiff further requests that this Court issue a Preliminary Injunction so enjoining Defendant
ISP / ABC, upon hearing of this Motion. Concurrently, if the case shall have been consolidated
timely, Plaintiff moves this Court to stay Defendant ISP! ABC from furiher agency action during
the pendency of the Petition for Judicial Review.

DATED this

L day of September, 2009.
Brian Donesley
Attorney for Plaintiff Daniel S. Fuchs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 4th day of September, 2009, I hereby certify that I served the above document on
the addressee(s) indicated, by delivering the same to the following pa~iy(s) by method indicated
below.:

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
700 W. Jefferson Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise,ID 83720

[ X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ J Facsimile (334-2530)

Stephanie Altig, Deputy AG.

[ ] U.S. Mail
[X J Hand-Delivered
[ ] Ovemight Mail
[ ] Facsimile (884-7090)

Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian, ID 83642-6202
Robert Clements
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Drive
Meridian,ID 83642-6202

[

] U.S. Mail

[X 1Hand-Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile (884- 7096)
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General

2009 SEP 10 Pl'1 3: 55

CHER YL E. MEADE
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Dr.
Meridian, Idaho 83680-0700
Telephone: (208) 884-7050
Facsimile: (208) 884-7228
Idaho State Bar No. 6200
Attorney for the Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,
Plaintiff,

)
) Case No. CV-09-4185
)
)
) ABC's RESPONSE TO
) COMPLAINT FOR

vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL,
Defendant.

) DECLARATORY AND
) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
)
)
)
)
)

Defendant, by and through its attorney, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney General,
hereby responds to and answers Plaintiff's Complaint For Relief and asserts its affirmative
defenses.

I. DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE
Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff s Complaint except for
those expressly admitted.
ABC's RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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I. PARTIES AND JlJRISDICTION (paragraphs 1-4),
1. Plaintiffs paragraph 1 is a legal conclusion for which no response is required.
2. Defendant admits paragraph 2.
3. Defendant admits paragraph 3.
4. Defendant denies paragraph 4, in that venue is proper in Twin Falls County.
Defendant's administrative office, containing all records and documents, along with numerous
personnel, associated with this case are located in Meridian, Idaho. Venue is proper in Ada
County for these reasons and should be moved accordingly.

II. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS (paragraphs 5-15)
5. Defendant admits paragraph 5.
6. Defendant admits paragraph 6 to the extent that current statute and IDAPA rules al10w
for. Otherwise Defendant denies any procedure that Plaintiff mayor may not perceive as being
correct
7. Defendant admits paragraph 7.
8. Defendant admits paragraph 8 to the extent that current IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.013.04
states that "An applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each incorporated city priority
list." Otherwise Defendant denies any procedure that Plaintiff mayor may not perceive as being
correct.
9. Defendant admits the first sentence of paragraph 9. Defendant denies the
argumentative characterization of the second sentence of paragraph 9.
10. Defendant denies paragraph 10 to the extent that Plaintiff alleges he was entitled to
notice and hearing. (Affirmative Defense --- Public notice and hearings of the rulema.1dng were

ABC's RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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conducted at the time the rule was approved.) Defendant neither admits nor denies sentences 2
and 3, paragraph 10 as they are legal conclusions for which no response is required.
11. Defendant denies sentence 1, paragraph 11 to the extent that Plaintiff s
characterization that a property right analysis is unnecessary. It appears that Plaintiffs
Complaint is overly argumentative and is in fact arguing for

a property right. Defendant denies

there is any legal property right held by a mere applicant on a list of names to the extent that
paragraph 11 alleges there seems to be. To the extent that Plaintiff is making legal conclusions
as to the law, Defendant neither admits nor denies as no response is required. Defendant denies
the tinal sentence of paragraph 11.
12. Defendant denies paragraph 12. To the extent that Plaintiff is making legal
conclusions as to the law, Defendant neither admits nor denies as no response is required.

13. Defendant admits paragraph 13 to the extent that it is required by law to offer a
retail-liquor-by-the-drink license to the next applicant on the list as that name appears.
14. Defendant denies paragraph 14 in its entirety.

15. Defendant denies paragraph 15 to the extent that Plaintiff will substantially succeed
on the merits of this action. To the extent that Plaintiff is making legal conclusions as to the la w,
Defendant neither admits nor denies as no response is required.

III. DECLARATORY RELIEF (paragraphs 16-20)
16. Defendant reincorporates its answers in full from above, to Plaintiff's paragraphs
lthrough 15.
17. Defendant denies paragraph 17 to the extent that the July 24, 2009, letter to Plaintiff
constituted a final agency action.

ABC's RESPONSE TO COMPLArNT FOR DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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18. Defendant denies paragraph 18.

19. Defendant denies paragraph 19.
20. Defendant denies paragraph 20.

IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (paragraphs 21-23)
21. Defendant reincorporates its answers in full from above to Plaintiff's paragraphs
1through 20.
22. Defendant denies paragraph 22.
23. Defendant denies paragraph 23 to the extent Plaintiff appears to be making a prayer
for relief instead of asserting disputable facts or law.

V. VIOLATION Ol? DUE PROCESS (paragraphs 24-25)
24. Defendant reincorporates its answers in full from above to Plaintiff's paragraphs

1through 23.
25. Defendant denies paragraph 25.

VI. ATTORNEY FEES
26. Defendant denies that attorney fees should be awarded in this action.

II. DEFENDANT'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
27. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
28. Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief because Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law through the administrative process, without the requirement of the injunctive relief sought;
29. Plaintiffhas failed to exhaust its administrative remedies;
30. This court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims;
31. At all times, relevant to this cause, Defendant's actions were reasonable and proper
under the laws of the United States and the state of Idaho;
ABC's RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
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31. At all times relevant to this cause, Defendants' actions were reasonable and proper
under the laws of the United States and the State of Idaho;
32. Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive or equitable relief to the extent that they have not
suffered, and will not suffer, irreparable harm or injury;
34. Retroactive application of a rule clarifying procedure is allowable against the
Plaintiffs application, when no privileges have yet been granted by the agency;
35. No contract rights exist between the agency and the applicant;
36. Plaintiff's claim is barred by unclean hands;
37. Plaintiffs claim is barred by waiver, estoppel or laches;
38. Venue is improper;
39. Defendant incorporates by reference any additional affirmative defenses that
may be uncovered or made known during the investigation and discovery in this case, as well
as those now made or those that might be added by amendment by any other defendant.
Defendant specitically reserves the right to amend this answer to include any such affirmative
defenses.
IV. DEFENDANT'S PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows:
1. That the Court deny Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
2. That Defendant has been required to retain the services of the Office of the Attorney
General for the State of Idaho to defend them in this action and that Defendant should be
awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12~ 117 and
other applicable Idaho laws; and
3. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
ABC's RESPONSE TO COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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CHERYL ~EADE
Deputy Attorney General
Counsel for Defendants

CERTIfICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ABC's RESPONSE TO
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF was served on the
following on this

_Ji)_ day of September 2009 by the following method:

Brian Donelsey
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box419
Boise, ID 83701-0419

Lt. Robert Clements
Bureau Manger
Alcohol Beverage Control
P. O. Box 700
Meridian, Idaho 83680-0700
(208) 884-7060

LJ

U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
I~ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid
LJ Federal Express
LJ Hand Delivery
LJ Facsimile
~j Electronic Mail

U U.S. First Class Mail, Postage Prepaid
L_] U.S, Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid

U

Federal Express

b-'.:l Hand Delivery

r~ Facsimile
[_] Electronic Mail
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATIORNEY GENERAL
CHERYL E. MEADE

Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Dr.
Meridian. 10 83642
Telephone: (208) 884-7050
Fax No. (208) 884-7228
Cheryl.meade@isp.idaho.gov
Attorneys for DefendantlRespondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

DANIEL S. FUCHS,

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT
OF IDAHO STATE POLICE, Bureau of
Alcohol Beverage Control,

Defendant.

)
)
)

Case No. CV 09-4185

)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ANDSTIPULATIONTO
CONSOLIDATE CASES

)

)
)
)

Defendant, by and through its attorney of record, Cheryl E. Meade, Deputy Attorney
General, and hereby objects to Plaintiffs Motion for Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction. These objections are based upon the grounds and reasons set forth herein, and those
reasons found in ABC's previous Response to Plaintiff's Petition for Judicial Review. See also
Affidavit of Robert Clements, attached to Defendant's ("ABC") previous Response in Twin Falls
County Court Case Number, CV-09-3914.

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1

1. FACTS.
The facts relevant to the law that applies to this case appear to be undisputed and are set
forth in full in ABC's Response to Fuch's Petition for Judicial Review, Civil Case Number,
CV2009-3914 and are incorporated in full herein.
II. ANALYSIS.

"[T]he selling of intoxicating liquor is a proper subject for control and regulation under
the police power. It is likewise universally accepted that no one has an inherent or constitutional
right to engage in a business of selling or dealing in intoxicating liquors. (citations omitted)."

Crazy Horse, 98 Idaho 762, 764-765,572 P.2d 864,867-868 (1977), citing Gartlandv. Talbott,
72 Idaho 125, 131, 237 P .2d 1067 (1951). A liquor license does not create a contract between
the state and the licensee; it is permission only, subject at all times to the control of the state, and
may be revoked and terminated without the state in any way being obligated to the licensee for
any damages that may result by reason of the state's action. In other words, a person has no
vested right to sell liquor and a liquor license confers no property right when the state acts to
annul or set aside such license. The mere fact that the person holds a liquor license does not vest
him with any property right that would entitle him to any damages by reason of the revocation or
cancellation of such license. Nims v. Gilmore, 171daho 609,107 P. 79, 81(1910). See also,

O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 44, 202 P.2d 401, 405 (1949) (a license to operate a
beer parlor does not confer any vested property right, yet if the city makes such businesses
lawful by a permit or license, it cannot arbitrarily, capriciously, or llilIeasonably impair, interfere
with, or eradicate the same); State v. Meyers, 85 Idaho 129,376 P.2d 710, 711-712 (1962) (a
license to sell beer is a privilege, not a property right, which the legislature may grant or
withhold at its pleasure and according to standards and requisites laid down by the legislature);

Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 379 P.2d 792 (1963), citing Nampa Lodge No. 1389, etc. v.

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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Smylie, 71 Idaho 212, 229 P .2d 991 (1961 ) (as between the State and the licensee, a liquor
license is simply a grant or permission under governmental authority to the licensee to engage in
the business of selling liquor; such a license is a temporary permit to do that which would
otherwise be unlawful; it is a privilege rather than a natural right and is personal to the licensee;
it is neither a right of property nor a contract, or a contract right).
Under Idaho law, the legislature has vested the Director of the Idaho State Police
("Director") with the authority to regulate liquor licensing and promulgate rules under the
Director's supervision for the supervision and control of the sale of liquor by persons licensed to
do so. Idaho Code § 23-901. The Director has delegated his authority to the Alcohol Beverage
Control Bureau ofthe Idaho State Police ("ABC"). Therefore, all applications and inquiries
concerning alcoholic beverage licenses must be directed to the Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau
at P.O. Box 700, Meridian, Idaho 83680. IDAPA 11.05.01.011.02.
The Idaho legislature established a quota system for issuance of incorporated city
liquor licenses. "No license shall be issued for the sale of liquor on any premises outside the
incorporated limits of any city except as provided in this chapter and the number of licenses so
issued for any city shall not exceed one (1) license for each one thousand five hundred
(1,500) of population of said city or fraction thereof... "

I.e. § 23-903.

Only Fuchs' mere

applications are at issue in this case, as no licenses have been approved for him for these
applications.
The Idaho legislature obviously anticipated that there would be no rights associated
with a retail-liquor-by-the drink-license because it further provided that "The director of the
Idaho State police is hereby empowered, authorized, and directed to issue licenses to qualified
applicants ... but only in accordance with the rules promulgated by the director ... " LC. §23-903.

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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As for entry of a preliminary injunction, the standard for such remedy is established by
Rule 65(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
A preliminary injunction may be granted in the following cases:
(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance
of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury to the
plaintiff.
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is
about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiffs
rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
(4) When it appears, by affidavit, that the defendant during the pendency of the action,
threatens, or is about to remove, or to dispose of the defendant's property with intent to
defraud the plaintiff, an injunction order may be granted to restrain the removal or
disposition.
Under paragraph (5) of Rule 64(e), a preliminary injunction may also be granted on the
motion of the defendant upon filing a counterclaim, praying for affirmative relief upon any of
the grounds mentioned above in this section, subject to the same rules and provisions provided
for the issuance of injunctions on behalf ofthe plaintiff.
As the Court will determine from the limited agency record before it, Plaintiff is not
entitled to the reliefhe seeks, i.e. the reinstatement of his position on a priority list. Furthermore,
he will not suffer the irreparable injury.
On the one hand, Fuchs has been refunded the portion ofthe application fee he
submitted to be placed on the priority list(s), so he has not lost those funds. Any further claim by
Fuchs' of irreparable loss is without merit. The additional losses Fuchs alludes to are too
tenuous. One must assume that Fuchs would even qualify to hold the additional licenses he
seeks; that he would find suitable premises for the 15 plus additional licenses; that he would also
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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implement the use of each of those licenses in accordance with all liquor laws; that he would no.t
succumb to any future penalty of suspension or revocation against any of those licenses; and all
for a period of two years before he could realize any potential earnings on his investment.
Fuchs argument that he is the holder of a threatened legal right to a place on a list,
through a mere application is without merit. Idaho's courts have continually held that a liquor
licensee has no property right in liquor licenses as between the licensee and the state. This
appears to beg the question then, if a liquor licensee has no property right, surely an applicant
has even less standing in this area oflaw. See, Nims v. Gilmore, 17 Idaho 609, 107 P. 79,
81(1910); O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 44,202 P.2d 401,405 (1949); State v.

Meyers, 85 Idaho 129,376 P.2d 710, 711-712 (1962); Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 379 P.2d
792 (1963), citing Nampa Lodge No. 1389, etc. v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212,229 P.2d 991 (1961).
Finally, the limited record before this Court clearly indicates that no issue of fraud
exists on the part of ABC. The IDAPA rule in question was manifestly promulgated and
approved, according to the laws of the State ofIdaho. See, Agency Record 21, copy ofthe Twin
Falls Times News Publication, publishing the Notice of Rulemaking. Attached and incorporated
herein. While Idaho does not appear to have any case law on point on the retroactive application
of an administrative rule, there is case law that speaks to the retroactive application of a statute in
such a manner.
Accordingly, Idaho courts have consistently ruled that "a statute that is procedural or
remedial and does not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy contractual or vested rights is
generally held not to be a retroactive statute, even though it was enacted a subsequent to the
events to which it operates." See, Wheeler v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207
P. 3d 988,993 (Idaho 2009).
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Idaho further follows the legal principle that administrative rules and regulations are
traditionally afforded the same effect of law as statutes. See, Huyett v. Idaho State University,
140 Idaho 904, 908, 104 P. 3d 946,950 (Idaho 2004).
Had Fuchs disagreed with the rule as it was written, he had plenty of opportunity either
by himself, or through his counsel to object or to seek and amendment to the rule at the time.
According to the testimony presented by the agency before the legislature, at the time the rule
was under consideration, the rule was being passed in order to deal with an overcrowding on the
priority lists by investors and speculators who were not properly placing these licenses into the
use intended by the legislature.

III. STIPULATION TO CONSOLIDATE CASES.
ABC hereby stipulates to consolidate the two cases, CV-09-3914 and CV-09-4185.

IV. UNAVAILABLE DATES FOR COUNSEL ..
Unavailable dates tor counsel for hearing are as foHows:
September 17-24,2009.
October 12-31,2009.
Counsel respectfully requests that she be allowed to appear telephonically for this
hearing.

V. CONCLUSION.
Fuchs cannot substantially prevail on the merits of this action because he has no
property right to a place on a priority list. ABC substantially complied with an IDAP A
procedural rule stating that an applicant shall hold only one position at a time on each
incorporated city priority list. If this Court were to rule in such a manner, the clear intent of the

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
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Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs Motion for
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this

_+I-=i_)__ day of September 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

day of September 2009, 1 caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RESTRAINlNG ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION by the U.S.
Mail, first-class postage as follows to:

Brian Donesley, Esq.
Attorney at Law
548 North Avenue H
PO Box 419
Boise, ID 83701-0419

U.S. Mail
_Hand Delivery
_Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
_Overnight Mail
_Facsimile: (208) 386-9428
Statehouse Mail
)lElectronic Delivery

AD

Deputy Attorney General

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 7

~.

•

\. ."

I

Idaho Newspaper Association Inc.
PMB 203 5120 W. Overland Rd. Boise. 83704

PH 208 375-0733

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Affidavit of Publication
STATE OF IDAHO)
COUNTY OF ADA)

Bob C. Hall, being tirst duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is the Executive Director and the principal clerk of the
Idaho Newspaper Associatiol} Inc., an Idaho corporation, and that, he is the duly authorized agr.nt and repre~en ta tive
of each of the newspapers hereinafter referred to and that he has completed the following publication assigl1n:1ent:
That upon the direction of the Ofiice of Administrative Rules, Department of Administration of the State of Idaho,
he caused the advertisement(s), copies of which are hereto attached and made partofthis affidavit, to be placed during
the weeks beginning .--Mond~Y...Q~tober 2.1.___._ 2006 in each newspaper on the attached list which is also a part
of this affidavit;
That all listed publications were in the format and readable appearance as shown by the attached sample advertisement
. and that all publications meet all requirements of Idaho Code and of the contract between Idaho Ne\vspaper
Association Inc. and the OtTtce of Administrative Rules, Department of Administration, State of Idaho.

Signed:

Bob . Hall, Principal Clerk
Idaho Newspaper Association Inc.

Subscribed and sworn to before me thi s _...

~~._ __day Of_._~_, 2006.

pers Used &Ad Space 0
Summary List of
For October 2006 Notice of Idaho Administrative Rules
City

NEWSPAPER NAME

COUNTY(S)
COVERED
AmericanFalis Power County Press
Power
Arco
Arco Advertiser
Butte
Bonners Ferry Bonners Ferry Herald
Boundary
Custer
Challis
Challis Messenger
Council
Council Record
Adams
Driggs
Teton Valley News
TElton
Emmett
Messenger-Index
Gem
Gooding
Camas, Gooding
Gooding Co.Leader
Grangeville
Idaho CO.FreePress
Idaho
Homedale
Owyhee Avalanche
Owyhee
Idaho City
Idaho World
Boise
Jerome
North Side News
Jerome
Ketchum
Blaine
Mountain Express
Malad
Oneida
Idaho Enterprise
McCall
C.ldaho Star/News
Valley
Montpelier
News-Examiner
Bear lake
Mt. Home
Mountain Home News
Elmore
Nez Perce
Clearwater Progress
Lewis
Orofino
Clearwater
ClearwaterTribune
Payette
Independent-Enterprise Payette
Preston
Franklin
The Citizen
Rexburg
Madison
Standard Journal
St. Anthony
Fremont Chronicle
Fremont
Rigby
Jefferson
Jefferson Star
Rupert
Minidoka County News Minidoka
Sf. Maries
Gazette/Record
Benewah
Salmon
The Recorder-Herald
Lemhi
Shoshone
Lincoln Co. Journal
Uncoln
SodaSprings Caribou County Sun
Caribou
Weiser
Weiser Signal-American Washington
Boise
The Idaho Statesman
Ada
Burley
South Idaho Press
Cassia
CoeurdAlene Coeur D'Alene Press
Kootenai
Idaho Falls
Post-Register
Bonneville, Clark
Kellogg
Shoshone News/Press Shoshone
lewiston
Lewiston Tribune
Nez Perce
Moscow
Daily News
latah
Nampa
The Press-Tribune
Canyon
Pocatello
Idaho State Journal
Bannock
Sandpoint
Sandpoint Daily Bee
Bonner
Twin Falls
The Times-News
Twin Falls
Blackfoot
The Morning News
Bingham

Ad Size

157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5
157.5

Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col-Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches
Col. Inches

State of Idaho
Department of Administration
Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator
C.L. "BUTCH" OTTER
Governor
MIKE GWARTNEY
Director
DENNIS STEVENSON
Rules Coordinator

650 West State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, lD 83720·0306
Telephone (208) 332·! 820
FAX (208) 332·1896
http://adtn.idaho.gov/adminrules/

CERTIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

SS.

County of Ada )
DENNIS R. STEVENSON, being tirst duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the Administrative Rules Coordinator for the State of Idaho in the Department
of Administration and he is the official custodian of the administrative rules of the State of Idaho,
and that to the best of his knowledge, the attachments hereto are true and correct copies of the
Affidavit of Publication and the Surmnary List of Newspapers Used and Ad Space Ordered for
October 2006 Notice of Administrative Rules as received from the Idaho Newspaper Association
Inc., and as published pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code.

/
.s R. Stevenson,
Administrative Rules Coordinator
Office of the Administrative Rules Coordinator
Department of Administration
State of Idaho

Subscribed and sworn before me on t is 10th day of September, 2009.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at Boise, Idaho
Expires:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
)
)
Petitioner/Appellant,
)
)
)
vs
)
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
)
IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF
)
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL,
)
)
______~R=e~sp~o=n=d=en=t.~______________)
DANIEL FUCHS,
)
)
)
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
)
IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF
)
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL,
)
______~D~e=fu=n=d=an=V~R=e=sp=o=n=de=n=t._________)

DANIEL S. FUCHS,

SUPREME COURT 37652-2010
DISTRICT COURT NO. CV 09-4185
CV 09-3914

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk ofthe District Court ofthe Fifth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that the foregoing
CLERK'S RECORD on Appeal in this cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a
hue, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28.
I do further certify that there are no exhibits, offered or admitted in the aboveentitled cause.
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 20 th day of
May, 2010.
KRISTINA GLASCOCK
Cle

ct=urtU

eputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
)
)
Petitioner!AppelI~t,
)
)
vs
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
)
)
IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL,
)
)
______~R=e~sp~o=n=de=n=t.________________)
DANIEL FUCHS,
)
)
)
Plaintiff!Appell~t,
)
vs.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
)
IDAHO STATE POLICE, BUREAU OF
)
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL,
)
)
______~D~e=fu=n=d=~=UR==e=sp=o=nd=e=n=t._________)

DANIEL S. FUCHS,

SUPREME COURT 37652-2010
DISTRICT COURT NO. CV 09-4185
CV 09-3914

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of
the State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the
Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

Certificate of Service

1

BRIAN DONES LEY
Attorney at Law
548 North Avenue H
P. O. Box 419
Boise, ID 83701-0419

CHERYL MEADE
Deputy Attorney General
Idaho State Police
700 S. Stratford Dr.
Meridian, ID 83642

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said this
dfp~th day of May, 2010.

KRISTINA GLASCOCK

Certificate of Service

2

